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Abstract 
 
Fiji became independent in 1970, and functioned for 17 years under a constitution with 
democratic elements, including elections. Three times since 1987, however, armed force has 
overthrown constitutionally elected governments. Some observers see this as a failure of  
the consolidation of  Fijian democracy, while others acknowledge the façade of  Fijian 
democracy. Among those who acknowledge Fiji’s authoritarian institutions, conflict persists 
as to whether authoritarianism is the inevitable product of  ethnic conflict in Fijian society, 
or a consequence of  post-colonial institutional legacies. No movement toward democracy 
in Fiji is likely to succeed until we understand the material foundations underlying Fiji’s 
authoritarian politics. 
 
This thesis argues that Fiji’s authoritarian political institutions, established under colonial 
rule, have been sustained since independence by forces in the international economy. These 
forces have helped to maintain the economic, social and political dominance of  a Pacific-
Fijian chiefly elite over Fijian society. Specially, chiefly control of  the sugar industry, Fiji’s 
principal export, has provided chiefs with sufficient patronage resources to retain their 
control over Fijian society through electoral politics or, at the event of  undesirable electoral 
outcomes, through armed opposition. Through post-colonial structures, the chiefs control 
the land-tenure system, and through their setting and receipt of  land rents, they have been 
the principal beneficiaries of  Fiji’s sugar exports. This comparatively inefficient industry, 
and the social and political institutions that it rests on, have survived because Fiji, as party 
to the European Union’s Sugar Protocol, has received two-and-a-half  to three times the 
world market price for its sugar exports between 1975 and 2009. 
 
This thesis makes its case through close textual analysis of  Fiji’s three constitutions, 
detailed inspection of  Fiji’s land-tenure system, and, specifically, the accounts of  the Native 
Land Trust Board, as well as examination of  the secondary literature on Fiji’s sugar 
industry.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
Fiji’s experience with democracy has been troubled. Elected government arrived in Fiji in 
with its independence from Britain in 1970. Initially its constitutional design seemed 
democratic. Since that time, however, elected government has been deposed by armed 
force three times – in 1987, 2000 and 2006. To some observers this demonstrates that Fiji’s 
democracy failed to consolidate. Each overthrow of  government has come when an elected 
government threatened to disrupt the traditional authorities’ control of  the economy and 
society. In the face of  that threat traditional authorities have used extra constitutional 
means to replace elected government, with an alternative aligned with their interests. The 
unwillingness of  traditional authorities to permit a transition of  government since 
independence poses the question as to whether Fiji ever was a democracy. 
 
Some observers acknowledge that Fiji was never democratic, offering contending 
explanations for the persistence of  traditional authoritarian rule. Analysts close to 
traditional Fijian elites explain the persistence of  authoritarian behaviour a necessary to 
maintain order in a society riven by ethnic conflict. Critics of  Fiji’s traditional social 
hierarchy see this relationship reversed, that is, chiefly elites aggravate ethnic divisions to 
maintain their position at the top of  Fijian society and politics. Both sides, however, cannot 
explain why ethnic divisions and social hierarchy have persistently prevented 
democratisation in Fiji, when they have not necessarily done so elsewhere. In other former 
British colonies, entrenched social hierarchies and ethnic divisions have not prevented 
democratic government, including alternations in power. Why has Fiji been unable to 
manage ethnic conflict and transcend traditional hierarchy? 
 
This thesis contends that the persistence of  authoritarianism in Fiji has other roots. A 
traditional elite of  Pacific-Fijian chiefs has maintained its place in Fiji’s social order through 
its control of  the critical factor of  production, land. Land is crucial to Fiji’s two largest 
industries, tourism and sugar. Control of  these resources provides chiefs with extensive 
resources of  patronage, to hold their place in society.  
 
This thesis focuses on the role of  sugar in this process, although developments in the 
tourist industry are similar.  
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The sugar industry links Fiji to the world economy. The Fijian sugar industry, however, has 
been able to avoid the competitive pressures of  world markets. As a party to the European 
Union’s (EU) Sugar Protocol and a recipient of  EU sugar subsidies, Fijian sugar producers 
receive two-and-a-half  to three times world market prices for their sugar. These subsidies 
permit chiefs to inflate lease rents. Inflated rents provide chiefs the material means to 
maintain patronage networks and their control of  Fijian society and politics.   
 
The remainder of  this thesis proceeds in five chapters. The second chapter examines and 
places the argument of  this thesis in the context of  existing explanations of  Fiji’s political 
development after independence. It critically examines assertions that Fiji possesses 
democratic institutions that have failed to consolidate. It also refutes arguments that claim 
authoritarianism is a necessary response to ethnic conflict in Fiji. It examines arguments 
about the persistence of  Fiji’s social oligarchy. Where these arguments simply assert the 
persistence of  colonial institutions after independence – without an explanation for why 
this should be – this thesis holds that their persistence reflects Fiji’s position in the 
international economic order. This chapter also introduces the framework for investigation 
of  the thesis and addresses the constraints under which the research was undertaken. 
 
The third chapter introduces the contending constitutional and traditional structures of  
political authority. It outlines the provisions for elected legislative and executive power in 
the 1970, 1990 and 1997 Constitutions. It also demonstrates how each of  those 
constitutions reserved decision-making authority on critical issue areas, specifically land 
tenure, for unelected representatives of  the chiefly social hierarchy. Finally it delineates the 
structure of  land tenure and sugar production, as well as how these serve to maintain 
chiefly control of  Fijian society and politics. 
 
Chapters Four and Five test the thesis’ hypotheses. Chapter Four examines motivations of  
political actors in the 1977 and 1987 general elections, and the chiefs’ responses to a 
possible change in government. In 1977, the chiefs were at best ambivalent about the 
constitution, yet found constitutional means to prevent a transition in government. In 
1987, chiefs simply dismissed the constitution and overthrew an elected government.  
 
Chapter Five examines the 1999 general election, the coups that followed in its wake, and 
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their aftermath. Once again, an election brought a change in government away from 
chiefly-backed parties. This chapter illustrates the involvement of  high chiefs in the May 
2000 overthrow. 
 
The concluding chapter reflects on the why chiefs were unwilling to surrender political 
authority to elected government. It also contemplates the growing divisions amongst chiefs, 
as became increasingly evident after the promulgation of  the 1990 Constitution. The 
divisions amongst the Pacific-Fijian chiefly elites have made it impossible for this elite to 
maintain their authority in Fijian society and politics. Finally, the conclusion considers the 
coup of  December 2006 in the context of  the erosion of  solidarity amongst Pacific-Fijian 
elites, and reflects on the thesis’ implications for cases akin to Fiji. 
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Chapter Two: Democratisation, Ethnic Conflict and the International 
Political Economy: Interdependence of Domestic Structures in the 
International Context 
 
 
Accounts of  Fiji’s political development since independence have been dominated by two 
partially conflicting categories of  explanation. Many observers suggest that Fiji has been 
moving toward democratic consolidation on a path interrupted by unfortunate 
circumstances. Others suggest that the sources of  Fiji’s democratic failings are home 
grown, rising out of  divisions within Fijian society.1 There are good reasons, however, to 
question whether since independence Fiji has ever been on the road to democratic 
consolidation or whether the forces restricting democratic development in Fiji are 
primarily, or even purely, domestic. 
 
The argument of  this thesis turns extant explanations of  the causes of  Fiji’s troubled 
experience with democracy on their head. First, it argues Fiji has never been moving 
toward democratic consolidation. An authoritarian political-economic structure was 
established prior to independence and has maintained itself  since. Second, neither ethnic 
nor class divisions in Fijian society are cause of  the failure of  Fiji’s democratic institutions 
to consolidate. Rather, consolidation of  these institutions was never permissible, as Fiji’s 
political system has always been authoritarian, despite the presence of  electoral institutions 
that have made it appear democratic. Finally, it is Fiji’s place in the world economy that 
permits the maintenance of  Fiji’s illiberal institutional structures, which in turn permit the 
repetition of  authoritarian behaviour. 
 
This chapter develops this argument in three sections. First, it considers arguments that see 
Fijian history as one of  ‘interrupted’ or ‘unconsolidated’ democratic development. Second, 
it considers arguments that hold divisions in Fijian society – ethnic and socio-economic – 
responsible for Fiji’s democratic failings. Finally, it demonstrates how Fiji’s experience fits 
into a wider literature that relates internal political developments to a society’s position in 
the international economy. It examines classic theoretical approaches that explain sources 
of  crisis within domestic politics, and the centre of  this conflict in relation to the political 
systems it operates within.   
                                                
1 I use this term to refer to any peoples living in Fiji, or holding citizenship of  Fiji. 
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Fiji: democracy of  authoritarian? 
  
Extant explanations diagnose the failings of  Fiji’s democracy by focusing exclusively on the 
phenomena that have interrupted its democratic consolidation.2 In doing this they have 
failed to capture the post-colonial reality of  Fiji’s political system. These explanations have 
examined the anti-democratic social forces that have caused the interruption of  democratic 
rule, which are presented as ethnic and socio-economic tensions. In doing so, they have 
depended on an assumption that Fiji’s post-colonial institutions were democratic at the 
outset. Therefore, Fiji’s constitutional provisions must be examined to determine whether 
democracy ever existed.  
 
To assess whether Fiji ever was a democracy, a suitable definition is needed. The literature 
on democracy and the character of  democratic institutions is vast and varied,3 however, 
Schumpeter provides a useful definition as a minimal standard of  democracy. Schumpeter 
outlines a clear definition of  the democratic process, as “that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of  
a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”4 This definition encompasses two elements: 
the presence of  a competitive struggle for power in elections, and that the competitive 
process determines the composition of  decision-making institutions that are not interfered 
with in their implementation of  policy. Building further on this, Przeworski defines 
democracy as a system in which “Outcomes…are uncertain, indeterminate ex ante; and it is 
‘the people,’ and political forces competing to promote their interests and values, who 
determine what these outcomes will be.”5 This definition comprises the necessity of  the 
presence of  contestation and uncertainty in the electoral system, and the ability of  elected 
office holders to translate their policy, uninhibited, to reform. 
 
                                                
2 Przeworksi notes that even if  a democracy is established it need not be consolidated. Rather a democracy is 
consolidated when most conflicts are processed through democratic institutions, when nobody can 
control the outcomes ex post and the results are not predetermined ex ante, they matter within some 
predictable limits, and they evoke the compliance of  relevant political forces. Adam Przeworksi, Democracy 
and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, ed. Jon Elster and Michael 
S. McPherson, Studies in Rationality and Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
p. 51. 
3 David Collier and Stephen Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative 
Research," World Politics 49, no. 3 (1997). 
4 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd ed. (New York and London: Harper & 
Brothers Publishers, 1942), p. 269. 
5 Przeworksi, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, p. 10. 
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Fiji fails to meet Schumpeter and Przeworski’s minimum standards of  democratic political 
institutions. Sovereignty is embedded in decision-making institutions, only some of  which 
are electorally accountable. Although electoral processes determine the composition of  the 
lower house of  the legislature, the upper house is unelected. But most importantly, those 
Senators nominated by an unelected authority, the Council of  Chiefs,6 hold an effective 
veto over any reform of  the land-tenure system. This means that critical features of  the 
Fijian economy, land tenure and the distribution of  rents, have been removed from the 
purview of  democratic decision-making, and preserved for a chiefly elite. Decision-making 
across these policy arenas is not, and never has been, democratically accountable. In failing 
Schumpeter and Przeworski’s minimal definitions of  democratic government, Fiji fails the 
test in all classic definitions of  democratisation literature.7 
 
Some arguments hold that, but for the lack of  a set of  particular electoral institutions, 
Fijian democracy would be successful. These scholars argue that merely the application of  
the most appropriate electoral system is sufficient to provide democratic consolidation.8 
These debates, however, overlook the authoritarian reality embedded in each of  Fiji’s three 
constitutions, and, therefore, fail to diagnose the underlying problem of  Fijian democracy.  
 
Since the 1987 coup and the 1990 constitutional reform, rigorous academic debate has 
focused on Fiji as a test tube for the effectiveness of  differing electoral systems in 
providing sustainable democratic outcomes. The aim of  this debate is to provide electoral 
stability by maximising the legitimacy of  electoral institutions, while ensuring outcomes are 
still proportionate to the ethnic demographics of  the population. Electoral constituencies 
have been gerrymandered and electoral mechanisms tailored to provide these outcomes.  
 
Reflecting on the Fiji’s 1999 and 2001 election results and the intervening putsch, Horowitz 
debated with Fraenkel and Grofman the virtues of  the electoral systems in providing 
stability and legitimacy to electoral outcomes.9 Horowitz advocated the use of  an 
                                                
6 Although colloquially known as the ‘Great Council of  Cheifs’ its formal title is simply the ‘Council of  
Chiefs’. I will use the formal title. Bose Levu Vakaturaga is the formal Pacific-Fijian title.  
7 Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1970), p. 78.; ———, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1971), pp. 150-62.; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of  Politics, Expanded and 
Updated edition ed. (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins Universtiy Press, 1981), p. 27.; Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Oklahoma: University of  Oklahoma 
Press, 1993), pp. 5-11. 
8 Rein Taagepera, "How Electoral Systems Matter for Democratization," Democratization 5, no. 3 (1998). 
9 Two exchanges have been published. The first in Public Choice 121, December 2004, the second in 
 16 
alternative vote electoral system because, even under adverse social conditions, he argued 
that they provided moderate electoral results that facilitate cross-ethnic cooperation.10 
Fraenkel and Grofman contest the success of  alternative vote, citing its record in Fiji 
where, electoral results have skewed margins of  victory, undermining the legitimacy of  
electoral institutions in the eyes of  the populous. They promote instead the adoption of  a 
proportional representation electoral system.11  
 
Despite different electoral systems under all three constitutions, the mitigation of  ethnic 
antagonism is not the principal cause of  Fiji’s failed democracy. At each re-design, the 
electoral system has only ever elected the lower house of  the legislature, whilst the upper 
house has remained appointed by political elites. Importantly the Council of  Chiefs’ 
appointees to the Senate have veto over specified legislation, limiting the influence of  
elected political actors to reform legislation. The veto power given to an unelected 
institution’s nominees in the Senate undermines Fiji’s democratic status. At best what these 
proponents of  electoral engineering see in Fiji is an illiberal democracy.12 In light of  the 
control this authoritarian institution possesses over the land-tenure system, which is the 
most pivotal feature of  Fiji’s economy, the academic debates over electoral reform argue 
past the Fiji’s post-colonial reality.  
 
Explanations for authoritarianism in Fiji 
 
Two types of  explanation – one based on the role of  ethnic divisions and the other based 
on socio-economic hierarchy – ignore debate about democratic consolidation to focus on 
the authoritarian nature of  the Fijian polity. Both categories of  explanation offer insight 
                                                                                                                                          
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 39, No. 5, June 2006. 
10 Donald L. Horowitz, "The Alternative Vote and Interethnic Moderation: A Reply to Fraenkel and 
Grofman," Public Choice 121 (2004).; ———, "Strategy Takes a Holiday: Fraenkel and Grofman on the 
Alternative Vote," Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 5 (2006).; ———, "Encouraging Electoral 
Accommodation in Divided Societies," in Electoral Systems in Divided Societies: The Fiji Constitution Review, ed. 
Brij V. Lal and P. Larmour (Canberra: The Australian National University Press, 1997). 
11 Jon Fraenkel and Bernard B. Grofman, "A Neo-Downsian Model of  the Alternative Vote as a Mechanism 
for Mitigating Conflict in Plural Societies," Public Choice 121 (2004).; ———, "Does the Alternative Vote 
Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies? The Case of  Fiji," Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 5 
(2006).; ———, "The Failure of  Alternative Vote as a Tool for Ethnic Moderation in Fiji: A Rejoinder to 
Horowitz," Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 5 (2006).; Jon Fraenkel, "The Alternative Vote System in Fiji: 
Electoral Engineering or Ballot-Rigging?," Journal of  Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 39, no. 1 (2001).; 
———, "The Failure of  Electoral Engineering in Fiji," Peace Initiatives 6, no. 1-3 (2000).; ———, "The 
Triumph of  Non-Idealist Intellectuals? An Investigation of  Fiji's 1999 Election Results," Australian Journal 
of  Politics and History 46, no. 1 (2000). 
12 Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of  Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (1997). 
 17 
into the dominance the chiefly elite has possessed over electoral institutions in Fiji. They 
both, however, offer incomplete explanations as to the means through which this elite has 
usurped electoral institutions. They fail to detail the role of  Fiji’s peculiar economic 
institutions and its position in the world economy in providing the chiefly elite material 
dominance over society. 
  
The distribution of  sovereignty across Fiji’s constitutional institutions, over which an 
unelected institution has held veto power, has undermined electoral institutions status as 
democratic institutions. Those who hold ethnic divisions responsible for the failure of  Fiji’s 
democracy, in detailing excuses for the overthrow of  electoral results, acknowledge the 
absence of  democracy in post-colonial Fiji. They hold that democracy is incompatible with 
Fiji’s traditional hierarchy, which holds more cultural legitimacy among Pacific-Fijians13 
than imposed Western liberal democracy. For these scholars the need to maintain tradition 
escalates this conflict. Others hold historical class differences within Fijian society 
responsible for the failure of  Fiji’s democracy. They demonstrate how chiefly elites exploit 
ethnic antagonism and utilise their material privilege to bypass undesirable electoral 
outcomes to maintain authoritarian control of  society.  
 
This section examines how these two schools of  thought have approached the problem of  
Fijian authoritarianism. First, it addresses those perspectives that hold ethnic divisions 
exacerbate political conflicts, making democratic governance untenable. Second, it 
examines the contributions of  those proponents of  class-based explanations of  the polity, 
and the relationship they draw between elite and non-elites in undermining electoral 
institutions. 
 
Ethnic divisions and the maintenance of  social hierarchy 
 
                                                
13 In referring to the two largest ethnic groupings in Fiji I use labels “Pacific-Fijians” and “Indo-Fijians”, 
which serve both to identify their current place of  residence and ethnic heritage. These labels are to ensure 
objectivity to the description of  each ethnic grouping. Commonly “Pacific-Fijians” are referred to as either 
“indigenous Fijians” or simply “Fijians”. Both of  these terms are problematic as they convey heritage and 
ownership, one in an historical sense and one in the moment. In Fiji, such a high proportion of  land (87%) is 
exclusively reserved for one ethnic group, and this is so highly politicized, ethnic labels with connotations of  
ownership are not useful. Historically “Pacific-Fijians” have referred to themselves in their tongue as 
“Taukei”. Taukei, in colonial and post-colonial Fiji is “Pacific-Fijian” for a member of  a land-owning clan. 
Pre-colonialism, where land was not ‘owned’ this term naturally extended to all “Pacific-Fijians.” I have not 
used the this term, however, as within post-colonial Fiji it brings strong associations with Pacific-Fijian 
nationalist phenomena, which have commonly labelled their causes and movements as Taukei. The 
politicisation of  this word makes it unusable whilst seeking objective analysis.  
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Most of  those who hold ethnicity as the cause of  Fiji’s failed democracy acknowledge the 
realities of  Fiji’s three constitutions, and importantly the absence of  democracy in them.14 
They argue that racial15 divisions and the paramountcy of  Pacific-Fijian traditions make 
democracy impossible and, that therefore, authoritarianism is the only way to prevent 
ongoing civil conflict. Further, they excuse the incompatibility of  democratic governance 
with the conflict between Fiji’s Pacific-Fijian and Indo-Fijian communities. They suggest 
arrangements where electoral representation can exist, but in a subordinate relationship to 
rule by chiefly elites. Bole and Ravuvu hold that authoritarianism must be entrenched 
before the anyway sovereignty can be transferred back to the populous in determining the 
governance of  Fiji. Their proposed order is backward in its understanding of  the power 
structures underlying Fiji’s polity.  
 
Proponents of  the role of  tradition in Fijian politics outright reject the viability of  an Indo-
Fijian government. They argue that Indo-Fijian controlled government is illegitimate, due 
to an apparent need for Pacific-Fijian chiefly paramountcy. In doing so, they point to the 
inevitability of  the overthrows.16 Dean and Ritova present an racially focused commentary 
justifying Rabuka’s 1987 overthrow, asserting that Fiji should be exclusively run by Pacific-
Fijians, irrespective of  whether electoral institutions provide for this or not.17 In defending 
authoritarianism, Bole argues that the rise of  modern democracies has been associated with 
instability, political conflagration and violence. He states that in the case of  Fiji, the chiefly 
system has played a vital role in minimising the impact of  destabilising contradictions 
                                                
14 Filipe N. Bole, "Fiji's Chiefly System and Its Pattern of  Political Self-Reliance," in Culture and Democracy in 
the South Pacific, ed. Ron Crocombe, et al. (Suva: Institute of  Pacific Studies, University of  the South 
Pacific, 1992).; Eddie Dean and Stan Ritova, Rabuka: No Other Way (Moorebank, New South Wales: 
Doubleday, 1988).; Asesela Ravuvu, The Facade of  Democracy: Fijian Struggles for Political Control 1830-1987 
(Suva: Reader Publishing House, 1991).; ———, "The Fijian Chiefly System and the Democratic 
Process," (Suva: Pacific Cultural Programme, 1991), ———, "Culture and Traditions: Implications for 
Modern Nation Building," in Culture and Democracy in the South Pacific, ed. Ron Crocombe, et al. (Suva: 
Institute of  Pacific Studies, University of  the South Pacific, 1992).; Deryck Scarr, Fiji: Politics of  Illusion, the 
Military Coups in Fiji (Kensington, New South Wales: New South Wales University Press, 1988). 
15 Observations of  ethnic phenomena are often characterised exclusively as racial, and observations of  socio-
economic difference are characterised exclusively as class. These labels too often over-politicise the 
demographic categorisations of  political cleavages. In place of  “race” I will use “ethnicity”. Although these 
are both social constructs, “race” has embedded in political connotations and implications, especially in the 
case of  Fiji. I have only used the term “race” where applicable in the narrowest context.  
16 Where literature excusing the overthrow of  1987 as necessity is prominent, literature arguing the same 
excusing the 2000 overthrow is rare. Clear linkages between chiefly elites and the protagonists of  the 2000 
overthrow, in the form of  legal convictions (as is discussed in chapter five), undermine arguments that 
ethnicity was solely responsible for the 2000 overthrow. As a result, there is little literature purporting these 
explanations of  the polity after the 2000 overthrow.  
Ravuvu, The Facade of  Democracy: Fijian Struggles for Political Control 1830-1987.; Dean and Ritova, Rabuka: No 
Other Way.; Bole, "Fiji's Chiefly System and Its Pattern of  Political Self-Reliance.", Scarr, Fiji: Politics of  Illusion, the 
Military Coups in Fiji  
17 Dean and Ritova, Rabuka: No Other Way.  
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embedded in these processes, providing political stability and harmony to Fiji’s institutions 
of  government.18 
 
Fiji’s ethnic communities are presented by these scholars as immutable political entities and 
they reject the viability of  any political cleavage in Fiji other than ethnicity. Ravuvu 
infamously described Fiji as a community riddled with entrenched ethnic antagonism, 
stating “[Pacific-] Fijians generally perceive Indians (Indo-Fijians) as mean, stingy, crafty 
and demanding to the extent of  being considered greedy, inconsiderate and grasping, 
uncooperative, egoistic and calculating.”19 He suggests those who seek the removal of  
ethnic politics merely do so for self-interested reasons, namely to enhance their personal 
position within their ethnic group.20 Scarr support these sentiments in refuting the raison 
d’être of  the Fijian Labour Party, labelling the Labour Party merely a front for the 
ethnically focused Indo-Fijian National Federation Party and asserting that materialist 
interpretations of  political conflict are inapplicable to the case of  Fiji.21 In proposing a 
solution to the rife ethnic conflict Ravuvu argues, that without full awareness of  
differences in Fiji’s ethnic communities and appropriate constitutional provisions 
acknowledging them, no realistic form of  democracy can be achieved in Fiji.22  
 
Inherent in these arguments is a claim that Fiji’s chiefly system is unique, and deserves a 
reserved place at the top of  Fiji’s political hierarchy. Ravuvu concludes his influential text,23 
by asserting “[Pacific-] Fijians, nevertheless, must be assured of  a degree of  political 
paramountcy if  all ethnic groups are to live together peacefully.”24 He advocated a 
democratic system in which Pacific-Fijian’s unique relationship to the state of  Fiji, as the 
indigenous ethnic grouping, would be recognised through institutional privileges.25 He 
proposes the placement of  ethnic privilege above equal contestation of  political office. 
This was illustrated in his design of  Fiji’s 1990 Constitution, with the disproportionate 
distribution of  electoral seats and gerrymandering of  electorates entrenching a Pacific-
Fijian majority in the House of  Representatives.26  
 
                                                
18 Bole, "Fiji's Chiefly System and Its Pattern of  Political Self-Reliance." 
19 Ravuvu, The Facade of  Democracy: Fijian Struggles for Political Control 1830-1987, p .57. 
20 ———, "Culture and Traditions: Implications for Modern Nation Building." 
21 Scarr, Fiji: Politics of  Illusion, the Military Coups in Fiji pp. 29-31, 35.  
22 Ravuvu, "Culture and Traditions: Implications for Modern Nation Building," p. 65. 
23 ———, The Facade of  Democracy: Fijian Struggles for Political Control 1830-1987. 
24 Ibid., p. 99. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
 20 
The origin and function of  the chiefly system is presented as the traditional social and 
political apex within the Pacific-Fijian community. From this observers contend that it is 
Fiji’s supreme political hierarchy, and must be entrenched to recognise its special position.27 
In reflecting on the 1987 coups, Bole and Ravuvu suggest that if  the chiefs are not 
constitutionally provided the position they deserve, they will eventually achieve through 
whichever means necessary.28 Bole argues that, even with the presence of  electoral 
institutions, it is inevitable that the chiefly hierarchy, as the highest social structure in Fiji, 
will reign supreme, excusing the chiefs’ overthrow of  elected government in 1987 as a 
quasi-natural social process.29 Ravuvu has even argued that the chiefly system is inherently 
democratic and egalitarian, in that it provides checks and balances on chiefs’ power. The 
‘checks and balances’ described by Ravuvu, however, posses no little democratic value.30  
 
These descriptions of  the chiefs’ dominance over Fijian society rest on an interpretation of  
the Pacific-Fijian social structure that is static, ignoring the presence of  change within these 
social hierarchies.31 These highly idealistic presentations of  the chiefly system, however, 
have not gone unchallenged. The 1959 Spate Report cited the irrelevance of  the chiefly 
hierarchy in modern Fiji as it neared independence. Spate reported that the chiefly system 
had become an end in itself, noting it was created and has been sustained merely for 
aesthetic reasons to preserve the pre-colonial traditional Pacific-Fijian way of  life.32 
Nayacakalou noted that the chiefly system entrenched in the colonial Fijian administration 
for the maintenance of  the traditional way of  life, had failed to develop into a modern 
political institution, as the colonial administration had hoped.33 The threat of  modernity to 
the legitimacy of  the chiefly system had not gone unnoticed by chiefly elites. In 1983, the 
                                                
27 Bole, "Fiji's Chiefly System and Its Pattern of  Political Self-Reliance."  
28 Ibid.; Ravuvu, "Culture and Traditions: Implications for Modern Nation Building." 
29 These comments came in the aftermath of  the 1987 coup and the rewriting of  constitution and electoral 
system, as a means of  legitimising both actions as inevitability. Bole, "Fiji's Chiefly System and Its Pattern of  
Political Self-Reliance." 
30 Unfortunately these checks on power described provide no non-violent checks on power. Rather Ravuvu 
details the killing or overthrow of  a chief  as justified if  they abuse the power granted under Pacific-Fijian 
custom. This does not align with aims of  democratic governance, the removal of  violence from the processes 
of  achieving governance. Ravuvu, "The Fijian Chiefly System and the Democratic Process." 
31 Bole, "Fiji's Chiefly System and Its Pattern of  Political Self-Reliance."; Ravuvu, The Facade of  Democracy: 
Fijian Struggles for Political Control 1830-1987.; ———, "The Fijian Chiefly System and the Democratic 
Process." This is a also a key theme of  Scarr’s academic writings about the chiefly elite in their role in 
Fijian society. Deryck Scarr, Ratu Sukuna: Soldier, Statesman, Man of  Two Worlds (London and Basingstoke: 
Macmilliam Education Limited, 1980).; ———, Fiji: A Short History (Hawaii: The Institute for Polynesian 
Studies, 1984). 
32 Spate predicted that left to its own devices, it would crumble in the modern world. O. H. K.  Spate, "The 
Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects," ed. Legislative Council of  Fiji (Suva: Colony of  Fiji 
Government Press, 1959), p. 8.  
33 Rusiate R. Nayacakalou, Leadership in Fiji (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 85, 92. 
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Council of  Chiefs appointed a review team34 to investigate the reorganisation of  the chiefly 
controlled Fijian Provincial Administration (of  which the Council of  Chiefs was the 
highest authority), to halt the decay of  its legitimacy.35   
 
The literature that focuses on ethnicity also fails to acknowledge that the chiefs’ dominance 
after independence was the product of  colonial policies. France has provided a detailed 
analysis of  the development of  colonial rule and the institutionalisation of  the chiefs’ rule 
through the land-tenure system.36 Rather than the chiefly elite possessing hierarchical 
control over Pacific-Fijians for traditional reasons, the chiefly hierarchy was, and continues 
to be, perpetuated through illiberal institutions remaining from colonial indirect rule. In 
their highly idealistic presentation of  chiefly hierarchy, proponents of  ethnic based 
explanations as the source of  conflict in Fiji, fail to report the colonial history from which 
the post-colonial chiefly elite has evolved.  
 
In their analysis of  the failing of  Fijian democracy, proponents of  ethnic antagonism hold 
that electoral governance was only ever permissible whilst it reinforced traditional 
hierarchy. They excuse authoritarianism, a necessity due to the extreme nature of  Fiji’s 
ethnic conflict. Although proponents of  ethnicity explain why electoral results were 
overturned when they provided non-chiefly-backed parties government, they fail to 
demonstrate the source of  the elites’ power, beyond weak claims of  social legitimacy and 
traditionalism.  
 
 
Historical revisionist explanations 
 
Historical revisionist writing on the failings of  Fijian democracy clearly outlines the 
presence of  an elite that has subverted electoral governance in Fiji.37 Writers in this 
                                                
34 Filipe Bole was charged with the appointment of  the review team. At that time Bole was the Director of  
the Pacific Islands Development Programme at the East-West Centre Honolulu.  
35 Rodney V. Cole, Stephen I. Levine, and Anare V. Matahau, "The Fijian Provincial Administration," 
(Honolulu: Pacific Islands Development Program, East-West Center, 1984). 
36 This is detailed in the following chapter. Peter France, The Charter of  Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
37 Simione Durutalo, "Na Lotu, Na Vanua, Na Mataintu/the Church, Tradition and the State: The 
Paramountcy of  Fijian Interest and the Polarisation of  Ethnicity," in South Pacific Forum Working Paper no. 6 
(Suva: Sociology Society, School of  Social & Economic Development, University of  the South Pacific, 
1986).; Robert Norton, Race and Politics in Fiji, 2nd ed. (St Lucia: University of  Queensland Press, 1990).; 
Robert T. Robertson and Akosita Tamanisau, Fiji: Shattered Coups (Leichhardt, New South Wales: Pluto 
Press 1988).; Stephanie Lawson, Tradition Versus Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa
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tradition argue Fiji’s intertwined power structures, are a direct result of  colonial 
administration and maintained by false consciousness. Where proponents of  ethnicity hold 
ethnic conflict and the need to maintain tradition causes authoritarianism, historical 
revisionists argue that it is authoritarian features of  Fiji’s polity that have promoted ethnic 
conflict. The maintenance of  communal politics has reinforced the position of  the chiefly 
elite that has dominated Fiji since independence.  
 
The historical revisionists’ explanations of  the polity reject the perspective that politics in 
Fiji was simply a matter of  ethnic representation. As one of  the first proponents of  a class 
interpretation of  Fiji’s political structures, Durutalo critiques Fisk’s pluralist “three Fiji’s”38 
explanations of  the polity. These revisionist arguments instead contend that multiethnic 
ideologies are used by elites to mask class rule.39 These proponents argue ethnicity has 
merely been a function of  class, stressing the politicisation of  ethnicity.40 Norton illustrates 
that it was colonial government and its socio-political and economic governance of  Fiji 
that left it partitioned along ethnic lines. These partitions gave rise to the political 
communalism of  the ethnically divided peoples in Fiji.41 Howard labels the chiefly elite an 
oligarchy, which has used and promoted communalism to undermine the threatening class 
                                                                                                                                          
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).; ———, The Failure of  Democratic Politics in Fiji (Oxford: 
Claredon Press; Oxford University Press, 1991).; Robert T. Robertson and William Sutherland, Government 
by the Gun: The Unfinished Business of  Fiji's 2000 Coup (Annaadale, New South Wales: Pluto Press, 2001).; 
William Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of  Race: An Alternative History of  Fiji to 1992, Political and Social 
Change Monograph 15 (Canberra: Department of  Political and Social Change, Research School of  Pacific 
Studies, Australian National University, 1992), William E. H. Tagupa, "The 1987 Westminster 
Constitutional Crisis in Fiji," Pacific Studies 12, no. 1 (1988).; Brij V. Lal, Power and Prejudice: The Making of  the 
Fiji Crisis (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of  International Affairs, 1988).; ———, "Rhetoric and 
Reality: The Dilemmas of  Contemporary Fijian Politics," in Culture and Democracy in the South Pacific, ed. 
Ron Crocombe, et al. (Suva: Institute of  Pacific Studies, University of  the South Pacific, 1992).; Alumita 
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and the Politics of  Development, ed. Brij V. Lal (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, Southwood Press Pty Limited, 
2000).; Jay Narayan, The Political Economy of  Fiji (Suva: South Pacific Review Press, 1984).  
38 The pluralist interpretation of  the polity has been used contextually by many academic writers in their 
description of  the development of  Fijian politics. This clean interpretation of  natural forming cleavages 
within the polity breaks Fiji into the seemingly natural categorisations of  Pacific-Fijians, Indo-Fijians and 
Europeans, through which British colonial administration chose to govern Fiji. A pluralist interpretation of  
the polity, although apt in a description of  how politics has played out through electoral mediums, fails to 
address the formation of  these political groups and the roots underpinning their division. E. H. Fisk, The 
Political Economy of  Independent Fiji (Wellington and Auckland: A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1970).; Durutalo, "Na Lotu, 
Na Vanua, Na Mataintu/the Church, Tradition and the State: The Paramountcy of  Fijian Interest and the 
Polarisation of  Ethnicity." 
39 Robertson and Sutherland, Government by the Gun: The Unfinished Business of  Fiji's 2000 Coup.; Tagupa, "The 
1987 Westminster Constitutional Crisis in Fiji."; Tim Bayliss-Smith et al., Islands, Islanders and the World: The 
Colonial and Post-Colonial of  Eastern Fiji, Cambridge Human Geography (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988). 
40 Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of  Race: An Alternative History of  Fiji to 1992.; Tagupa, "The 1987 Westminster 
Constitutional Crisis in Fiji." 
41 Durutalo, "Na Lotu, Na Vanua, Na Mataintu/the Church, Tradition and the State: The Paramountcy of  
Fijian Interest and the Polarisation of  Ethnicity." 
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cohesion from below, through policies of  divide and rule.42 Ethnic identities have been 
exploited by elites for their own political needs, as the maintenance of  an ethnic 
consciousness has sustained communal politics and chiefly elites’ control of  government.43 
The Council of  Chiefs has positioned itself  as the dominant link and actor between the 
principal chiefs in national politics and the Fijian population, and as the suppressor of  
Fijian democracy.44 
 
These historical revisionists refute claims of  the traditional status of  the Council of  Chiefs 
as an institution of  social importance and Pacific-Fijian tradition. Norton identifies links 
between colonial political institutions and ‘modern’ chiefly elites as well the elite’s use of  
their hierarchy to subvert political outcomes.45 The Council of  Chiefs and the Pacific-Fijian 
‘traditional’ social order rests on colonially infrastructure, which colonial authorities 
established and through which they channelled political patronage to facilitate colonial their 
rule.46 Further, the Council of  Chiefs itself  did not exist until Governor Gordon set it up 
for colonial purposes in 1875 as a cheap and effective means of  ruling Fiji.47  
 
Among historical revisionists, debate rages as to the composition of  the elite who usurped 
government in 1987. Predominantly this has focused on the centrality of  Council of  Chiefs 
as the apex of  Pacific-Fijian social hierarchy and political chiefly authority.48 Whilst others 
suggest a coalition of  foreign and Indo-Fijian business interests backed the chiefs’ in their 
overthrow of  government.49 Little substantive evidence has been presented affirming the 
involvement of  big business in the 1987 coup, whereas vast evidence exists demonstrating 
the roles of  high chiefs in the coup. 
 
                                                
42 Michael C. Howard, Fiji: Race and Politics in an Island State (Vancouver: University of  British Columbia Press, 
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43 Durutalo, "Na Lotu, Na Vanua, Na Mataintu/the Church, Tradition and the State: The Paramountcy of  
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The visible conflicts within the post-1987 coup interim government between chiefs, 
demonstrated the coup of  1987 was not undertaken for the noble causes its protagonists 
claimed.50 Rather, events following the coup unfolded, a veil was lifted exposing personal 
interests and the myth of  nobility underlying ‘Pacific-Fijian’ chiefly paramountcy. These 
claims by chiefly elite were merely used to obscure the realities of  class rule. In addressing 
the 2000 overthrow, Robertson and Sutherland reject claims of  Indo-Fijian privilege over 
Pacific-Fijians, blaming instead privileged chiefs’ who manipulate Pacific-Fijian commoners, 
economically and politically.51 Chiefs’ generated hysteria regarding their fears of  loss of  
government and the potential reform of  the land-tenure system are unfounded. These 
claims are unfounded, however, given the senatorial veto of  the Council of  Chiefs 
nominees is sufficient to halt any reform of  these provisions.  
 
Proponents of  critical history present clear arguments as to how chiefly elites have 
suppressed democratic outcomes that threatened their dominance of  the polity. In doing 
this, however, they fail to analyse how the infrastructure of  elite control. These historical 
revisionist arguments, in demonstrating the maintenance of  colonial institutions, fail to 
explain the sources of  elite power that have undermined government. Although the Labour 
Party successfully tapped into class sentiments, winning government twice, its tenure in 
government was overthrown swiftly by chiefs’. These arguments hint at the presence of  
class identities within Fiji but fail to explain, why class-consciousness did not translate to 
the reordering of  Fiji’s social order after independence. Something deeper than political 
identities and false consciousness has held this system together. Attempts at forming cross-
ethnic alliances among the poorest Fijians have not just been undermined by communal 
politicking, but rather through dominant material controls of  the chiefly elite over society. 
 
Neither those who have viewed Fiji through a lens of  ethnicity nor those who have 
considered it through revisionist history have sufficiently described the power structures 
underlying Fiji’s polity. Alone explanations based on ethnicity and colonial history 
misdiagnose the realities of  Fijian politics. Such arguments are intertwined and intimately 
related. Class hierarchies and ethnic identities overlap in that Pacific-Fijian chiefs occupy a 
privileged economic and social position in the Fijian society, which has provided them the 
means to usurp elected government. Both arguments of  historical revisionism and ethnic 
identities, however, have overlooked the linchpin that holds together the chiefs’ control of  
                                                
50 Sutherland, Beyond the Politics of  Race: An Alternative History of  Fiji to 1992. 
51 Robertson and Sutherland, Government by the Gun: The Unfinished Business of  Fiji's 2000 Coup. 
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Fiji’s political system. To understand the power structures underlying the polity, and how 
the chiefly elite has usurped government at its will, an institutional analysis of  the Fiji’s 
economy, and Fiji’s position in the world economic order, is necessary. Reflection on 
broader literature from the field of  political economy provides insight into these underlying 
power structures and the sources of  the chiefly elites’ power.  
 
 
Maintaining authoritarianism in Fiji 
 
Fiji has neither a liberal land-tenure system nor democratic political institutions. Fiji’s 
chiefly elite controls the key economic institutions within the economy providing it vast 
economic advantages and social controls over Fijian society. These institutional advantages 
were provided to the chiefs under colonial rule, and have never been reformed since. Of  
the institutional advantages provided to the elite, the flow of  rental income from ‘native 
land’ leases directly to chiefly elites has served to perpetuate the elites’ dominance over the 
Fijian polity. These sinecures, and Fiji’s illiberal land-tenure system have been maintained in 
part through Fiji’s position in the world economy. A reflection on wider literature offers 
insight into the structure of  Fiji’s entrenched elite, the illiberal institutions it controls and 
the source of  the material advantage, which has enabled it to usurp elected government on 
several occasions. 
 
Fiji’s domestic institutional structures are illiberal 
Institution-focused economists examine the consequence of  monopolies and rent-seeking52 
on the efficiency of  production. Krueger argues rent-seeking behaviour is present in all 
economies, and comes in the form of  regulatory restrictions or illegal behaviour such as 
bribery or corruption. 53 Tullock argues that monopolies facilitate inefficient production, 
and encourage rent-extracting behaviour within industry.54 Monopolies require the use of  
inefficient technology to maintain price levels and satisfy rent-seeking demands. Through 
                                                
52 Rent-seeking is intended in a broad sense, as a return derived from market power or coercion, typically a 
monopoly, rather than by competition, it is also applicable in its classic form. Ronald Rogowski, "Trade 
and Variety of  Democratic Institutions," International Organization 41, no. 2 (1987). 
53 Anne O.  Krueger, "The Political Economy of  the Rent-Seeking Society," The American Economic Review 64, 
no. 3 (1974). 
54 Gordon Tullock, "The Costs of  Special Privilege," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James E. Alt 
and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Political Economy of  Institutions and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990).; ———, "The Welfare Cost of  Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft," Western Economic Journal 5 
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this behaviour, monopolies incur large social costs as a weight on production, extracting far 
beyond what they would receive under an efficient system of  production. This rent-
seeking, whether legal or illegal, as Krueger argues, produces far greater inefficiency and 
social cost than is produced by trade restrictions, such a tariffs.55 Rogowski adds that, in 
heavily trade-dependent economies, the consequence of  monopoly controls are 
heightened. The rent-seeking facilitated by monopoly actors and the inefficiencies created 
by them, induce fatal inefficiencies that cripple industries, and economies.56   
 
Fiji’s land-tenure system and sugar industry is riddled with rent-seeking monopoly actors. 
This rent-seeking behaviour is facilitated within the land-tenure system through the close 
proximity of  high chiefs to land valuations and lease rent setting. Chiefs have a vested 
interest in setting highly inflated land valuations and rental prices as they are the major 
recipients of  native land lease rents.  
 
In reviewing successful democratisation in post-colonial transitions, Lipset observes that 
success is most prominent in states where a competitive domestic market economy has 
been established.57 This is because competitive markets have proven themselves to be the 
best way to reduce the impact of  nepotistic networks and the room for rent-seeking by 
elites – remnant from colonial or authoritarian rule – who still possess privileged access to 
state power and resources.58 Moore’s modernisation theorem “No bourgeois, no 
democracy,” also speaks to the need to diffuse the monopoly elite’s influence over the state 
and material resources at democratic transition.59 This assertion contends that a politically 
mobilised landed class, who depend on the rule of  law for maintenance of  property rights 
is needed to sustain democratic institutions.60 Without the development of  a middle class 
and without it receiving a share of  the elite’s wealth and power, the elite possesses a 
monopoly over the institutions of  power, and can undermine electoral institutions at will. 
 
At the moment of  transition to independence and electoral rule, the controls of  the chiefly 
elite over Fijian society were not altered. Rather, the chiefs’ institutionalised privilege and, 
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importantly its ability extract rents was entrenched within the constitution. Hence, Fiji’s 
democratic transition produced no reform of  the material controls of  the economy. Chiefs’ 
retained control of  the resources that colonial authorities had given them a century earlier.  
 
Moore’s assertion proves to be apt in the case of  Fiji, where control over land is vested in 
the highest chiefs. The legal state of  native land has inhibited the development of  property 
ownership as a bulwark of  electoral institutions, as Moore argues. Although there is a 
perception that the legal state of  native land provides all Pacific-Fijians ownership of  their 
tribal lands, the inability to utilise or trade the asset sits in conflict with this. Thus, Pacific-
Fijians have not developed recognition of  the necessity of  the rule of  law and the 
importance of  checks and balances on the power of  the state in protecting their ownership 
rights, undermining the legitimacy of  elected government. In reality, the legal state of  
native land has inhibited, rather than extended, ownership of  property to the masses. This 
was made possible by Fiji’s position in the world economy, as a former British colonial 
sugar producer, which served to maintain its inflated land-tenure system and the 
authoritarian elite’s patronage networks.  
 
How Fiji’s illiberal structures have been maintained 
Fiji’s position in the international economy has made possible chiefs’ efforts to maintain 
the colonial designed land-tenure system and their position within Fijian society and 
politics. Fiji’s position in the world economy resembles post-Marxist analyses of  economies 
dependent on the export of  primary goods in the international economy.61 Such analyses 
view the world as a single system in which there is a hierarchical division of  labour between 
economies. Fiji’s dependence on sugar exports under the Sugar Protocol in particular 
makes it dependent on commercial relations with the European Union. Post-Marxist 
analyses also argue this division of  labour between societies has an impact on the internal 
organisation of  societies.  
 
Observers disagree as to how integration into an economic division of  labour and shapes 
domestic political structures. Wallerstein demonstrates how export dependence on primary 
products can reinforce repressive systems of  labour relations.62 Rogowski and Gourevitch 
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point out that while external structure has an influence, it does not determine the domestic 
structure of  internal politics.63 Fiji’s position within Europe’s preferential trade system 
reinforces a post-colonial authoritarian system based on chiefly control of  land tenure.  
 
These post-Marxist explanations of  states’ colonial and post-colonial trade relations speak 
to Fiji’s trade relations with the world economy and the material structures that underlie its 
political institutions. Fiji’s sugar industry has been a recipient of, and continues to be 
dependent on, preferential access to markets in Europe. Fiji’s ability to sell sugar to the 
European Union well above world market prices has, in part, permitted the maintenance 
the political institutions established under colonial rule. Under British colonial rule, sugar 
was developed as a cash crop and exported back to Britain. To facilitate smooth colonial 
governance of  the colony British authorities granted control of  Fiji’s land-tenure system to 
the Pacific-Fijian chiefly elite. This provided the elite control over material resources 
extracted from sugar production providing it patronage resources assisting colonial 
governance. At independence, despite the arrival of  electoral institutions to reorder 
political hierarchy in Fiji, the colonial mechanism of  patronage was not reformed. In 
addition, colonial development of  sugar as Fiji’s only cash crop has left its economy heavily 
dependent on favourable subsidy payments. These conditions have permitted the 
maintenance of  the chiefs’ control over Fijian society. 
 
Developments in Fiji are comparable to events earlier in history in region geographically far 
removed from the South Pacific. The interdependence between Fiji’s position in the 
international economy and the persistence of  a feudal elite to the present day, mirrors 
Alexander Gerschenkron’s explanation the survival of  Germany’s East-Elbian landed 
aristocracy (Junker’s) as a dominant political group in the political development of  
Wilhelmine Germany.64 Gerschenkron explains how domestic tariff  policies segregated 
Germany from competitive international grain market prices, permitting Junker’s to 
                                                                                                                                          
Sixteenth Century.; ———, "The Rise and Future Demise of  the World Capitalist System: Concepts for 
Comparative Analysis." 
63 Peter Gourevtich, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of  Domestic Politics," 
International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978).; ———, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International 
Economic Crises, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1986).; Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political 
Alignments (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989).; Rogowski, "Trade and Variety of  
Democratic Institutions." 
64 Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy in Germany (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989). Also 
Peter Gourevitch’s generalised discussion of  how world trade crises affected political structures in Europe 
and North America in the late 19th Century in Peter Gourevtich, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, 
and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of  1973-1896," Journal of  Interdisciplinary History 8, no. 2 
(1977). 
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maintain their position within the German economy, and therefore their privileged place 
within society and politics. The Junker’s maintained their hold over German political 
development and dominance over German society, at the expense of  democratisation. Not 
domestically controlled tariffs, but rather, trade preferences have shielded Fiji’s landed 
aristocracy from the pressures of  international commercial competition, permitting them 
to retain their position against efforts to create democracy in Fiji. The title of  the present 
work is the author’s acknowledgement of  the debt owed to Gerschenkron’s analysis.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
This research provides an examination of  Fiji’s political institutions demonstrating how 
authoritarian actors have reasserted their control political institutions repeatedly since 
independence. It analyses each of  Fiji’s three constitutions, demonstrating why Fiji has 
never been a democracy. It examines the economic and political power structures 
underlying Fiji’s polity, and how these have ensured the continuation of  authoritarian rule 
in Fiji, despite the presence of  electoral institutions.  
 
In addressing the persistence of  authoritarianism in Fiji, I propose the following 
hypothesis: Fiji’s polity is dominated by authoritarian institutions, which possess the 
means to usurp elected governments at their will. These authoritarian institutions are 
controlled by a chiefly elite that was provided material advantages over the rest of  Fijian 
society under British colonial rule. This chiefly elite possesses a monopoly over land in 
Fiji, allowing it to charge highly inflated lease rents, which have been sustained through 
the sugar industry’s receipt of  the EU’s Sugar Protocol subsidy payments. The 
distribution of  these rents down a hierarchical structure has perpetuated the chiefs’ 
advantages over Fijian society. The result has been extreme instability in Fiji’s elected 
political institutions. 
To test this hypothesis this thesis will demonstrate the links between Fiji’s position in the 
international economy and the structure of  Fiji’s domestic politics. I will explore the 
following research questions to demonstrate the power structures underlying Fiji’s polity 
and the causes of  sustained authoritarianism: What perpetuates chiefly hierarchy over Fijian 
society? How have chiefly advantages translated into political control? How have Fiji’s 
unique institutions sustained themselves? Have coups occurred when democracy has been 
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at its weakest or strongest? In addressing these questions, this thesis will provide empirical 
evidence demonstrating the power structures underling Fiji’s economy and polity, and the 
overwhelming influence these structures have on its governance. In conducting this 
research, I must also be aware of  evidence to the contrary of  the tenets of  the hypothesis 
that prove it inaccurate or incorrect. Where these instances arise, I must ascertain whether 
they undermine the linkages between the tenets underlying the argument of  thesis. 
 
The first question outlined seeks to determine what institutional mechanisms have 
perpetuated chiefly hierarchy over Fijian society. This will examine how a Pacific-Fijian 
chiefly hierarchy remained prominent through colonial rule and since independence. It will 
analyse what institutional mechanisms exist that provide advantage to chiefs over other 
Fijians. It will also examine how these institutional advantages have been maintained within 
Fiji’s constitutions. Counter evidence to this will include the absence of  institutional 
mechanisms providing advantage to chiefly elites and the absence of  any constitutional 
protections of  these.   
 
The second seeks to analyse how have Fiji’s illiberal institutions been buffered from 
economic pressure on world markets. It will examine the structure of  Fiji’s illiberal 
institutions and what permits their operations. It will focus on the Fijian sugar industry’s 
receipt of  EU subsidy payments far above world market prices. It will demonstrate how 
chiefly elite’s control these illiberal institutions have provided it vast dominance over the 
Fijian economy. Counter evidence to this will include dominant sources of  socio-economic 
power other than control of  the land-tenure system and its distribution of  lease rents. 
 
Finally, this thesis will reflect on whether interruptions of  Fijian democracy occurred when 
it has been at its weakest, or when they threatened to impinge on core chiefly institutions. 
Specifically, it examines whether the coups have overthrown governments at times when 
electoral contestability seemed strong producing changes in governments or rather when 
electoral institutions struggled to produce a change in government. Counter evidence to 
this will include instances where the chiefly elite acted as a guardian or protector of  
electoral institutions or where the chiefly elite actively discouraged authoritarian behaviour 
or rhetoric. 
 
The following chapter analyses each of  Fiji’s three constitutions, demonstrating the 
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presence of  parallel electoral and authoritarian structures within the polity, undermining 
electoral institutions’ ability to be democratic. It examines the institutional mechanisms the 
chiefly elite has possessed within the economy and society and how these mechanisms have 
provided the means for chiefs to usurp government at will. Chapter Four and Five explain 
how and why, since independence this chiefly elite has acted to reassert itself  whenever 
electoral institutions have threatened their control of  government. These chapters 
demonstrate how each time electoral institutions have provided non-chiefly backed parties 
government, it has been overthrown. 
 
 
Scope of  the Thesis 
 
The temporal limitations imposed on a Masters of  Arts thesis necessarily restrict the scope 
of  its conclusions, its depth of  argument, and the evidence that can be gathered. This 
thesis, therefore, offers a limited, and by no means exhaustive, examination of  the 
economic power structures underlying Fiji’s land-tenure system and in particular the role 
of  the sugar industry within Fiji’s political economy.  
 
This thesis draws on a combination of  primary documentation and secondary literature. In 
its analysis of  political and economic institutions, it examines each of  Fiji’s three 
constitutions, Acts of  Parliament, land valuation documents, and the Native Land Trust 
Board’s (NLTB) Annual Reports going back forty years. To round out the examination of  
Fiji’s political history, this thesis consults secondary literature on the topic in a 
comprehensive manner. 
 
Constraints 
The largest constraint on this research is the unavailability of  complete data on all native 
land lease rents. The NLTB refused to release to the author lease rent data. Accordingly, 
this study can only consult lease rent data already available in the public domain. The public 
availability of  land units’ valuations provides a limited amount of  data on ALTA lease 
rents, and the relatively equitable earnings of  sugar farmers make analysis of  its inflated 
rents possible. The decentralised nature of  Fiji’s tourism lease agreements, on the other 
hand, makes study of  inflated tourism lease rents unrealistic. Unlike the native land sugar 
lease agreements, which are universally governed by one piece of  legislation, tourism lease 
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agreements are individually and privately negotiated and so the size of  premium payments 
and annual rents is isolated from the public domain. As Fiji’s largest earner of  foreign 
currency and under the unlimited size of  these lease rents, it would be expected that 
tourism leases provide more income to the proprietary units than sugar leases, however, 
due to the absence of  publically available material on this, of  the size of  this cannot be 
estimated credibly.65 
 
The vast inaccuracies presented within the NLTB’s annual reports makes ascertaining 
actual commercial activity of  the institution problematic. The reliability of  the data present 
in these annual reports is limited by the NLTB’s application self-prescribed accounting 
standards. This opaque financial management by the NLTB’s of  its own operations limits 
the ability to analyse its role within the economy. This also reinforces the claim of  the 
thesis, that the NLTB’s deliberate obfuscation within its financial records has been a 
deliberate effort to operate as an unchecked financial institution.  
 
Due to the political situation in Fiji at the time fieldwork was undertaken,66 Human Ethics 
approval was not granted by Victoria University of  Wellington to conduct interviews while 
in Suva and Lautoka. This severely constrained the author’s ability to obtain primary source 
material, specifically with regard to the financial operations and management practices of  
the NLTB. It also constrained investigation of  the strength of  the chiefs’ patronage 
networks within Pacific-Fijian communities. 
 
Timeframe of  analysis 
Of  particular note is that this study excludes the political events after 2005. I have 
deliberately excluded the military coup d’état on 5 December 2006 from this study. The 
meaning and outcome of  the events after December 2006 remain undetermined. The coup 
may be interpreted as a product of  the re-emergence of  intra-Pacific-Fijian rivalries, 
sidelined after the putsch by the success of  the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) 
Party since the 2000 military overthrow. It might also be interpreted as a counter-coup, as 
Land Force Commander Colonel Pita Driti has described it.67 However, as the interim 
                                                
65 Although averages can be estimated through the division of  total tourism leases by total lease agreements, 
these figures are not reliable. The NLTB’s financial reporting practices makes any of  its statistics not credible. 
In addition to this, the financial details of  tourism leases are not provided to the public. 
66 Fieldwork was conducted between 16 August – 7 September 2008 in Suva and Lautoka, Fiji. During this 
time the RFMF still controlled the apparatus of  government in Fiji and diplomatic relations between this 
Fijian government and the New Zealand government were tense. 
67 Pita Driti, "Pacific News," Morning Report, Radio New Zealand National, 3 April 2009. 
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government has not handed power back to a civilian authority, in many ways the coup is 
not yet over. Therefore, analysis of  this coup would be premature. This fact may also be a 
contributing factor to the absence of  literature addressing the causes of  coups and deeper 
structural analysis of  the ever-changing Fijian polity.68  
                                                
68 Very little academic literature has been published to date on this overthrow. Of  that which has, it has 
presented a simple narrative of  events readily available in newspapers of  the time. Jon Fraenkel and 
Stewart Firth, From Election to Coup in Fiji: The 2006 Campaign and Its Aftermath (Canberra: The Australian 
National University Press and Asia Pacific Press, 2007). Even this text presents very little directly focused 
on the events of  the coup and phenomenon underpinning it. However, days before the submission of  
this thesis a text on the 2006 coup was released. Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij V. Lal, The 2006 
Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups? (Canberra: The Australian National University E Press, 
2009). Due to the proximity of  this books release to the submission of  the thesis, I have not taken into 
account its analysis. 
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Chapter Three: Fiji’s Parallel Authority Structures 
 
 
For seventeen years, Fiji seemed a perfect model of  post-colonial democracy. After 
independence in 1970, Fiji followed peaceful processes of  decolonisation that led many to 
see it as model of  multicultural liberal democracy and a guiding light for the post-colonial 
Pacific. The structures underlying Fijian democracy, however, had not been tested. 
Although Fiji looked like the embodiment of  liberal electoral democracy, an authoritarian 
elite was embedded in its political and economic structures. This elite had sufficient power 
to overthrow Fiji’s democratic experiment whenever it deemed necessary. 
 
The position of  the Council of  Chiefs, an unelected institution, within each of  Fiji’s three 
constitutions since independence, demonstrates the enduring influence of  the Pacific-Fijian 
chiefly hierarchy in Fijian society. Created under colonial rule, the Council of  Chiefs 
assisted British governance of  the colony. Following independence, within the different 
constitutions, the Council has been granted notable statutory powers. Had the Council and 
its highest chiefs remained apolitical, supporting the rule of  law and electoral results, the 
constitutional advantages provided to chiefs and the Council may have had little influence 
over the maintenance of  electoral results. Nonetheless, there is clear evidence, that the 
Council of  Chiefs and Fiji’s highest chiefs have used their material and political privilege to 
undermine and overthrow electoral government whenever the results did not serve their 
interests. Under each of  Fiji’s three constitutions, chiefs received institutional economic 
advantages and controls over Fiji’s productive resources that allowed them to undermine 
electoral institutions.  
 
This chapter exposes the authoritarian institutions within Fiji’s polity. First, it explains how 
Fiji has maintained the appearance of  a democracy under the different constitutions, 
despite the consistent removal of  elected governments. This section also demonstrates the 
loopholes in each constitution that allowed an authoritarian elite to operate in within these 
to restrict the impact of  electoral results. Second, it explores how authoritarian structures 
govern Fiji’s economy, examining the chiefly elite’s control over key productive resources in 
Fiji.  
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Fiji’s constitution and the placement of  sovereignty within it 
 
Fiji appeared to be a constitutional liberal democracy. Its electoral institutions functioned 
uninterrupted69 for seventeen years, from independence in 1970 until May 1987 when a 
military coup suspended elections. After five years of  military rule, it reverted to elections 
in March 1992, with electoral institutions lasting until May 2000. To explain these lapses in 
electoral governance70 it is necessary to examine the distribution of  power under Fiji’s 
constitutions. This will also provide an insight into whether Fiji’s institutions are 
democratic, as they seem. 
 
Under each of  Fiji’s three constitutions, the distribution of  sovereignty across the executive 
and legislature has changed little and the power structures underlying constitutional 
institutions been the focus of  little reform. All three constitutions have reserved a place for 
the unelected Council of  Chiefs, providing it influence over institutions in which 
sovereignty is embedded. The key advantages provided to the chiefly elite, through the 
Council of  Chiefs, have remained relatively consistent across all three constitutions. The 
Council’s position at the centre of  Fiji’s political institutions has challenged the 
maintenance of  electoral institutions, and these institutions’ status as democratic 
institutions. 
 
The following section examines Fiji’s three constitutions. It details the composition of  
Fiji’s executive and legislature, and the appointment and electoral processes, which 
determine the composition of  key political institutions. In discussing whether Fiji’s political 
institutions are democratic, it particularly focuses on the role of  the Council of  Chiefs in 
constitutional institutions.  
 
Fiji’s 1970 Constitution was drafted to facilitate constructive governance and to support 
Fiji’s transition from colonial governance to independent rule. Under the 1990 
Constitution, Fiji’s governmental institutions reflected the desires of  the 1987 coup’s 
principal backers. Finally, the constitutional reform of  1997 explicitly sought to provide an 
                                                
69 This does not take into account the 1977 ‘constitutional crisis’ as discussed in Chapter Four. 
70 I define electoral governance as the composition of  government determined by elections. Although the 
Council of  Chiefs’ senatorial nominees’ veto power inhibits Fiji’s political institutions from being democratic. 
In turn, despite constitutional provisions allowing the cabinet to comprise members of  the Senate (who are 
not elected), the prerogative to form the cabinet is granted to the leader of  the party, or coalition of  parties, 
who commands a majority of  seats in the parliament. 
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environment for cross-ethnic power sharing. Under each of  the three constitutions, one 
can identify elements of  democracy. Common to all constitutions was the diffusion of  
power across the legislature and the executive. The legislature comprised a bicameral 
parliament, with a Senate and a House of  Representatives. The House of  Representatives 
was the only institution that could propose legislation. The Senate can alter or vote down 
legislation. The executive comprises the cabinet, and is ceremonially headed by the 
President, but led by the Prime Minister. The cabinet is made up of  individuals chosen by 
the Prime Minister from either the Senate or the House of  Representatives. The leader of  
the party, or coalition of  parties, with the most votes in Parliament attains the Prime 
Ministership, and then holds the prerogative to form the cabinet. Across Fiji’s three 
constitutions, processes of  appointment and election of  constitutional institutional have 
varied.  
 
The Head of  State  
The office of  Head of  State has evolved with each of  Fiji’s constitutions. The Head of  
State holds executive authority over the state of  Fiji and is the Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
military forces.71 Under the 1970 Constitution, the Head of  State was the British Monarch 
represented by a Governor General based in Fiji.72 After the September 1987 coup, Fiji’s 
second, Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Ligamamada Rabuka73 declared Fiji a Republic and 
appointed Ratu Sir Penaia Kanatabatu Ganilau President of  Fiji.74 Subsequently, under the 
1990 Constitution, the office of  the President was explicitly reserved for a Pacific-Fijian, to 
be appointed by the Council of  Chiefs.75 This was altered under the 1997 Constitution,76 
where the Council of  Chiefs held the power of  appoint of  the President, but after 
consultation with the Prime Minister.77 The reserve Head of  State is the Vice-President, 
who acts as the Head of  State in the President’s absence.78 The President holds the 
                                                
71 Constitution of  the Republic of  the Fiji Islands 1997, Act No. 13 of  1997 as amended by Act No. 5 of  1998. 
Chapter VII, Part 1, Section 85, 86, 87 
72 Fiji 1970 Constitution. Chapter IV, Section 27  
73 At the time of  the May 1987 coup Rabuka was a Lieutenant-Colonel. Brij V. Lal, Islands of  Turmoil: Elections 
and Politics in Fiji (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press 2006), p. 72. In Rabuka’s authorised biography he is 
referred to as a Major-General. John Sharpham, Rabuka of  Fiji: The Authorised Biography of  Major-General 
Sitiveni Rabuka (Rockhampton, Queensland: Central Queensland University Press, 2000). 
74 Subsequently all high chiefs with chiefly title will only be referred to by their surname. 
75 Constitution of  the Sovereign Democratic Republic of  Fiji 1990.Chapter V, Section 31 
76 As the 1997 Constitution was abrogated by the President of  Fiji on 10 April 2009 I refer to the 1997 
Constitution in the past tense. 
77 Constitution of  the Republic of  the Fiji Islands 1997, Act No. 13 of  1997 as amended by Act No. 5 of  1998. 
Chapter VII, Part 2, Section 90 
78 Under the 1970 Constitution, the Chief  Justice filled this role. Under the 1990 Constitution, two Vice-
Presidents shared the constitutional role. Under the 1997 Constitution, the Council of  Chiefs appointed a 
single Vice-President after consultation with the Prime Minister. Constitution of  the Sovereign Democratic 
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constitutional power to intervene in constitutional conflicts or crises, where electoral results 
are ambiguous or where government is disrupted by external circumstances. The position 
of  President has played a key role in direct of  Fiji’s history.    
 
The House of  Representatives 
The House of  Representatives is the lower house of  the parliament and the only body that 
can present new legislation. It is also the only elected institution in Fiji’s governmental 
institutions. Across the three constitutions, the distribution of  seats between general, 
ethnically-designated communal and cross-ethnic constituencies, as well as the distribution 
of  these seats has been the focus of  persistent reform, see Table 1.79  
 
Table 1: Composition of  the electoral seats in the House of  Representatives across Fiji’s 
1970, 1990 and 1997 Constitutions 
 
Communal Cross-Ethnic  
Pacific-
Fijian 
Indo-
Fijian 
‘Other’ Rotuman Pacific-
Fijian 
Indo-
Fijian 
‘Other’ 
General Total 
1970 
Constitution 
12 12 3 - 10 10 5 - 52 
1990 
Constitution 
37 27 5 1 - - - - 70 
1997 
Constitution 
23 19 3 1 - - - 25 71 
Source: Fiji 1970 Constitution; Constitution of  the Sovereign Democratic Republic of  Fiji 1990; 
Constitution of  the Republic of  the Fiji Islands 1997. 
 
Under the 1970 Constitution, the House of  Representatives had 52 seats. Electoral 
constituencies were divided between communal ethnic and national cross-ethnic 
constituencies.80 Of  these 52 seats, 22 were reserved for Pacific-Fijians.81 Of  these Pacific-
Fijian constituents elected 12 Pacific-Fijian Members of  Parliament (MPs)82 from Pacific-
Fijian communal constituencies, and all Fijians elected 10 Pacific-Fijian MPs from Pacific-
Fijian national constituencies.83 22 seats were reserved for Indo-Fijians.84 Of  these, Indo-
Fijians elected 12 Indo-Fijian MPs from communal Indo-Fijian constituencies, and all 
                                                                                                                                          
Republic of  Fiji 1990.Chapter V, Section 31; Fiji 1970 Constitution. Chapter IV, Section 28; Constitution of  the 
Republic of  the Fiji Islands 1997. Chapter VIII, Part 1, Section 88 
79 All ethnically reserved seats are referred to as “Fijian”, “Indian” and “other”. Whilst general seats are 
referred to as “general”. I use “Pacific-Fijian” and “Indo-Fijian” for clarity and to avoid the numerous 
implications that accompany the use of  these words in Fiji.  
80 Fiji 1970 Constitution.Chapter V, Part 1, Section 32 (1) 
81 Ibid.Chapter V, Part 1, Section 32 (3) 
82 ‘Members of  Pariament’ refers to those members of  the lower house, the House of  Representatives. 
83 Fiji 1970 Constitution.Chapter V, Part 1, Section 32 (3)(a) and (b). 
84 Ibid.Chapter V, Part 1, Section 32 (4). 
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Fijians elected 10 Indo-Fijian MPs from Indo-Fijian national constituencies.85 The 
remaining eight were reserved for Fijians of  ‘other’ ethnicities (neither Pacific-Fijian nor 
Indo-Fijian ethnicity).86 Of  these eight seats, ‘other’ ethnic constituents elected three MPs 
from ‘other’ communal constituencies, and all Fijians elected five MPs from ‘other’ national 
constituencies.87  
 
Under the 1990 Constitution, the lower house comprised of  70 seats.88 All electoral 
constituencies were communal and all voting was communal. 37 seats were reserved for 
Pacific-Fijians, all of  which were elected by Pacific-Fijian constituents.89 27 seats were 
reserved for Indo-Fijians, all of  which were elected by Indo-Fijian constituents.90 One seat 
was reserved for a Rotuman, which was elected by the Rotuman constituency,91 and the 
remaining five seats were reserved for constituencies of  ‘other’ ethnicities, elected by these 
‘other’ ethnic constituents.92  
 
Under the 1997 Constitution, the House of  Representatives membership expanded by one 
to 71 seats. Electoral constituencies comprised a combination of  both communal and 
general cross-ethnic constituencies.93 Of  the 71 seats, 23 were reserved for Pacific-Fijians, 
all of  which were elected by Pacific-Fijian constituents.94 19 seats were reserved for Indo-
Fijians, all of  which were elected by Indo-Fijian constituents.95 One seat was reserved for a 
Rotuman, which was elected by the Rotuman constituency,96 while, three seats were 
constituencies for voters of  ‘other’ ethnicities. In addition, 25 seats were general non-ethnic 
constituencies, elected by all Fijian voters.97  
 
The Senate 
The Senate is the Fijian Parliament’s upper house, it has power to approve, amend, or vote 
                                                
85 Ibid.Chapter V, Part 1, Section 32 (4)(a) and (b) 
86 Ibid.Chapter V, Part 1, Section 32 (5) 
87 Ibid.Chapter V, Part 1, Section 32 (5)(a) and (b) 
88 Constitution of  the Sovereign Democratic Republic of  Fiji 1990.Chapter VI, Section 41(1) 
89 Ibid.Chapter VI, Section 41(3) 
90 Ibid.Chapter VI, Section 41(4)  
91 Or the ‘people as Rotuma’ as it is referred to. 
Ibid.Chapter VI, Section 41(5)  
92 Ibid.Chapter VI, Section 41(6)   
93 Constitution of  the Republic of  the Fiji Islands 1997.Chapter VI, Part 2, Section 50 
94 Ibid. Chapter VI, Part 2, Section 51(2)   
95 Ibid. Chapter VI, Part 2, Section 51(3) 
96 Ibid. Chapter VI, Part 2, Section 51(4) 
97 Ibid. Chapter VI, Part 2, Section 51(5) 
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down legislation proposed by the House of  Representatives.98 It comprises members 
formally appointed by the President, but nominated from constitutional institutions and 
office holders, see Table 2.  
 
Under the 1970 Constitution, the Senate had 22 seats.99 Of  these eight seats were 
appointed by the Governor General on the advice of  the Council of  Chiefs;100 seven were 
appointed by the Governor General on the advice of  the Prime Minister;101 the Governor 
General appointed a six members on the advice of  the Leader of  the Opposition;102 and 
one was appointed by the Governor General on the advice of  the Council of  Rotuma.103 
 
Table 2: Composition of  the Senate across Fiji’s 1970, 1990 and 1997 Constitutions 
 
Appointed by the President on the advice of  the:   
Council of  
Chiefs 
Prime 
Minister 
Leader of  the 
Opposition 
Council of  
Rotuma 
President’s own 
determination Total 
1970 Constitution 8 7 6 1 - 22 
1990 Constitution 24 - - 1 9 34 
1997 Constitution 14 9 8 1 - 32 
Source: Fiji 1970 Constitution; Constitution of  the Sovereign Democratic Republic of  Fiji 1990; 
Constitution of  the Republic of  the Fiji Islands 1997. 
 
Under the 1990 Constitution, the Senate’s membership increased to 34. Of  these 24 were 
appointed by the President on the advice of  the Council of  Chiefs and these were reserved 
for Pacific-Fijians;104 nine by the President, on his own judgement;105 and one, on the advice 
of  the Council of  Rotuma.106  
 
Under the 1997 Constitution, the Senate’s membership decreased to 32 seats.107 Of  these 
14 seats were appointed by the President on the advice on the Council of  Chiefs;108 nine 
seats were appointed by the President on the advice of  the Prime Minister;109 eight seats 
were appointed by the President on the advice of  the Leader of  the Opposition;110 and 
                                                
98 Fiji 1970 Constitution. Chapter V, Part 1, Section 30 
99 Ibid. Chapter V, Part 1, Section 45(1)  
100 Ibid. Chapter V, Part 1, Section 45(1)(a) 
101 Ibid. Chapter V, Part 1, Section 45(1)(b) 
102 Ibid. Chapter V, Part 1, Section 45(1)(c) 
103 Ibid.Chapter V, Part 1, Section 45(1)(d) 
104 Constitution of  the Sovereign Democratic Republic of  Fiji 1990. Chapter VI, Part 3, Section 55(1)(a) 
105 Ibid. Chapter VI, Part 3, Section 55(1)(c) 
106 Ibid. Chapter VI, Part 3, Section 55(1)(b) 
107 Constitution of  the Republic of  the Fiji Islands 1997. Chapter VI, Part 2, Section 64(1) 
108 Ibid. Chapter VI, Part 2, Section 64(1)(a) 
109 Ibid. Chapter VI, Part 2, Section 64(1)(b) 
110 Ibid. Chapter VI, Part 2, Section 64(1)(c) 
 40 
one, on the advice of  the Council of  Rotuma.111 
 
Deeper analysis of  Fiji’s constitutions provides further evidence as to the extent of  its 
democratic façade. Specifically, an examination of  the exclusive veto powers that the 
Council of  Chiefs’ senatorial nominees held over all legislation governing the land-tenure 
system highlights the true nature of  Fiji’s political institutions. 
 
The constitutional controls of  the chiefly elite  
The Council of  Chiefs was established to facilitate British colonial rule in the 19th Century. 
It has held direct control of  Fiji’s political economy ever since. After independence, this 
institution has been the chiefly elite’s centre of  power. Provisions protecting the Council’s 
control over the economy have been entrenched in all three constitutions, thereby limiting 
elected government’s influence in a critical policy-making area.   
 
The Council of  Chiefs is the highest pan-Pacific-Fijian chiefly institution in Fiji. 
Established by Fiji’s British Governor, Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon, the Council was a key 
institution in the colonial office’s system of  indirect rule. The Council of  Chiefs assisted in 
the governance of  the colony, by integrating traditional authorities into the colonial 
administration. In the immediate period after independence, the Council of  Chiefs had an 
ambiguous constitutional status. Used as a proxy of  colonial rule, whilst Fiji was governed 
by Britain, independence brought to an end the very need for its existence. Nonetheless, it 
was recognised in the 1970 Constitution, through its powers of  appointment (of  
constitutional positions) as a representative institution of  Pacific-Fijian high chiefs. The 
Council existed in this representative capacity until the 1987 coup, when it, and numerous 
high chiefs involvement in the interim government and subsequent constitutional reform 
left it politicised. Under the 1990 Constitution and was formally acknowledged in the text 
of  the 1997 Constitution.112 
 
The Council of  Chiefs was made up of  54 members.113 Each of  Fiji’s 14 provincial 
                                                
111 Ibid.Chapter VI, Part 2, Section 64(1)(d) 
112 Although the literature dwells frequently on the formal recognition of  the Council within the text of  the 
1997 Constitution itself  (for example Lal, Islands of  Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji, p. 2.), the two 
preceding constitutions in fact already provided it with constitutionally recognised roles. In turn, the role 
attributed to it in the 1997 Constitution was no more entrenched anymore than any other institution, as is 
commonly claimed.  
113 The past tense is used in relation to the Council of  Chiefs as at this time it remains a defunct body, as its 
membership was sacked by the interim government in 2007. 
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councils has three representatives and the Council of  Rotuma has two representatives on it. 
There are four ex-officio members: the President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister 
and the Minister of  Fijian Affairs, who also nominates the final six members.114 Although 
there is provision for provincial council representatives to be elected to the Council of  
Chiefs, the dominance of  a traditional social hierarchy has meant that most appointees to 
the Council are simply the highest-ranking chiefs. Thus, a majority of  the Council’s 
members are chiefs chosen are from the hereditary chiefly elite.115  
 
An examination of  the power structures controlling Fiji’s key productive resources reveals 
the material realities underlying its constitutional institutions. As is explained in the 
following section, the structure of  the land-tenure system and the sinecures awarded to the 
chiefly elite directly reinforce the socio-political legitimacy of  the elite, while providing it 
with unparalleled dominance within Fijian economy. The chiefly elite’s vast socio-economic 
and political power has made the maintenance of  independent electoral institutions 
impossible.  
 
Alongside their economic power, the Council of  Chiefs, under each of  Fiji’s constitutions, 
has advised the President on the appointment of  more senatorial appointees than any other 
institution or office holder.116 Since the declaration of  Fiji as a Republic, the Council of  
Chiefs has also held the power to appoint of  the Vice-President and President, who have 
only been constitutionally responsible to the Council.117 The Council also possesses the 
power to remove the President and Vice-President from office.118  
 
Under all three constitutions, the Council’s senatorial nominees have effectively held a veto 
over legislation that might threaten “Fijian land, customs or customary rights.”119 
Specifically, all three constitutions stipulated that reform of the Agricultural Landlord and 
Tenant Act (ALTA), the Fijian Affairs Act, the Native Lands Act and the Native Land 
                                                
114 Robert Norton, "The Great Council of  Chiefs in Fiji's Era of  Crisis and Reform," in 1987: Fiji Twenty 
Years On, ed. Brij V. Lal, Ganesh Chand, and Vijay Naidu (Lautoka: Fiji Institute of  Applied Studies, 
2008), p. 116. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Eight under the 1970 Constitution, 24 under the 1990 Constitution, and 14 under the 1997 Constitution. 
117 Although the Council of  Chiefs is obliged to consult with the Prime Minister regarding the appointment 
of  the President or Vice-President, it acts on its own voliton. Constitution of  the Sovereign Democratic Republic 
of  Fiji 1990. Chapter V, Section 31 
118 As with the process of  appointment of  the President, although the Council of  Chiefs is obliged to consult 
with the Prime Minister if  it wishes to remove the President or Vice-President, it acts on its own voliton. 
Constitution of  the Republic of  the Fiji Islands 1997. Section 93(3)(f)  
119 Fiji 1970 Constitution. Chapter V, Part 4, Section 67(1) and Section 68(2) 
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Trust Act (NLTA),120 could not be undertaken without a majority121 of support at the third 
reading of Senators appointed by the President on the advice of the Council.122  
 
These constitutional provisions have entrenched the system of land tenure, distribution of 
lease rents and structure of lease agreements in Fiji’s economy. They have also provided 
the chiefly elite with exclusive control of this section of the economy and the resources 
extracted from it. This has entrenched the Council as the highest political authority within 
the Fijian polity, effectively making the Council of Chiefs a parallel – and often superior – 
authority to the legislative and executive bodies.  
 
For political institutions to be democratic, electoral institutions must determine the 
composition of  the offices that possess sovereignty. Importantly, as Schumpeter and 
Przeworksi’s definitions demand, their decision-making must not be greatly inhibited by 
unelected powers. The presence of  constitutional offices and processes has created the 
illusion that Fiji’s electoral institutions have exercised unchallenged sovereignty. In each of  
Fiji’s constitutions, the Council of  Chiefs has held direct influence over the composition of  
the institutions in which sovereignty is embedded. Although Fiji has had a written 
constitution, maintained electoral institutions and observed the rule of  law, an unelected 
chiefly elite has maintained it ability to usurp government. As is demonstrated in the 
following chapters, when electoral results handed government to chiefly-backed parties, 
electoral institutions were sustainable. Yet, when non-chiefly backed parties attained 
government, the elite overthrew the electoral institutions and usurped the government.  
 
Fiji has never been a democracy. The authoritarian elite that overthrew the Labour-
National Federation government in 1987, and then the Labour-led government in 2000, 
                                                
120 The importance of  these Acts in the structure of  the Fijian economy, and the power of  the chiefly elite, is 
detailed in the following section.  
121 Notably the power of  the Council of  Chiefs is explicitly described as “veto power of  certain members”. 
The 1970 Constitution states that the support of  six of  the eight Senators is needed to alter Section 
45(1)(a). Fiji 1970 Constitution. Chapter V, Part 4, Section 67(1). The 1990 Constitution states that the 
support of  18 of  the 24 Senators is needed to alter this legislation. Constitution of  the Sovereign Democratic 
Republic of  Fiji 1990. Chapter VI, Sections 77(7) and 78(1). The 1997 Constitution states that the support of  
nine of  the 14 Senators is needed to alter this legislation. Constitution of  the Republic of  the Fiji Islands 1997. 
Chapter XV, Sections 185 (1)(k), 185(2)(b)(ii) and 192(4).  
122 This clause is almost identical across each of  Fiji’s constitutions. Constitution of  the Republic of  the Fiji Islands 
1997. Section 68(2) lists the Acts protected by this clause: (a) the Fijian Affairs Act; (b) the Fijian 
Development Fund Act; (c) the Native Lands Act; (d) the Native Land Trust Act; (e) the Rotuma Act; (f) 
the Rotuma Lands Act; (g) the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act; (h) the Banaban Lands Act; or (i) 
the Banaban Settlement Act.  
Fiji 1970 Constitution. Chapter V, Part 4, Sections 67(1), and 68(2). 
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was never subordinate to electoral processes. The chiefly elite has held power outside Fiji’s 
electoral institutions even as they were written into its constitution. 
 
 
How an authoritarian chiefly elite governs the economy 
 
The Pacific-Fijian chiefly elite exerts influence over Fijian society through its management 
of  the illiberal land-tenure system, which provides it economic and political dominance 
over Fijian society. As well as management of  the land-tenure system, chiefs’ extensive 
influence over the productive resources of  the Fijian economy have been separated from 
parliamentary decision-making. Chiefly control over the utilisation of  native land, the price 
of  lease rents and the distribution of  those rents has provided chiefs with the political and 
material advantages necessary to suppress any challenges to their authority. In managing 
native land, the NLTB has served as an economic proxy for the Council of  Chiefs. This 
land-tenure system and its lease-rents has been, in part, maintained through excess earnings 
in the sugar industry that are made possible by subsidy payments from the EU.  
 
Vesting control over the vast majority of  land in the highest chiefs has given them motive 
and capacity to suppress electoral processes at their will. Under the claim of  preserving 
traditional elements of  Pacific-Fijian culture, this authoritarian elite has suppressed liberties 
and prosperity for both Indo-Fijians and Pacific-Fijians commoners. 
 
This section comprises of  four parts. It demonstrates how the management of  native land 
and the distribution of  lease rents directly support the authoritarian chiefly elite. First, it 
investigates how native land was removed from the market and put under the control of  
chiefly elites. It explains the two lease-tenure agreements, and the manipulation of  native 
land valuations and lease rents. Second, it compares the productivity of  Fiji’s sugar 
industries with other Sugar Protocol recipients, and explains how the Sugar Protocol 
subsidy payment has helped maintain Fiji’s systems of  native land tenure, land valuation 
and lease-rent determination. Third, it examines how lease rents are distributed within the 
“proprietary unit,”123 and the influence this distribution mechanism has on communal 
                                                
123 Landowning units are referred to in legislation as proprietary units. 
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hierarchical structures. Finally, it examines how the NLTB receives poundage124 for its 
management of  native land, and how the NLTB is an unaccountable, unchecked economic 
proxy for the Council. 
 
 
The legal status of  land and the maintenance of  the pre-colonial social hierarchy 
 
Pacific-Fijian tribal social hierarchy has been perpetuated by institutional advantages that 
were established as mechanisms of  colonial rule. The British colonial administration used 
pre-existing hierarchies to facilitate and maintain control over its colonies. In the case of  
Fiji, this led to the establishment of  the Council of  Chiefs in 1874, a body that housed the 
highest, vanua chiefs.125 The native land-tenure system and institutions such as the Council 
of  Chiefs were designed and entrenched by the colonial authority to facilitate peaceful 
colonial rule. Importantly these policies of  indirect rule also influenced the charter of  land 
in Fiji. Through the registration of  native land, colonial administration vested control and 
determination of  lease rents in the chiefly-controlled social unit mataqali. This assisted in 
the management of  the Pacific-Fijian population. Fiji’s colonial history was founded on a 
reciprocal relationship between colonial authorities and high chiefs: where the Colonial 
Office entrenched chiefs’ control over commoners through patronage, and chiefs ensured 
this hierarchy translated to the subordination of  Pacific-Fijians to colonial rule. 
 
Through the registration of  native land proprietary units, the colonial administration 
perpetuated the maintenance of  the ‘pre-colonial’126 Pacific-Fijian hierarchy. Despite the 
corrosive presence of  urbanisation and modernisation, Pacific-Fijian social hierarchy still 
rests on this pre-colonial chiefly system. The sediments of  colonialism lie deep within 
Pacific-Fijian society; with the entrenchment of  pre-colonial tribal and sub-tribal levels of  
hierarchy in the land-tenure, system has perpetuated the sustenance of  this social order.127  
 
Land in Fiji exists in one of  three legal states: freehold land, state land and native land. 
                                                
124 Poundage is a term used for payments by the NLTB for the maintenance of  the native land lease system. 
125 Simione Durutalo, "The Fiji Trade Union Movement at the Crossroads: Social and Political Options for 
the Labour Movement," in Fiji Trade Union Council Workshop on Social and Political Options for the Labour 
Movement in Fiji (Suva1985), p. 18. 
126 The assertion that the social structure maintained within the land tenure system has been a ‘pre-colonial’ 
one is contentious. 
127 Durutalo, "The Fiji Trade Union Movement at the Crossroads: Social and Political Options for the Labour 
Movement," p. 17. 
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Governor Sir Hercules Robinson’s first proclamation following the Deed of  Cession in 
1874 prohibited all land that had not been ‘sold’ previously128 from future legal exchange.129 
This decree, formalised by Governor Gordon’s 1875 Native Land Ordinance, stipulated 
that: “All conveyances, transfers, leases, and all transactions whatsoever in land or relating 
to any interest between Natives and any persons not being Natives are hereby expressly 
prohibited and declared to be invalid and it shall not be lawful to institute any proceedings 
whatever in any Court of Law in respect thereof.”130 
 
Since the Native Land Ordinance native land has existed as an untradeable asset.131 Original 
registration of  native land recorded it at 82% of  total land in Fiji. Native land now 
encompasses 87% of  all land in Fiji.132 Freehold land comprises 8% of  total land and is as a 
tradable asset. This was land sold by chiefs or the crown, or simply claimed by settlers, 
before the decree alienating it from the market.133 State land comprises 4% of  total land.134 
Before the declaration of  a Republic in 1987, this land was called ‘Crown’ land. State land 
is the remnant of  that land taken by the British colonial administration. 
 
Under the Native Land Act,135 the composition of  proprietary units,136 the specific family 
unit or individual that are the registered land owners of  any unit of  land can vary according 
to “custom and tradition” within tribal units.137 The ownership is predominantly collective, 
with mataqali holding the majority of  native land titles. Other tribal units holding 
proprietary titles over native land include the tokatoka or family unit,138 the yavusa or tribe, 
                                                
128 ‘Sold’ land was determined to be any that had been traded through legal or financial transaction by Pacific-
Fijians, predominantly chiefs, to Europeans.    
129 Fiji To-Day by M.A.T.E. (Sydney: Geo. Robertson & Co. , 361 George Street, 1886), p. 29. 
130 Native Lands Ordinance 1875. Section II 
131 Exception can be made for the transfer of  title to the State, with consent of  the NLTB, however, this 
rarely happens. 
After independence this status has been governed under Native Land Trust Act 1970, Legal Notice 112 of  
1970. Section 5(1) 
132 The increase is been due to the sale of  crown and state land to Pacific-Fijian communities.  
There are inconsistent figures surrounding the total proportion of  native land in Fiji. These range from 82% 
to 90%. I will use the figure stipulated by the NLTB, 87%, as it is the legal manager of  that land. Native Land 
Trust Board, "Native Land Trust Board Website,"  http://www.nltb.com.fj. 
133 France, The Charter of  Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji  pp. 46-54. 
134 Totals of  freehold and state land vary. Many texts estimate the proportions at 6% for each, however, the 
NLTB states 8% of  land is freehold and 4% is state. Because the NLTB is the authority on land management, 
I will use its statistics. Native Land Trust Board, "Investing." http://nltb.com.fj/investing.html (accessed 12 
March 2009) 
135 Native Lands Act 1905. 
136 Proprietary units are the legal land owning units of  native land. 
137 Native Lands Act 1905. Section 3 
In practice this difference was a product of  the Native Lands Commissions variance in determining its 
allocation of  native land.  
138 This ownership structure is predominantly used in the province Ba. 
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or several yavusa collectively (see Figure 1).139 Some individuals hold proprietary titles over 
native land. These are predominantly title heads of  tribal units140 or agnate descendants of  
high chiefs.141  
 
The process of  registration of  land during early colonial rule was highly political and 
contentious. After taking office in 1875, Governor Gordon was instructed by the British 
Secretary of  State to construct a system of  land administration to govern land alienated 
from the market by the Native Land Ordinance. Gordon outlined that the native land-
tenure system should reflect its immemorial origin and customary state. This was in 
accordance with Gordon’s policy of  retaining “indigenous [social] institutions” and his 
determination that this pre-existing system, “should be expounded, recorded and 
preserved.”142 Following this, the Native Lands Commission travelled Fiji recording the 
hierarchical structure of  each mataqali or tokatoka143 and individual mataqali and tokatoka’s 
claims to ownership of  native land. To obtain property rights mataqali and tokatoka had to 
lay claim to land and demonstrate their habitual use of  it. Where this was not done, land 
was then recorded as belonging to the crown.144 
 
In his text Vaka I Taukei: The Fijian Way of  Life,145 Asesela Ravuvu presents Figure 1 as the 
depiction of  the “classical [Pacific-] Fijian social structure.”146 The Pacific-Fijian social 
structure is described as encompassing three hierarchical levels derived he pre-colonial 
chiefly system: the vanua, yavusa and mataqali. Vanua is the largest unit, which 
encompasses yavusa and mataqali. Yavusa are the middle level unit, which encompass 
mataqali.  
 
                                                
139 Native Land Trust Act 1970. Section 2  
140 Chiefs who hold the hereditary title of  Ka Levu. 
141 Chiefs who hold the hereditary title Qele Ni Kawa, inherited through the paternal lineage. Native Land 
Trust Board, "Ownership Structure." http://nltb.com.fj/land_ownership.html (accessed 12 March 2009) 
142 France, The Charter of  Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji  p. 110. 
143 This concerned the parallel and vertical structure of  each tribes and sub-tribe. 
144 This is taken from an extract from the opening address of  Sir Bickham Escott to the Council of  Chiefs on 
20 May 1914 France, The Charter of  Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji  p. 177-78.  
Peter France has cited the difficulty and inaccuracy of  this process undertaken by the Native Lands 
Commission. The inacurracy of  mythical theory and oral histories is uncertain and made less credible by 
the consumption of  kava, a Fijian narcotic, during the processes.  ———, The Charter of  Land: Custom and 
Colonization in Fiji  p. 10. 
145 Asesela Ravuvu, Vaka I Taukei: The Fijian Way of  Life (Suva: Institute of  Pacific Studies, University of  the 
South Pacific, 1983). 
146 Ibid., p. 77. 
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Figure 1: Maxwell’s depiction of  Fiji’s pre-colonial social structure 
 
Source: Peter France, The Charter of  Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), p. 165-75. 
 
This depiction of  pre-colonial Pacific-Fijian social structure is highly simplistic and 
somewhat inaccurate. Rather, Figure 1 is merely the depiction drawn in 1913 by G. V. 
Maxwell,147 an administrative officer in the colonial government. After less than six months 
of  field investigations and recording evidence, Maxwell produced a depiction that has 
formed the definitive interpretation of  Pacific-Fijian social structure in Fiji. Maxwell’s 
diagram, presented to the Legislative Council in 1914,148 provided the Colonial Office with 
an orthodox149 interpretation of  Fijian hierarchical and tribal structures, and served as the 
basis of  all subsequent investigations of  the Native Lands Commission. Maxwell’s diagram 
was used as the framework upon which the land-tenure system was based, although it is 
nothing more than an abstraction of  a complex system by a colonial official. As is 
explained later in the chapter, this diagram became the structure according to which all 
native land lease rental income has been distributed. From this diagram, colonial authorities 
also determined the amount of  rent due to Pacific-Fijian chiefs to guarantee their 
adherence to and cooperation with colonial governance. The simplicity of  Maxwell’s 
interpretation is concerning given its impact on political and economic structures within 
Fijian society, and given its maintenance until the present, the longevity of  the diagram.  
 
Peter France150 has stated that the diagram drawn by Maxwell in 1913 (Figure 1) was solely 
Maxwell’s basic interpretation of  Pacific-Fijian tribal hierarchy. In commenting on 
                                                
147 Maxwell was chosen by Governor May to complete the task of  registering all native land.  
148 Colonial Office of  Fiji, "Legislative Council Paper No. 27 of  1914," (1914). Cited in France, The Charter of  
Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji  p. 166. 
149 France discusses the importance of  establishing an orthodox model of  pre-colonial Fijian hierarchy. This 
concerned the simplicity of  the model drawn by Maxwell, providing the Colonial Office a uniform model 
through which it could interpret chiefly hierarchy and interact with Pacific-Fijians. France, The Charter of  
Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji  pp. 102-76. 
150 France’s text ‘The Charter of  Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji’ is seen as the authoritative text on 
early colonial interaction in Fiji and the commodification of  land. 
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Maxwell’s reports that demonstrate the difficulties of  his fieldwork, France argues that 
given the circumstances of  Maxwell’s investigation, it is hard to comprehend that 
sufficiently reliable evidence was obtained to produce a comprehensive report and to 
substantiate his constructions.151 Notably, although Maxwell was instructed to objectively 
observe and record the customary Pacific-Fijian tribal structure, the chiefs exerted 
significant influence over his investigations. The 1892 Native Land Ordinance enshrined 
the position of  mataqali as the proprietary unit and thus, as landowner. This stemmed from 
a Council of  Chiefs decision in 1879, decreeing mataqali as the proprietary unit of  all 
native land.152  
 
During Maxwell’s investigations, and as happened with the Council of  Chiefs 1879 
decision, chiefs sought to ensure all land was recorded as being held by mataqali. As at this 
hierarchical level it provided chiefs control over the proprietary title and, thus, control over 
the land. In 1915, subsequent to the presentation of  his report to the Legislative Council, 
Maxwell reported to the Colonial Office his original observation, affirming the Council of  
Chiefs 1879 decision, that mataqali were the pre-colonial customary proprietors, was 
incorrect. Rather, Maxwell informed the Colonial Office that the tokatoka, the tribal unit 
below the mataqali, was in fact predominantly the customary proprietor. The Colonial 
Office informed Maxwell that it had no interest in recording any variance from mataqali 
across the composition of  proprietary units, as doing so would provoke conflict with the 
Council of  Chiefs who had determined that mataqali would be the proprietors, as was 
stipulated in the NLO.153 In 1917, after years of  uncertainty, Maxwell conceded that the 
Native Lands Commission would restrict the recording of  proprietary units to mataqali and 
the existence of  any ‘special interests’.154  
 
In regard the registration of  native land, the influence of  the chiefs over proceedings 
cannot be underestimated. Where mataqali were registered as proprietors, chiefs’ were 
granted exclusive control over the unit of  land. Where tokatoka were registered as 
proprietors, chiefs lost direct control over the unit of  land because the heads of  tokatoka 
do not have chiefly title. Maxwell himself  observed the chiefs desire to manipulate the 
registration of  land during his fieldwork in 1915. He observed, “It must not be supposed 
that the natives (Pacific-Fijians) welcome the Commission [led by Maxwell]. They know 
                                                
151 France, The Charter of  Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji  pp. 166-69. 
152 Ibid., p. 170. 
153 Ibid., pp. 170-71. 
154 Ibid., p. 173. 
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that they have much to lose and nothing to gain if  the truth comes out and they resort to 
every possible means to conceal the truth.”155 Maxwell, had undertaken his investigations 
much like anthropologist, naively assuming he could observe the tribal hierarchy in its 
customary state, without the realising the impact the chiefs’ awareness of  the importance 
of  his work would have on what he observed. As they had done in 1879, high chiefs were 
well aware of  the implications and importance of  land registration. Form the 1915 
affirmation of  the original (1879) determination of  land ownership, the chiefs had once 
again dictated reality to the Colonial Office for their own benefit. Mataqali chiefs’156 direct 
control of  land is remains today, and the legislation governing this stipulates that these 
chiefs are the sole determinants of  how lease rental incomes are distributed.  
 
The contention that the registration of  ‘native land’ simply transferred the pre-colonial 
state of  land in Fiji from its immemorial state to Western legal recognition and to 
formalised ownership has been disputed. Lorimer Fison157 argued at a public lecture in 
Levuka158 in April 1880 that because all land in Fiji was traditionally owned collectively by 
social unit, all land was, according to the immemorial Pacific-Fijian customs, inalienable 
from the market.159 As explained earlier, the Council of  Chiefs decision in 1879 had 
determined all native land was to be vested in the control of  the turaga160 mataqali as the 
proprietors. France argues that this transfer of  title from common ownership to chiefly 
ownership was able to take place because common Pacific-Fijians were oblivious to it. 
Their customs and appreciation of  hierarchy had itself  been corrupted by chiefly elites.161 
Arguing chiefly control over the registration of  native land, Fison stated: “The chief  is not 
their lord, but he is their landlord. He is but one of  the joint tribal owners together with 
themselves. As a member of  a landowning tribe, he has his own share of  the tribal land; 
and, as far as rightful ownership of  the soil is concerned, he has not one acre more.”162 
Despite Fison’s objections, registration proceeded and by the early 1920s, most native land 
was registered predominantly with mataqali as the propitiators.  
 
                                                
155 Ibid., p. 167. 
156 Or turaga 
157 Fison was an anthropologist and a graduate of  the University of  Melbourne. He was in Fiji in the late 19th 
Century, with the Wesleyan Methodist Mission. 
158 Levuka was Fiji’s first colonial capital. 
159 France, The Charter of  Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji  pp. 117-18. 
160 Turaga is the individual, usually a chief, in which the proprietary unit of  native land is vested.  
161 France, The Charter of  Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji  p. 119. 
162 Lorimer Fison, Land Tenure in Fiji (London: Harrison, 1881), p. 13. cited in France, The Charter of  Land: 
Custom and Colonization in Fiji  p. 119. 
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The process of  land registration in Fiji between the alienation of  native land in 1874 and 
the Council of  Chiefs’ recommendation to register all land under mataqali fundamentally 
restructured Fijian society. Whereas colonial authorities thought the registration of  land 
was merely a legal formalisation of  a pre-existing social system, the codification of  native 
land was more akin to the British enclosures movement. Polanyi has described the 
enclosures transfer of  common land to private ownership as “virtually a revolution of  the 
rich [elite] against the poor [masses]” where the elite “were robbing the poor of  their share 
in the common.”163 In Fiji, as in Britain, land was transferred from common ownership to 
private ownership, with the determination of  the land’s use and control of  its lease rents 
vested in the control of  chiefly elites.  
 
As demonstrated by Ravuvu’s presentation of  the “classical [Pacific-] Fijian social 
structure”, there is much confusion surrounding the traditional status of  the pre-colonial 
social structure and the Council of  Chiefs. Simione Durutalo164 noted, that the vast 
majority of  Pacific-Fijians believe that Fiji’s native land-tenure system is purely a 
‘traditional’ one and that the Council of  Chiefs is a ‘traditional’ institution.165 Since 
independence, chiefs have claimed that the Council is the representative institution for the 
Pacific-Fijian community and that the socio-economic advantages provided to chiefs are 
necessary to maintain the Pacific-Fijian culture. Indeed, chiefs’ material advantages 
institutionalised with the distribution of  native land lease rents has served an important 
role in perpetuating this social hierarchy. A clear example of  this was an assertion by the 
Alliance Party Deputy Prime Minister, Ratu David Tognivalu, during the 1987 election 
campaign, saying that  
 
“All land in Fiji was threatened by the Fiji Labour Party, and…[it] wanted 
to remove the chiefs from politics. This will destroy the inseparable link 
between the turaga and the vanua166…The turaga and the vanua are one 
– one could not exist without the other – the chiefs were a bulwark of  
security for all and custodians of  Fijian identity, land and culture…to 
                                                
163 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of  Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1957), p. 37. 
164 Ratu Simione Durutalo was a Pacific-Fijian political scientist based at the University of  the South Pacific. 
He was also the founding Vice-President of  the Fijian Labour Party in 1986. 
165 Durutalo, "The Fiji Trade Union Movement at the Crossroads: Social and Political Options for the Labour 
Movement," p. 17. 
166 In this context vanua is taken to mean land. 
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remove chiefs would pave the way for instability.”167  
 
Here, Ron Crocombe’s168 observation is apt “…many do not realise that what they believe 
to be their ancient heritage is in fact a colonial legacy.”169  
 
Within pre-colonial Fiji, social hierarchy prescribing chiefly hierarchy was maintained for 
social cohesion and survival.170 Under colonial rule, and since independence, however, the 
maintenance of  the hierarchy is directly linked to the mechanism facilitating the 
distribution of  rents down the chiefly hierarchy. The filtering of  rents down the social 
hierarchy and the ability of  the turaga to distribute revenues amongst the individuals in the 
proprietary unit, incentivises observing and maintaining this pre-colonial social hierarchy. 
In absence of  the EU sugar subsidies there would be no excess earnings to meet inflated 
rents charges. In the absence of  the inflated rent earnings and the patronage flowing from 
them, there would be less motivation to maintain this hierarchy and less incentive to 
observe a hereditary authoritarian hierarchy against the challenges of  modernisation.  
 
The system of  inflated land valuations and the distribution of  lease rents have been 
supported by the presence of  inflated export earnings in the sugar industry.171 Through the 
chiefs’ monopoly over native land and their arbitrary control over native land valuation, 
they have been able to charge inflated rents that are a product of  the exclusion of  native 
land from the market. Where highly inflated rents would have otherwise been 
unsustainable, the subsidies Fiji’s receives under the EU’s Sugar Protocol provides it with 
export earnings far above world market prices. This provided the excess to satisfy the 
financial demands of  less efficient sugar production in Fiji and support chiefs’ patronage. 
 
 
                                                
167 Lawson, The Failure of  Democratic Politics in Fiji, pp. 242-43. 
168 Ron Crocombe is Emeritus Professor of  Pacific Studies at the University of  the South Pacific.  
169 Durutalo, "The Fiji Trade Union Movement at the Crossroads: Social and Political Options for the Labour 
Movement," p. 17. 
170 Ravuvu, Vaka I Taukei: The Fijian Way of  Life. 
171 Tourism is frequently referred to as Fiji’s largest industry, although this has been dependent on political 
situations. Native land leases to tourism operations are charged out at exorbitant prices, as provided for 
under the Native Land Trust Act. The lack of  empirical data on tourism lease rents makes comparisons 
with the sugar industry difficult, hence I will focus predominantly on the role of  the sugar industry in 
maintaining exuberant land valuations. 
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Lease agreements & land valuations 
 
The alienation of  native land from the market, and the conflicts between the two lease 
agreements makes the construction of  land valuations a highly political process and subject 
to manipulation.172 The removal of  native land from the market makes the construction of  
“fair” or “market” values of  land and the rents in lease agreements problematic. The 
management of all native land rests with the NLTB “for the benefit of the [Pacific-] Fijian 
owners.”173 Through its influence over the NLTB's Board of  Trustees,174 the Council of  
Chiefs controls the determination of  land values and lease rents. 
 
Native land lease agreements exist in two forms and are governed by two pieces of  
legislation: the 1970 NLTA, which governs non-agricultural leases, and the 1976 ALTA, 
which governs agricultural leases. This differentiation between agricultural and non-
agricultural leases arose with the issuance of  the 1966 Agricultural Landlord and Tenant 
Ordinance (ALTO). The following chapter examines the differences between the lease 
agreements and the politics surrounding the formalisation of  the ALTO into an act of  
parliament. Before the issuing of  the ALTO, all native land lease agreements were governed 
under the 1940 Native Land Trust Ordinance (NLTO). Agricultural land leases are defined 
as those encompassing land “used predominantly for the growing of  crops, dairy farming, 
fruit farming, forestry, horticulture, bee keeping, poultry keeping or breeding and rearing or 
keeping of  livestock.”175 All sugar leases are therefore governed as agricultural leases. Non-
agricultural land encompasses all land not under the terms listed above. The Department of 
Lands zones land in Fiji, which then determines the applied land lease agreement. Before 
the issuing of  the ALTO, all native land lease agreements were governed under the 1940 
Native Land Trust Ordinance (NLTO). 
 
The ALTA and the NLTA formulated rents in very different ways; though these inevitably 
intertwined. Under the NLTA, non-agricultural native land leases require annual rental and 
a premium ‘goodwill’ payment to secure the lease. These both have no fixed value and are 
                                                
172 I will focus on the position of  native land within the economy due to its high proportion of  total land 
(87%). Academic scholarship has focused of  Fiji’s economy and land tenure focuses near exclusively on 
native land.  
173 Native Land Trust Board, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Review 1969-1974 " (Suva: Native Land Trust 
Board, 1974), p. i.; Native Land Trust Ordinance 1940. Section 4(i); Native Land Trust Act 1970. Section 4(1). 
174 Note the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) is an institution encompassing both the Board of  Trustees of  
the NLTB and the management of  the NLTB. I will use these terms to distinguish where responsibility 
lies for actions under taken on behalf  of  the NLTB. 
175 Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act 1976. Part 1, Section 2 
 53 
charged at ‘market’ rates, as determined by the NLTB.176 Under the NLTA, the NLTB 
determines non-agricultural lease rents on a case-by-case basis, providing chiefly elites with 
direct control over the value of  non-agricultural lease rents.177 Under the ALTA, no 
premium is paid, and lease rents are set using a formula: 6% per year of  the Unimproved 
Capital Value (UCV) of  the native land unit.178 Before the issuing of  the ALTO, native land 
units had no formal value, as they were all determined on a case-by-case basis by the 
NLTB. When the ALTO was issued, all agricultural lease units were given a valuation 
through the setting of  first UCVs. The UCV of  land units are set by a Committee of  
Valuers, who sit at the request of  the Minister of  Lands, generally every five years.179 There 
is not UCV valuation for all native land units, only those that are leased under the ALTA.  
 
The problematic and political nature of  valuating native land 
The peculiar nature of  Fiji’s land-tenure system causes inflation of  both ALTA and NLTA 
native land leases rents. Because 93% of  land is alienated from sale (87% is native land and 
6% state held land), market valuations for the freehold land are highly inflated. Despite 
native land being alienated from the market, its valuations are regularly calculated in direct 
relation to the valuation of  comparable freehold land. Clearly, attaching the value of  a scare 
resource to one that is relatively abundant results in prices that are much higher than would 
be expected in a truly open market. What is more, the value of  native land takes into 
account only the freehold land sold in the year of  evaluation. The high quality, prime 
location and infrequency of  sale of  freehold land only further inflates its vales; and by 
extension that of  native land. The Committee of  Valuers has tried to link the UCV to the 
output of  the industry using the land, but the vast variations in production levels has made 
                                                
176 Native Land Trust Act 1970. Part 2, Section 13  
177 The NLTA lease terms, including rent and premium values are negotiated between parties and overseen by 
the NLTB management. The NLTB Board must approve all of  the NLTA leases, providing the Council with 
tight control over all native land leases and the value of  rents and premiums. 
178 Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act 1976. Part II, Section 14(1) 
179 The Committee of  Valuers is appointed by the Minister of  Lands and comprises of: a NLTB land valuer, a 
public sector land valuer, a private practice land valuer and a chairman with knowledge in agricultural matters. 
The first UCV valuations were stipulated in the 1976 Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA) itself. 
The Committee of  Valuers is meant to sit every five years, but this is dependent on Ministerial discretion. 
Subsequently, the Committees have sat in 1982, 1987 and 1992, producing Agricultural Land (Declarations of  
Unimproved Capital Values) Orders at each sitting. Lands Department, "Agricultural Landlord and Tenant 
Act (Chapter 270) - Agricultural Land (Declaration of  Unimproved Capital Values) Order - 1987, Legal 
Notice No. 67 of  1987," (Suva: Fiji Government Printer, 1987).; ———, "Agricultural Landlord and Tenant 
Act (Chapter 270) - Agricultural Land (Declaration of  Unimproved Capital Values) Order - 1992, Legal 
Notice No. 127 of  1992," (Suva: Fiji Government Printer, 1992).; ———, "Agricultural Landlord and Tenant 
Act (Chapter 270) - Agricultural Land (Declaration of  Unimproved Capital Values) Order - 1997, Legal 
Notice No. 104 of  1997," (Suva: Fiji Government Printer, 1997). 
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this problematic.180 In its formulation of  ‘market’ value lease rents, the NLTB uses UCV 
only as the bare minimum land. 
 
There are also major problems in the process of  UCV setting. While, provision is made for 
different classes and quality of  land, quality it does not differentiate land according to 
geographic location, or other important factors such as access to transport, major urban 
centres or markets for goods and services.181 
 
Figure 2: Rent per hectare for agricultural lease agreements in Fiji across ethnic groups in 
1990182 
 
 
Source: Biman C. Prasad, "Property Rights, Economic Performance and the Environment in Fiji: A Study 
Focusing on Sugar, Tourism and Forestry - Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation" (University of  Queensland, 
1998). 
 
Although the ALTA lease rents have a fixed lease value, the NLTB has been inconsistent in 
the way it applies this to specific lease agreements. For example, Figure 2 displays the range 
of  agricultural lease agreements held by individuals in different ethnic groupings for the 
                                                
180 Lands Department, "Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (Chapter 270) - Agricultural Land (Declaration 
of  Unimproved Capital Values) Order - 1987, Legal Notice No. 67 of  1987," p. 214-25.  
181 Biman C. Prasad, "Property Rights, Economic Performance and the Environment in Fiji: A Study 
Focusing on Sugar, Tourism and Forestry - Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation" (University of  Queensland, 
1998), p. 93. 
182 Within this figure the term “non-Pacific-Fijians” is used by the NLTB. This terms refers almost exclusively 
to represent Indo-Fijian leases.   
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year 1990.183 This diagram shows that Indo-Fijians pay significantly more rent per hectare 
than Pacific-Fijian. Although Pacific-Fijians have tended to lease land of  a lower quality, 
and pay lower rents as a result, the disparity between lease rents paid by Pacific-Fijian and 
Indo-Fijians is dramatic. This evidence suggests that even under the seemingly fixed ALTA 
lease rents, the NLTB has artificially lowered lease rents for Pacific-Fijians.184 
 
The NLTB’s Board of  Trustees ultimate discretion over both lease rents and premium 
payment determination is problematic. As explained later in this chapter, the NLTB’s 
Board is almost exclusively comprised of  high chiefs. Furthermore, chiefs’ have a vested 
interest, as institutionalised recipients of  native land lease rents, in ensuring native land 
lease rents are charged at the highest possible value. Thus, their ability to determine market 
or fair rents for non-agricultural leases is compromised. In addition, the NLTB not only 
possesses a monopoly over rent setting of  NLTA leases and the application of  ALTA 
leases, but also over the knowledge of  what NLTA lease rents are worth. This chapter goes 
on to show that the NLTB has systematically constructed its own accounting standards that 
do not require it make public both its applied value of  native land and the lease rents it 
charges. The absence of  this knowledge serves to further strengthen the NLTB’s control 
over lease rent determination. 
 
As the monopoly supplier of  lease land, the NLTB does not set lease rents at a value 
comparable to the equilibrium between supply and demand. Rather, it has the ability to set 
them at a rate between the extremity of  the chiefs’ demands for high rents and the rate at 
which leaseholders can sustain sufficient profit to maintain production and not abandon 
their lease. Therefore, dependent on native land for production are forced to pay exorbitant 
rents, which acts as a weight on their competitiveness with industries in comparable 
economies further decreasing Fijian industries comparative advantage.  
 
The presence of  a uniform lease rent in ALTA, and relatively equitable earnings for a 
sector of  leaseholders in the sugar industry, provided by the EU’s Sugar Protocol subsidy 
payment, make analysis of  the structures of  inflated agricultural lease rents possible.185 As 
                                                
183 The data displayed in Figure 2 is the best of  very little data available on land lease valuations available in 
the public domain.  
184 Prasad, "Property Rights, Economic Performance and the Environment in Fiji: A Study Focusing on 
Sugar, Tourism and Forestry - Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation", p. 62. 
185 As mentioned in Chapter Two the decentralised and private nature of  tourism lease agreements makes it 
difficult to examine their role in inflating lease rents.  
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will be explained in the following section, these inflated ALTA land lease rents have in part 
been sustained by the subsidies the Fijian sugar industry has received as a recipient of  the 
EU’s the Sugar Protocol. 
 
 
The role of  EU sugar subsidies in sustaining inflated lease rents 
 
Fiji’s sugar industry, as a recipient of  the EU’s Sugar Protocol quotas and subsidy payments 
has earned far above what it would have earned at world market rates. These subsidies have 
buffered the illiberal institutions within the industry from market realities. The centrality of  
sugar industry within Fiji’s economy, the common structure of  agricultural lease rents and 
farmers’ relatively equitable earnings make the sugar industry a suitable example to 
demonstrate how inflated lease rents have been sustained.  
 
The sugar industry and Fiji’s racial divisions are intimately intertwined, as both are 
remnants of  colonial governance. British colonial administrators brought Indians to Fiji as 
indentured labourers, to grow sugar as a cash crop for the British Empire. This system of  
labour continued until 1920. Following their release from indenture, Indo-Fijian farmers 
leased land from landowners, of  which they predominantly used for sugar farming.  
 
The Fijian sugar industry 
Historically sugar production has been Fiji’s leading industry186 and retains a significant 
position within the Fijian economy. It is estimated that up to 40,000 people are directly 
employed in the sugar industry, amounting to 25% of  Fiji’s labour force,187 and up to 
250,000 people are indirectly dependent on the industry for their livelihoods, many of  
these being native land owners.188 The sugar industry is Fiji’s main commodity earner 
bringing in US$ 230-240 million a year,189 amounting to 22% of  foreign exchange earnings 
annually and amounting to between 7% and 11% of  gross domestic product.190  
                                                
186 Although in recent years, with the non-renewal of  ALTA leases (see discussion in chapter five) declining 
sugar production has led to tourism surpassing it. Paresh Kumar Narayan and Biman C. Prasad, 
"Economic Importance of  the Sugar Industry in Fiji: Stimulating the Impact of  a 30% Decline in Sugar 
Production," in Working Paper No. 2004/12, July 2004 (Suva: Department of  Economics, University of  the 
South Pacific, 2004), p. 2. 
187 Fiji Sugar Corporation, "The Fiji Sugar Industry," Fijian Studies 1, no. 2 (2003): p. 318. 
188 Paresh Kumar Narayan and Biman C. Prasad, "Fiji's Sugar, Tourism and Garment Industries: A Survey of  
Performance, Problems and Potentials " Fijian Studies 1, no. 1 (2003): p. 17. 
189 “US$” indicates United States Dollars 
190 These statistics are inconsistently detailed across numerous sources. I have used the most commonly cited 
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For 20 years after independence, successive governments sought to stimulate sugar industry 
production. In 1976, cane production was 272,000 tonnes, before peaking in 1980 at 
475,000 tonnes. From 1981 to 1990, cane production averaged 416,800 tonnes, which 
increased between 1990 and 1995, to 439,000, before falling again between 1995 and 2000 
to 357,750 tonnes. Sugar production further decreased again between 2000 and 2006 to 
310,000 tonnes and is now projected to fall by up to 40% in coming years.191  
 
The Fijian sugar industry’s Master Award governs the sharing of  proceeds between sugar 
farmers and the Fijian Sugar Corporation (FSC). Under the 1984 Master Award, the 
payment that sugar farmers receive is dependent on cane production of  the industry as a 
whole.192 If  output is less than 325,000 tonnes, growers receive 70% and the FSC receives 
30% of  revenue from sales. If  production is between 325,000 and 350,000 tonnes, growers 
receive 72.5% and the FSC receives 27.5%. While, if  production is above 350,000 tonnes, 
growers receive 75% and the FSC receives 25%.193 
 
Britain’s departure from Fiji, in 1970 brought with it the disengagement of  the Fijian 
domestic economy from the British economy. Although this also brought a transition of  
Fijian exports from guaranteed British markets to world-markets, Britain extended its 1950 
Colonial Sugar Agreement (CSA), maintaining preferential market access and subsidies for 
Fijian sugar. Under the CSA, Britain provided Commonwealth countries, including Fiji, 
preferential access to its markets for set quotas of  sugar at a negotiated price. Between the 
its inception and the signing of  the Sugar Protocol the CSA’s negotiated price exceeded the 
world market price by an average of  165%.194  
 
The European Economic Community’s (EEC) 1975 Sugar Protocol, under the Lomé 
                                                                                                                                          
statistics across the following sources. The figures listed are for between 1997-2001. Fiji Sugar 
Corporation, "The Fiji Sugar Industry," p. 318, P. Lal, H. Lim-Applegate, and M. Reddy, "Alta or Nlta: 
What's in a Name? Land Tenure Dilemma and the Fiji Sugar Industry," in Working Paper No. 46, October 
2001 (Land-Tenure Center, University of  Wisconsin-Madison, 2001), p. 1.; Narayan and Prasad, 
"Economic Importance of  the Sugar Industry in Fiji: Stimulating the Impact of  a 30% Decline in Sugar 
Production," p. 2.; Mahendra Reddy, "Production Analysis of  Fiji's Sugar Industry. Unpublished Ph.D 
Dissertation" (University of  Hawaii, 1998), p. 130. 
191 Narayan and Prasad, "Economic Importance of  the Sugar Industry in Fiji: Stimulating the Impact of  a 
30% Decline in Sugar Production," p. 4. 
192 The Master Award refers to sugar farmers as “growers”. Sugar Industry Tribunal, "Sugar Industry Tribunal 
Master Award," (Suva: Sugar Industry Tribunal, 1997). 
193 Ibid., Part 20, Section 20.2, p. 61.  
194 Malakai Tadulala, Sugar Protocol Agreement 1998, 
www.parliament.govt.fj/publications/viewResearch.aspx?research=21 (accessed 21/4/2008). 
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Agreement, formalised the EEC’s trade relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) sugar producers. The EU centralised administration of  trade preferences for its 
member states with their former colonies in a uniform manner. The Sugar Protocol was 
extended under the EU’s 2000 Cotonou agreement, which superseded the Lomé 
Agreement. The Sugar Protocol has provided Fiji a set quota for sugar imports to EU 
markets, which provides it total exemption from import duties on sugar, and a negotiated 
price far above the world market price.195 In addition to the Sugar Protocol quota, since 
1995 Fiji has received further quota access to European markets through the EU’s Special 
Preferential Sugar (SPS) scheme. The SPS was developed to formalise sugar trade 
arrangements with Portugal’s former colonies. The SPS scheme encompassed the 
mechanisms from the Sugar Protocol, through which the EU had previously used to satisfy 
its sugar refiners’ demands when they were excess to what the Protocol’s quotas provided. 
The SPS scheme’s allocation is divided amongst the five ACP non-Protocol signatory 
countries. The remaining allocation is shared amongst the Protocol signatories on a pro 
rata basis.  
 
Under the Sugar Protocol, the EU has imported nearly 1.3 million tonnes of  sugar annually 
from 16 ACP countries, of  which Fiji has received a guaranteed quota of  12.75%, or 
165,348 tonnes per year.196 In addition to this quota, under the SPS, Fiji has received an 
extra allocation of  approximately 9.3% or an additional 30,000 tonnes of  sugar to sell on 
European markets.197 The Protocol and SPS have allowed Fiji to export an average of  
about 200,000 tonnes of  sugar annually to the EU.198 Despite these fixed allocations, year-
to-year, Fiji’s total sugar export production has varied greatly, sometimes exceeding the 
quotas such as in 1995, when it exported 246,532 tonnes to the EU. In other years sugar 
exports have fallen short of  the Protocol’s quota, as occurred in 2003 when it exported 
                                                
195 The Sugar Protocol will cease on the 1 October 2009. It will be replaced by individual agreements under 
Economic Partnership Agreements. This decision was made by the Council of  the European Union 28 
September 2007. See discussion in chapter six. The Council of  the European Union, "Council Decision 
to Denounce the Acp Sugar Protocol," (Brussels: The Council of  the European Union, 2007). 13345/07 
(Presse 213) 
196 European Commission, "A Description of  the Common Market Organisation of  the Market in Sugar - 
Acp Protocol/Agreement with India - Annex Iii," (Brussels: European Commission, 2004), p. 27.  
197 On occasion this figure has been as high as 60,000 tonnes of  sugar. This variance is due to the year-to-year 
demands of  the EU’s refiners’. Jane Kelsey, "A People's Guide to the Pacific Economic Partnership 
Agreement. Negotiations between the Pacific Islands and the European Union Pursuant to the Cotonou 
Agreement 2000," in World Council of  Churches (Suva2005), p. 58. 
198 European Commission, "The European Sugar Sector: A Long-Term Competitive Future," (Brussels: 
European Commission, 2006), September 2006, Section 4, pp. 2-3.; Kelsey, "A People's Guide to the 
Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement. Negotiations between the Pacific Islands and the European 
Union Pursuant to the Cotonou Agreement 2000," p. 58. 
 59 
only 159,254 tonnes.199  
 
The Sugar Protocol’s guaranteed price has been directly tied to the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) payment for sugar.200 This guaranteed price has amounted to 
between two-and-a-half  and three times the world market rate for sugar per tonne.201 Tate 
and Lyle, a London based sugar refinery, has purchased virtually all the Sugar Protocol 
ACP signatories have produced. The SPS scheme guarantees prices through the same 
process as the Protocol, but at 85% of  the Protocol’s guaranteed price.202 
 
Once the allocation of  annual quotas of  sugar exports to the EU are set, the Fijian 
Marketing Association sells the balance of  yields to second-tier premium markets. This has 
predominantly been to Japan and the United States, who have also paid prices significantly 
higher than world market price to ensure the security of  supply year-to-year for their 
refiners. The United States has also purchased between 10,000 and 20,000 tonnes of  sugar 
annually,203 at a rate between two to three times the world market rates.204 Fiji’s remaining 
sugar has then been sold on the open market for world market prices.  
 
The comparative efficiency of  the Fijian sugar industry  
The small size of  sugar farms and the sugar industry’s dependence on native land for leases 
(due to the scarcity of  freehold land), combined with high lease rents and the coercive 
monopsony of  sugar industry’s miller has resulted in severe inefficiencies within Fiji’s sugar 
industry. Specifically, the structure of  Fiji’s land-tenure system makes its sugar industry 
unique in contrast with other Sugar Protocol signatories’. The structure of  the sugar 
industry provides Fiji with a highly inefficient process of  production, making Fiji a ‘low 
productivity producer’ of  sugar.205 In contrast with ‘high productivity producers’, such as 
                                                
199 European Commission, "Eu-Acp Trade Main Products Imported 2003, Acp Statistical Analysis," 
(European Commission, 2003). 
200 ———, "A Description of  the Common Market Organisation of  the Market in Sugar - Acp 
Protocol/Agreement with India - Annex Iii," p. 16. 
201 Lal, Lim-Applegate, and Reddy, "Alta or Nlta: What's in a Name? Land Tenure Dilemma and the Fiji Sugar 
Industry," p. 2. 
202 Kelsey, "A People's Guide to the Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement. Negotiations between the 
Pacific Islands and the European Union Pursuant to the Cotonou Agreement 2000," p. 58. 
203 Donald Mitchell, "Sugar Policies: Opportunity for Change," in World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
3222 (Development Prospect Group, The World Bank, 2004), p. 39. 
204 Wali M. Osman, "Fiji: Economic Report, September 1998 " (Honolulu: Bank of  Hawaii, 1998), p. 20. 
205 In his working paper Mitchell uses the labels ‘low cost’ to describe producers with a higher tonnage output 
per employee and ‘high cost’ to describe producers with a lower tonnage output per employee. These 
labels are misleading, however, as there are no financial factor in either measure used to attain the ratio 
and within the measures presented by Mitchell nothing is ‘costed’ at all. Therefore I have used the more 
accurate labels of  ‘high productivity’ in the place of  ‘low cost’ and ‘low productivity’ instead of  ‘high 
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Guyana, which produces 16.3 tonnes of  sugar per industry employee, Fiji produces only 
8.3 tonnes of  sugar per industry employee (See Appendix 1).206 This low productivity 
magnifies the Fijian sugar industry’s dependence on the EU’s subsidy payment.  
 
Yet, it is not the presence of  subsidy alone that determines productivity, but what countries 
do with it. The cases of  Fiji, Kenya and Mauritius suggest (See Appendix 1), as is often 
claimed, that the presence of  the Sugar Protocol’s subsidy has disincentivised competitive 
production leading to inefficient production and low productivity.207 The case of  Guyana, 
however, suggests this correlation is not as clear as is claimed. Guyana has been a recipient 
of  Sugar Protocol subsidy payments whilst still producing sugar at a rate comparable with 
the most productive sugar producing countries, and producing similar amounts of  sugar to 
Fiji annually. Guyana embarked upon structural reform of  its economy in 1989, which 
included the devaluation of  its currency. 208 Devaluation provided Guyana’s sugar industry 
with growth in foreign exchange earnings, which provided the Guyana Sugar Corporation 
greater capacity to access and utilise investment capital to develop its infrastructure.209 The 
case of  Guyana demonstrates that, even with high earnings and a lack of  competition, the 
right domestic institutional structures can make it possible to produce sugar at 
internationally competitive rates (per employee).  
 
Causes of  inefficiencies in the Fijian sugar industry  
The structure of  Fiji’s land-tenure system, which creates a dependence of  sugar farmers on 
native land lease agreements, and the position of  the NLTB as monopoly provider of  these 
highly inflated lease rents, makes sugar production in Fiji unique. In addition, the FSC’s 
status as monopsony buyer of  sugar cane has inhibited comparative efficient production 
with comparable Sugar Protocol subsidy recipients such as Guyana. 
 
The milling of  sugar in Fiji has been a monopsony since it began. The Colonial Sugar 
Refining Company (CSR), an Australian-owned company, operated milling in Fiji without 
                                                                                                                                          
cost’. 
206 Donald Mitchell, "Sugar Policies: Opportunities for Change, Development Prospects Group," in Global 
Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries, ed. M. Ataman Aksoy and John C. Beghin (Washington DC: The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2005), p. 145  
207 J. C. Bureau, H. Guyomard, and V. Requillart, "Inefficiencies in the European Sugar Regime," Journal of  
Policy Modeling 23, no. 6 (2001). 
208 Adrian P. Hewitt, "Guyana, Sugar and Eba: Case-Study of  a Country Which Is Not Quite Least 
Developed," in The Regulatory Framework of  Globalisation (Barcelona, Spain: Overseas Development 
Institute, London, 2001), pp. 15-16. 
209 Ibid., p. 17. 
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competition from 1882 to 1973. CSR’s dominance, as the sole miller in the industry 
provided it with the ability to control cane payout to sugar farmers. In 1969, after dispute 
between the miller and growers, the Denning Report investigation and recommendations, 
led to reform of  the payout to sugar farmers.210 Following this reform, having initially 
viciously disputing the Denning Report’s recommendations,211 the CSA sold its operation 
in 1973 with the Fijian government purchasing a considerable share. The government now 
holds approximately 68% of  the FSC. Since its takeover, little reinvestment has gone back 
into milling infrastructure. Even the FSC has described its infrastructure as “mills [that] are 
old, overturned, not automated, and expensive to operate and maintain. Further, they are 
not equipped to make the quality of  sugar the market is increasingly demanding.”212 Across 
the industry, productivity stagnated over the twenty-year period 1978-1998.213 Although the 
FSC bears much responsibility for the flagging investment within the industry, the highest 
inefficiencies remain are at the level of  sugar production on farms.214 
 
The structure of  Fiji’s land system, with the alienation of  87% of  land from the market, 
creates vast inefficiencies within the sugar industry. Economic analysis has demonstrated 
that tenant-operated farms are substantially less efficient than owner-operated farms.215 The 
lack of  security of  agricultural leases, heightened since 1997 with expiry of  the ALTA lease 
agreements,216 has inhibited potential long-term investments on sugar farms operated on 
leased land. Whereas farmers operating on freehold land have been able to raise capital 
loans against their freehold land, and are then able to reinvest in their production of  sugar. 
Farmers on leased land have been unable to do this.217 The evidence that lease land 
impinges on efficiency improvements, partnered with the presence of  high lease rents, as 
explained in the preceding section, has been sustained in part by the EU’s subsidy payment.  
 
                                                
210 Lord Denning, "The Award of  the Rt. Hon. Lord Denning in the Fiji Sugar Cane Contract Dispute 1969," 
(Suva: The Government of  Fiji, 1970). 
211 The CSR claimed Denning lacked understanding of  accounting principals and the practical working of  the 
sugar industry. It asserted the implementation the the Denning Report would impose high risks on the 
miller, with little or no prospect of  worthwhile profits. The Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited, 
"Lord Denning's Award Concerning the Fiji Sugar Cane Contract: Observations on Its Consequences and 
Mistakes," (Sydney: The Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited, 1970). 
212 Fiji Sugar Corporation, "The Fiji Sugar Industry," p. 316. 
213 Reddy, "Production Analysis of  Fiji's Sugar Industry. Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation", p. 118. 
214 Ibid., p. 118-19. 
215 Mahendra Reddy demonstrated this in his Ph.D dissertation and subsequent journal article. He also notes 
all prior attempts to demonstrate this failed due to flawed methodologies. Ibid., pp. 118-19.  
216 As is explained further in Chapter Five. 
217 Mahendra Reddy, "Implication of  Tenancy Status on Productivity and Efficiency: Evidence from Fiji," Sri 
Lankan Journal of  Agricultural Economics 4, no. 1 (2002): p. 31. 
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The Sugar Protocol subsidy has not produced inefficiencies within Fiji’s sugar industry per 
se; rather, it has provided a surplus income to the industry, which permits the maintenance 
of  illiberal institutions and inefficient practices. Had Fiji’s domestic institutions been 
liberalised and legal monopolies eliminated, the Fijian sugar industry might have achieved 
productivity levels comparable with the most efficient producers. This is, however, a 
counterfactual.  
 
These illiberal institutions have been critical in perpetuating the dominance of  a chiefly 
elite over the Fijian economy and polity. The Sugar Protocol subsidy has buffered Fiji’s 
land-tenure system from conditions on world markets, and thus, maintained the structure 
of  the land-tenure system, its high lease rents, and the NLTB’s management of  these. The 
following section demonstrates how these inflated lease rents are filtered down a tiered 
system, which sustains the chiefs’ position over Fijian society.  
 
 
The distribution of  native land rents  
 
Proprietary unit’s native land lease rents are distributed down a formalised mechanism as 
stipulated in legislation. This stipulated distribution of  rents was institutionalised as a 
means of  indirect rule providing political patronage to chiefly elite by colonial authorities. 
The stipulated distribution’s structure is a reflection of  the pre-colonial chiefly hierarchy as 
drawn by Maxwell in 1913.  
 
Lease rents are distributed to the proprietary unit from the NLTB, which collects lease 
rents from landowners. The NLTB receives poundage for its management of  the lease 
agreements. With both lease rents distributed to proprietary units and poundage received 
and spent by the NLTB, the chiefly elite has vast control over all lease rents. Within 
proprietary units, the tiered distribution of  rents provides chiefs with sinecures, and the 
remaining income is managed in an ad hoc manner by the turaga of  the proprietary units, 
see Figure 3. Although turaga of  proprietary units are obliged to share the income equally 
amongst the unit, they are entitled to distribute it as they wish. This gives chiefs discretion 
over the majority of  lease rents, facilitating their dominance over Fijian society. The 
poundage paid to the NLTB for its management of  native land also provides the chiefs 
with access to vast material resources, adding to their material advantages over Fijian 
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society. As is explained in the following section, little about the NLTB’s financial 
operations historically can be ascertained, due to its opaque accounting practices and 
financial records. 
Figure 3: Tiered Distribution of  Native Land Lease Rents 
 
Source: Native Land Trust Act 1970. Section 11 (1) 
 
Pacific-Fijian tribal hierarchy has been reinforced and perpetuated through the tiered 
distribution of  land rental income from native land leases (see Figure 3). The tribal-
hierarchy was first institutionalised in 1940 under the NLTO,218 legislation that stipulates 
that lease payments are to be paid by lessees down a tiered structure that reflects the 
hierarchical levels of  the chiefly system. The NLTB subtracts its poundage charge for 
managing the native land and then distributes the rents.219 Of  the total lease rent remaining, 
the turaga i taukei, or head of  vanua (district)220 receives 5% of  the rents paid to their 
mataqali, and all mataqali within their vanua;221 the head of  the turaga ni yavusa, or head of  
yavusa222 receives 10% of  the rents paid to their mataqali, and all mataqali within their 
yavusa;223 and the turaga ni mataqali, or head of  the mataqali,224 receives 15% of  the rents 
paid to their mataqali.225 The remaining 70%226 of  the lease rent is distributed to the turaga 
ni mataqali, or head of  the proprietary unit, who is obliged to distribute the sum fairly 
                                                
218 After independence this was formalised under the 1970 NLTA 
219 Native Land Trust Act 1970. Chapter 134, Section 33, provision 11(1) 
220 Or Turaga ni Vanua 
221 Native Land Trust Act 1970. Section 33, provision 11(1)(d)   
222 Or Turaga ni Qali 
223 Native Land Trust Act 1970. Chapter 134, Section 33, provisions 11(1) and(c)  
224 Ibid. Section 33, provision 11(1)(b) 
225 There are varied interpretations of  the distribution of  lease rents. Commonly it is stated that from the 
overall lease rent the NLTB gets 15%, the turaga i taukei 5%, the turaga ni yavusa 10%, the turaga ni 
mataqali 15% and the then the turaga ni mataqali receives 45% to distribute amongst the mataqali. In 
addition, NLTB General Manager, in an article published in 1988 stated the actual distribution levels were 
in fact: 3.75% to the turaga i taukei, 7.5% to the turana ni yavusa, 11.25% to turaga ni mataqali and 52.5% 
to the mataqali (including the 25% to the NLTB). Due to the inconsistency across the literature I have 
used the distribution as stipulated in the NLTA. 
226 Native Land Trust Act 1970. Section 33, provision 11(1)(a) 
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amongst the people within that unit.227 
 
The tiered hierarchical distribution of  lease rents provides cumulative rents for chiefs, 
exacerbating disparities between chiefs and commoners. As explained earlier in Figure 1, 
vanua units encompass multiple yavusa, and yavusa units encompass multiple mataqali. 
Thus, vanua and yavusa chiefs collect cumulative rents in accordance with their chiefly 
roles. All heads of  vanua are also the head of  their yavusa and the head of  their mataqali. 
Therefore, heads of  vanua receive 5% of  rents received by mataqali units within their 
vanua, and as the head of  yavusa they collect 10% of  rents received by mataqali.228 All 
heads of  yavusa are head of  their mataqali. Therefore, heads of  yavusa receive 10% of  
rents received by all mataqali units within their yavusa, and as head of  the mataqali, they 
receive 15% of  rents received by their mataqali, whereas heads of  mataqali collect the 15% 
of  rents received by their mataqali.  
 
There are no checks on the distribution of  rents amongst landowners, allowing the turaga 
to distribute the rents as they see fit. Since the rules surrounding rent distribution has not 
been reformed since the 1940 NLTO, the mechanism of  resource allocation designed by 
colonial administration to entrench chiefly hierarchy and assist indirect rule was never 
adjusted for the transition from independence to liberal democracy. Such distribution of  
lease rents among proprietary units has encouraged a particular relationship between 
Pacific-Fijians and their mataqali. To receive a share of  rental income, Pacific-Fijians must 
preserve a close association with their mataqali and its turaga. Where Pacific-Fijians cannot 
identify their mataqali, they cannot claim lease rents. At the 1956 census, only 66% of  
Pacific-Fijians were able to identify the mataqali and yavusa to which they belonged.229 The 
control provided to turaga over rent distribution therefore provides material incentives for 
Pacific-Fijians to actively observe chiefly hierarchy. It also imposes costs on Pacific-Fijians 
who live lives, either through choice or circumstance, disconnected from tribal life and their 
historical lineage.230 The institutionalisation of  such stark mechanism of  rent distribution 
accentuates material disparities and the social hierarchy within the traditional social unit. 
These fixed social structures not only permeate the maintenance of  tribal hierarchy, but 
                                                
227 Ibid. Section 33, provision 11(3)  
228 I have used mataqali as the example of  a land owning proprietary unit because they are the most common 
land owning unit. However, this rent distribution structure described applies to all landowning units. 
229 Interestingly this question has not featured in subsequent censuses. The absence of  this data displays 
elite’s desire to not track the decay of  Pacific-Fijians associations with their tribal units. France, The Charter 
of  Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji  p. 174. 
230 These are predominantly urban Pacific-Fijians.  
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also facilitate the chiefly elites manipulation of  Pacific-Fijian communal politics and 
political parties. 
 
The poundage paid to the NLTB also provides Fiji’s high chiefs with direct control over 
large financial resources. Between 1940 and 1998, poundage was fixed at 25% of  the lease 
rents.231 As well as collecting poundage for lease rents, the NLTB also collects poundage on 
premium payments. After the presentation of  the NLTB’s Annual Report in 1997, its first 
in seven years, the NLTB’s Board of  Trustees agreed to an external review of  the NLTB’s 
practices. The Coopers & Lybrand’s report from its review, presented in March 1998, 
stated: “[The NLTB is] not maximising opportunities to increase the level of  income 
flowing to the landowners”, it “is not operating in a business like manner” and is “over 
resourced and inefficient.” It also concluded that, “the poundage level of  25% is 
excessive”.232 As a result, poundage was decreased incrementally from 25% to 15%, at a 
rate of  5% per year between 1999 and 2001.233 Nevertheless, this decrease resulted in an 
increase in residual rents distributed to proprietary units through the mechanism stipulated. 
The NLTB’s records reveal it has compensated for the decrease in poundage by raising 
administration fees and premium costs, leaving little real increase in net residual rent for 
landowners.234  
 
 
NLTB accountability 
 
The NLTB holds a legal monopoly on land-leases.235 This permits the NLTB to inflate 
lease rents and it is the Council of  Chiefs, which exercises direct control over the NLTB 
                                                
231 Native Land Trust Act 1970. Section 14(1). 
The 25 % figure for poundage was set as an estimate cost of  the NLTB’s operation. These were the following 
proportions: 9% for land agency and land administration; 10% for office administration, secretarial and 
conveyancing; and 6% for accountancy, collection and distribution of  rents. Prasad, "Property Rights, 
Economic Performance and the Environment in Fiji: A Study Focusing on Sugar, Tourism and Forestry - 
Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation", p. 83. 
232 Native Land Trust Board, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1998," (Suva: Native Land Trust 
Board, 1998), p. 9. 
233 This decrease was not obliged by legislation. Rather, it was a directive from the Board to management, 
after the financial mismanagement between 1990-1997. Mara’s comment in ———, "Native Land Trust 
Board Annual Report 1990-1997," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 1998), pp. 4-5.  
234 ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1999," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 2000), p. 9. 
235 Biman Prasad points out that in academic studies of  the Pacific, the study of  multinational corporations 
has been given attention but traditional and local institutional monopolies have largely been ignored. He 
points in particular to the NLTB and its legally entrenched monopoly and monopsony over leases and 
landowners respectively in Fiji, have received little attention from scholars. Prasad, "Property Rights, 
Economic Performance and the Environment in Fiji: A Study Focusing on Sugar, Tourism and Forestry - 
Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation", p. 82. 
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and, through it, considerable influence within the Fijian economy. Since the role of  high 
chiefs is institutionalised within the tiered distribution of  lease rents, chiefs have personal 
incentives to inflate lease rents. This is further supported by the NLTB’s opaque 
presentation of  its financial activities in its annual reports.  
 
Through its collection of  poundage from native land lease rents and premiums, the NLTB 
also commands vast political and economic institutional power in Fiji. This political power 
has provided the NLTB with relative freedom in prescribing and adhering to loose financial 
management. The NLTB’s financial records, presented in its annual reports, provide an 
incomplete picture, and what is present lacks reliability. 
 
The NLTB is a dominant actor in Fiji’s political economy. Established in 1940, by the 
colonial administration and Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, the NLTB manages all native land leases. 
In doing this, it approves all new lease agreements and the renewal of  expired lease 
agreements. The NLTB’s Board of Trustees possesses vast power in Fiji, so much, that it 
holds the statutory ability to regulate its own operations. This is facilitated by provisions in 
the NLTA that allow the NLTB to “make its own rules as to its own proceedings under 
this Act and the carrying out of the powers vested in the [Native Land Trust Board’s] 
Board [of Trustees] by this Act.”236  
 
Pacific-Fijian high chiefs, through the Council of  Chiefs, hold considerable influence over 
the NLTB, and appoint of  a majority of  its Board of  Trustees. The Council of  Chiefs 
itself  appoints five of  the 12 members of  the NLTB's Board of  Trustees and the 
remaining Trustees are the President of  Fiji, three Fijian Affairs Board nominees, two 
nominated by the President, the Minister of  Fijian Affairs, who chairs the Board of  
Trustees, and the Board of  Trustees’ Secretary.237 As the President is appointed on the 
advice of  the Council, it also holds indirect influence over the three presidential nominees 
to the Board of  Trustees. The President holds the power to dismiss any non-Pacific-Fijian 
appointee to the Board of  Trustees. In contrast, the President cannot dismiss Pacific-
Fijians from the Board of  Trustees.238 Overall, these rules provide the Council with 
positional influence over eight of  the 12 Board of  Trustees members.  
 
                                                
236 Native Land Trust Act 1970. Section 3(5) 
237 Ibid. Section 3(1) 
238 Ibid. Section 2(b) 
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The NLTB has received substantial income through the poundage it collects from native 
lease activity, but it provides little information about what it does with these resources. 
NLTB financial reports list its greatest expense as the salaries for employees of  the NLTB 
and members of  its Board of  Trustees. Despite the decrease in poundage to 15% in 2001, 
the NLTB still collects far more than comparative tertiary service asset managers.239 
Tertiary service industries also tend to pay the staff  no more than 50% of  their income 
they receive.240 In contrast, in 2001 the NLTB paid out 85%241 of  the poundage collected 
out in salaries, in 2002, it paid out 75%.242 As the NLTB is in many ways the corporate 
embodiment of  the chiefly elite, this ‘poundage’ merely represents a transfer of  resources 
to high chiefs. 
 
The NLTB’s financial reports present flawed accounting procedures that insulate it from 
financial accountability. The NLTB’s accounting practices appear to straddle both public 
and private accounting standards. This can be interpreted as an attempt to shield the 
NLTB’s financial operations from public scrutiny. A more charitable interpretation, 
however, is that the NLTB’s confused legal status has translated into confused financial 
reporting. Indeed, the NLTB describes itself  as “not part of  government, rather…a 
partner of  government in the development of  Fiji.”243 Its collection and distribution of  
lease rents is within a private capacity. In its capacity as the manager of  native land leases, 
however, the NLTB acts in a public capacity. Private and publicly accountable institutions 
are required to adhere to differing accounting standards. The ambiguity surrounding the 
NLTB’s legal state has created uncertainty around the accounting standard to which it must 
adhere. 
 
The NLTB’s financial reports are riddled with inconsistencies and practices that conceal 
more information than they reveal. The NLTB’s Annual Reports for the period 1976-2004 
claim that the NLTB’s “…[accounting] policies do not require the application of  all Fiji 
                                                
239 Parsad, Biman C.,———, "Property Rights, Economic Performance and the Environment in Fiji: A Study 
Focusing on Sugar, Tourism and Forestry - Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation". 
It is cited that private rental arrangements in Queensland only charge approximately 7.5% of  the rents 
collected. 
240 Olivia Majesky, "Metric of  the Month: Salaries as a Percentage of  Operating Expense," Society for Human 
Resource Management Research Quarterly 8-9 (2008). 
241 Native Land Trust Board, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2001," (Suva: Native Land Trust 
Board, 2002), p. 25. 
242 ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2002," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 2002), p. 27. 
243 ———, "Frequently Asked Questions." http://www.nltb.com.fj/faqs.html (accessed 12 March 2009) 
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Accounting Standards.”244 The NLTB’s auditors also acknowledge the NLTB’s substitution 
of  accounting standards, “In our (the auditor’s) opinion, the financial statements have been 
prepared in accordance with the accounting policies described in Note 1 to the financial 
statements...” Note 1 states that the report has been prepared on the basis of  “historical 
costs and…do not take into account current valuation.”245 Citing the incompatibility of  the 
Fiji Accounting Standards (including both modified historical cost and market valuations) 
with the function of  the NLTB, as a manager of  an untradeable asset, the NLTB has 
developed its own accounting standards. The NLTB states that “the accounting policies 
adopted are consistent with those of  the previous year unless otherwise stated, but do not 
conform with all standards promulgated by the Fiji Institute of  Accountants.”246 The 
                                                
244 Across this time period the wording has differed slightly, but its substance has not. I have used the most 
recent wordings. ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1976," (Suva: Native Land 
Trust Board, 1977), p. 23.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1977," (Suva: Native 
Land Trust Board, 1978), p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1978," (Suva: 
Native Land Trust Board, 1979), p. 10.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1979," 
(Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 1980), p. 8.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 
1980," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 1981), p. 8.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual 
Report 1981," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 1982), pp. 8, 17.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust 
Board Annual Report 1982," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 1983), pp. 8, 17.; ———, "Vanua: Native 
Land Trust Board Annual Report 1983," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 1984), pp. 8, 15.; ———, 
"Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1984," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 1985), pp. 8, 
15.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1985," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 
1987), pp. 8, 15.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1986," (Suva: Native Land 
Trust Board, 1988), pp. 12, 24.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1987," (Suva: 
Native Land Trust Board, 1989), pp. 16, 29.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 
1988," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 1991), pp. 8, 21.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board 
Annual Report 1989," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 1991), pp. 9, 22.; ———, "Native Land Trust 
Board Annual Report 1990-1997," pp. 21, 39, 47, 63, 71, 88, 96, 112, 20, 36, 44, 60, 68, 83, 91, 205.; ——
—, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1998," pp. 27, 41.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board 
Annual Report 1999," pp. 19, 35.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2000," (Suva: Native 
Land Trust Board, 2001), pp. 23, 39.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2001," pp. 14, 
29.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2002," pp. 26, 45.; ———, "Native Land Trust 
Board Annual Report 2003," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 2003), pp. 23, 40.; ———, "Native Land 
Trust Board Annual Report 2004," (Suva: Native Land Trust Board, 2005), pp. 20, 42. 
245 Native Land Trust Board, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1976," p. 26.; ———, "Vanua: 
Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1977," p. 16.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual 
Report 1978," p. 14.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1979," p. 13.; ———, 
"Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1980," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board 
Annual Report 1981," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1982," p. 13.; ———
, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1983," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board 
Annual Report 1984," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1985," p. 13.; ———
, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1986," p. 17.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board 
Annual Report 1987," p. 20.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1988," p. 12.; ———
, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1989," p. 13.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual 
Report 1990-1997," pp. 26, 51, 75, 100, 24, 48, 72, 95.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 
1998," p. 31.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1999," p. 23.; ———, "Native Land Trust 
Board Annual Report 2000," p. 27.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2001," p. 18.; ———, 
"Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2002," p. 31.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 
2003," p. 28.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2004," p. 25. 
246 Native Land Trust Board, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1976," p. 26.; ———, "Vanua: 
Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1977," p. 16.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual 
Report 1978," p. 14.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1979," p. 13.; ———, 
"Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1980," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board 
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NLTB’s claim regarding the maintenance of  its ‘traditional’247 accounting practices seems 
to serve its political objectives over its financial needs.  
 
The inconsistencies in the NLTB’s use of  accounting standards go some way toward 
exposing the practices they exist to conceal. The NLTB undermines it own claim that 
modified historical cost and market valuations are inappropriate for its financial operations 
by using both mechanisms in other sections of  its financial reporting. For example, it obeys 
historical cost techniques by using depreciation in the presentation of  its accounts and it 
recognises market valuations through its use of  contingent liabilities in its financial reports. 
In addition, in its presentation of  its investments, on records them according to their 
historical cost valuation.248  
 
Furthermore, the NLTB has a history of  the delayed filing of  annual reports well after the 
year of  focus. It did not release annual reports between 1990 and 1996. Instead, in 1997 it 
released a seven-year retrospective report. The 1990 audit report was signed off  in 
September 1996, whilst the 1991-1996 audit reports were all signed off  in late 1997.249 In 
                                                                                                                                          
Annual Report 1981," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1982," p. 13.; —
——, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1983," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust 
Board Annual Report 1984," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1985," p. 
13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1986," p. 17.; ———, "Vanua: Native 
Land Trust Board Annual Report 1987," p. 20.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 
1988," p. 12.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1989," p. 13.; ———, "Native 
Land Trust Board Annual Report 1990-1997," pp. 26, 51, 75, 100, 24, 48, 72, 95.; ———, "Native Land 
Trust Board Annual Report 1998," p. 31.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1999," p. 
23.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2000," p. 27.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board 
Annual Report 2001," p. 18.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2002," p. 31.; ———, 
"Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2003," p. 28.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual 
Report 2004," p. 25. 
247 Native Land Trust Board, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1976," p. 26.; ———, "Vanua: 
Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1977," p. 16.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual 
Report 1978," p. 14.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1979," p. 13.; ———, 
"Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1980," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board 
Annual Report 1981," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1982," p. 13.; —
——, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1983," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust 
Board Annual Report 1984," p. 13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1985," p. 
13.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1986," p. 17.; ———, "Vanua: Native 
Land Trust Board Annual Report 1987," p. 20.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 
1988," p. 12.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1989," p. 13.; ———, "Native 
Land Trust Board Annual Report 1990-1997," pp. 26, 51, 75, 100, 24, 48, 72, 95.; ———, "Native Land 
Trust Board Annual Report 1998," p. 31.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1999," p. 
23.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2000," p. 27.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board 
Annual Report 2001," p. 18.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2002," p. 31.; ———, 
"Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2003," p. 28.; ———, "Native Land Trust Board Annual 
Report 2004," p. 25.  
248 This is my assertion after having read the conclusion of  Ronita Devi Singh and Mahendra Reddy, 
"Corporate Governance in Fiji's Native Land Trust Board," Pacific Economic Bulletin 22, no. 2 (2007): p. 41. In 
their analysis of  the NLTB’s reports. 
249 Native Land Trust Board, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1990-1997," pp. 21, 39, 47, 63, 71, 88, 
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addition, between 1985 and 1989 audit reports were signed off  over 18 months after the 
year of  the report.250 
 
The NLTB is granted the right to determine ‘market’ values for all lease rents. The 
exclusion of  native land valuations from the NLTB’s financial reports, however, limits 
public knowledge of  the value of  native land lease rents. This makes it difficult to provide 
consistent valuations of  native land. Although the Committee of  Valuers’ reports provide 
the valuations of  agricultural lease agreements within the public domain, its valuations are 
highly inflated as it adopts those of  recently sold freehold land (see lease valuation section 
above). This non-disclosure of  native land valuations, means new tenants of  non-
agricultural leases have no knowledge of  what is a fair, or even what the market rate for 
their lease rents might be. This provides the NLTB vast control in determining lease rents. 
 
Essentially, the NLTB’s simple role of  administrating native land lease rents should provide 
it with a relatively minor role in Fijian economy, in which would exist merely as an 
administrator of  lease rents at prices determined by NLTB land valuers. If  its operations 
were this simple, its accounting practices would be expected to also display simplicity. The 
complex financial operations, however, as displayed by the misleading accounts, suggest the 
extent to which the administration of  native land has been politicised. The presence of  the 
President, Minister of  Fijian Affairs and the dominance of  the Council of  Chiefs over the 
NLTB’s Board of  Trustees, speaks to the overtly political role the NLTB plays within Fiji’s 
economy.  
 
The NLTB’s financial history displays little financial transparency. The annual presentation 
of  audited financial reports, provide some legitimation to the NLTB as an institution. 
Nonetheless, its selective application of  accounting standards have allowed it to construct 
its own reality, while communicating, albeit opaquely, that it operates as a sound financial 
institution, serving a noble purpose.251 The NLTB has erected fences around its operations, 
which are deemed too political for public disclosure, thus excusing itself  from presenting 
                                                                                                                                          
96, 112, 20, 36, 44, 60, 68, 83, 91, 205.; 
250 ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1985," pp. 8, 15.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land 
Trust Board Annual Report 1986," pp. 12, 24.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 
1987," pp. 16, 29.; ———, "Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1988," pp. 8, 21.; ———, 
"Vanua: Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 1989," pp. 9, 22. 
251 Gareth Morgan, "Accounting as Reality Construction: Towards a New Epistemology for Accounting 
Practice," Accounting Organizations and Society 13, no. 5 (1988).; Ruth D. Hines, "Financial Accounting: In 
Communicating Reality, We Construct Reality," Accounting Organizations and Society 13, no. 3 (1988). 
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native land values and only selectively detailing the operations that present the NLTB’s 
operations in positive light. This loose and inconsistent management of  the NLTB’s 
finances, as overseen by its Board of  Trustees, has centralised the chiefs’ control over 
material resources within the Fijian economy.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of  the chiefs’ position in the Fijian economy and the constitutional provisions 
provided to the Council of  Chiefs, it is difficult to call Fiji a democracy. The socio-
economic advantages of  the chiefly elite, provided by the land-tenure system, are 
entrenched within the constitution and excluded from the potential elected legislature’s and 
executive’s to reform them. Fiji’s constitutional structures are not democratic and Fiji was 
never a democracy. 
 
The veto held by the Councils of  Chiefs’ senatorial nominees over the land-tenure system 
is the linchpin of  chiefly control over Fijian society and politics. Through the design of  the 
land-tenure system and the high earnings derived from the sugar industry, the chiefly elite is 
able to control native land, the terms of  lease rents and the distribution of  rental incomes. 
These advantages have all served to perpetuate the chiefs’ dominance over Fijian society.  
 
The case of  Fiji is peculiar. In most cases market forces render illiberal, monopolistic and 
monopsonistic institutions, such as those in Fiji unsustainable. Market competition would 
have disciplined NLTB’s attempts to use its legal monopoly to inflate lease rents, however, 
excess earnings provided by the Fijian sugar industry’s receipt of  EU subsidy payments has 
in part sustained this situation. These heavily inflated lease rents have been filtered down a 
tiered mechanism to landowners, directly reproducing Pacific-Fijian chiefs’ material 
advantages over common Pacific-Fijians. Furthermore, the design of  Fiji’s land tenure-
system has permitted the chiefly hierarchy to exist as an authority parallel to and has 
repeatedly undermined elected government. 
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Chapter Four: Independence and the Resurgence of Authoritarianism 
1970 -1990 
 
 
Since independence, Fiji has had a troubled experience with electoral governance. The 
chiefly elite has usurped government when electoral processes have produced political 
outcomes at odds with their interests. Each time electoral institutions have produced a 
change of  government chiefly control has moved to displace these elected governments. 
These overthrows of  government reflect the depth at which chiefly hierarchy has been 
entrenched in formal institutions of  government, the economic and political powers of  the 
elite outside of  the electoral process, and the chiefs’ ability to reassert their dominance of  
government. Moreover, they display how, despite the presence of  ‘modern’ liberal 
institutions, an authoritarian chiefly elite has maintained its control of  government even 
when electoral institutions threatened to remove it from power. 
 
The dominance of  the chiefly elite underlies the façade of  Fijian democracy. Fiji’s three 
constitutions have each prescribed a limited role for the chiefly elite, while masking the true 
extent of  its dominance. Entrenchment of  the chiefly elite in Fiji’s political economy has 
provided the chiefs’ with the means to dominate government within constitutional bounds 
and, when necessary, through armed force. Control of  an infrastructure of  illiberal 
institutions provides the elite with both the financial means and socio-political legitimacy to 
crush electoral institutions when electoral results do not coincide with chiefly interests. 
 
This chapter examines the chiefly elite’s actions to undermine electoral outcomes and 
ensure the continuation of  its control of  government. First, it explains the attempts of  
Ratu Sir Kamisese Kapaiwai Tuimacilai Mara, Prime Minister and leader of  the Alliance 
Party, to forge a cross-ethnic coalition and the electoral consequences of  this. Mara’s failed 
attempt to forge a cross-ethnic coalition of  voters exposed the static nature of  political 
cleavages and the risks of  reforming the fundamental features of  the land-tenure system. 
Second, it addresses the rise of  the Fiji Labour Party, its electoral victory in 1987 and the 
subsequent coup. This coup deposed the Labour-National Federation government, and was 
the first time the parallel set of  authoritarian institutions, controlled by the Pacific-Fijian 
chiefly elite, was exposed. 
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The first Fijian elections 1970-1977 
 
The general election of  1977 was the first threat to the political dominance of  the Pacific-
Fijian chiefly elite over Fijian society. The Alliance Party, led by Mara,252 had been in power 
since the pre-independence election of  1968. It guided Fiji through independence and 
solidified its electoral appeal with victory in the 1972 general election. Following the 
election, the new Prime Minister sought to consolidate his electoral base. In order to 
solidify his, and his chiefly peers, control over Fiji’s political institutions, he sought to 
attract votes from the Indo-Fijian population. To do this, Mara attempted to form a new 
political coalition bridging Fiji’s ethnic communities under his leadership and multicultural 
governance.253 
 
Mara appealed to Indo-Fijian voters through their interest in the status of  the 1966 
ALTO,254 which governed agricultural land leases.255 Mara, however, overestimated his 
personal influence in Pacific-Fijian communities, and efforts to construct a coalition with 
Indo-Fijian interests around ALTO alienated a number of  Mara’s core supporters. At the 
1977 general election, conservative Pacific-Fijian communities abandoned the Alliance 
Party in reaction to Mara’s courting of  Indo-Fijian support by passing the 1976 ALTA. 
However, Mara narrowly escaped the full ramifications of  this political misjudgement. 
Although the National Federation Party256 won a plurality of  seats at the 1977 election, the 
                                                
252 Mara assumed the leadership of  the Alliance Party through his status as a high chief  and his close 
associations with a tight elite of  European, part European and Indo-Fijian business interests. Mara’s 
chiefly authority arose from his chiefly title, as Tui Nayau. It also came from his wife, Adi Mara’s chiefly 
status, she was from the confederacy of  Burebasaga and her title Roko Tui Drekti is the highest chiefly 
title in the islands. Roderic Alley, "The Emergence of  Party Politics in Fiji," in Politics in Fiji: Studies in 
Contemporary History, ed. Brij V. Lal (North Sydney, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 34-40.  
253 Mara commonly described policies within his multicultural governance as the “Pacific way”. He even used 
it in the title of  his autobiography: Kaimesese Mara, The Pacific Way: A Memoir (Honolulu: University of  
Hawaii Press, 1997). This “Pacific way” became an ideology used by a number of  political elites across 
various Pacific Islands where it synthesised various local appeals for the maintenance of  “tradition”. Here 
the chiefly elite, and particularly Mara, used a combination of  traditionalism, ethno-nationalism and ethnic 
racism and labeled it multiculturalism within the “Pacific way.” Michael C. Howard, "Vanuatu: The Myth 
of  Melanesian Socialism," Labour, Capital and Society 16, no. 2 (1983): p. 180-86. 
254 See the discussion of  this in Chapter Three. 
255 The importance of  the review of  the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance in Mara’s electoral 
strategy has been underemphasised by the literature. With the benefit of  historical insight and 
understanding of  the political importance of  the land tenure system, however, the importance of  the 
legislating of  Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act in Mara’s strategy of  constructing a cross-ethnic 
coalition is unmistakable. 
256 The National Federation Party grew out of  the Federation of  Cane Growers, which had been set up in 
1960 by Indo-Fijian sugar farmers to voice grievances against the Colonial Sugar Refining Company. The 
National Federation Party had its first national convention in 1965, where it solidified its constituency 
amongst the Indo-Fijian community. Initially led by A. D. Patel, who was its first Party president and then 
leader in the Legislative Council, after his death in late 1969, Siddiq Koya took over as Party leader. Alley, 
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distribution of  electoral seats left it unable to form a workable coalition and the Governor 
General called a second election. While constitutional, the consequences of  the Governor 
General’s actions raised questions about his impartiality.  
 
This section is in two parts. First, it explains Mara’s attempt to court political support from 
the Indo-Fijian community with the passing of  the ALTA. The ALTA formalised lease 
conditions that favoured leaseholders, mainly Indo-Fijians, against the material interests of  
the Alliance Party’s core constituency. Second, it addresses the general election of  1977 and 
the challenge it presented to the Alliance Party and its dominance over Fijian politics. The 
Alliance Party’s key strategic reform of  its second term translated to electoral overreach. 
Luckily for the Alliance Party, it was reinstated as government by the Governor General’s 
solution to the constitutional crisis. 
 
 
ALTA: a political act 
 
Ahead of  the 1977 general election, Mara’s government legislated a reform of  agricultural 
land rents to attract Indo-Fijian political support. After independence, all colonial 
ordinances, including the 1966 ALTO, required a legal review by the government. The 
Government needed to reform agricultural leases, either by preserving the provisions of  
ALTO in a post-independence legal framework, favouring lease holders, or by drawing 
agricultural leases under the terms of  the 1970 NLTA, which would extend the chiefly 
elite’s control over native land. Considering Mara's electoral position as the incumbent 
Prime Minister, it seemed an unusual choice to legislate against the interests of  the Alliance 
Party’s core constituency by formalising the ALTO’s provisions.257  
 
After two general elections, it was clear to Mara that the Alliance Party’s long-term 
dominance of  the electoral system would be possible if  it could capture votes outside the 
Pacific-Fijian community. As Indo-Fijians had received little real political representation 
from either colonial or elected governments, Mara saw the Indo-Fijian community as 
having significant electoral potential. In legislating the ALTA, the Alliance government 
                                                                                                                                          
"The Emergence of  Party Politics in Fiji," pp. 40-47. 
257 Notably the reform of  the ALTO to the ALTA came soon after the signing of  the Sugar Protocol, in the 
European Union’s (EU) 1975 Lomé Convention. This deal guaranteed the Fijian sugar industry 
preferential access to European markets and subsidy payments comparable to the EU’s own internal price 
for sugar per tonne. See discussion in preceding chapter.   
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sought the goodwill of  the Indo-Fijian community at the expense of  alienating groups 
within the Pacific-Fijian community, especially the chiefly elite.  
 
The structure of  the Fiji’s land-tenure system and the lease agreements governed by the 
NLTA favours the native land owners (for the differences between ALTA and NLTA see 
Table 3 and note discussion of  lease rents in Chapter Three). Under the NLTA, chiefly 
elites, through the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) determine the terms of  lease 
agreements, the value of  rent and premiums to be paid. Although agricultural native land 
leases fell under the ALTO (that favoured leaseholders), its terms were up for review after 
independence. Formalisation of  agricultural land leases under the ALTO benefited Indo-
Fijian communities and demonstrated Mara’s commitment to integrating their interests in 
the governing of  the country. Thus, legislating the ALTA provided Mara a policy tool to 
make electoral gains.  
 
It is significant to note that in choosing to reform the ALTO Mara was altering Fiji’s land-
tenure system and, thus, needed support from a majority of  the eight Senators nominated 
by the Council of  Chiefs. Although the NLTB publicly opposed formalisation of  the 
ALTO, as it severely disadvantaged the NLTB and native land owners, these Senators still 
voted for the reform. Despite the chiefs’ material interests in eliminating the ALTO, Mara 
had sufficient control over his chiefly peers to provide him the necessary political support 
to formalise it.  
 
Fiji’s illiberal land-tenure system and the legislation that governs lease agreements are 
highly political as they are central determinants of  the structure of  the economy. Passage 
of  the 1976 ALTA formalised the differences between agricultural and non-agricultural 
leases, as the ALTO had provided. The ALTA formalised the provisions of  the ALTO in 
the post-independence legal environment and altered the land-tenure system in a highly 
political manner. The ALTO in 1966 removed all new agricultural leases from the control 
of  the NLTB and its arbitrary system of  rent setting, into one formalised system of  fixed 
land valuation and lease rents. In doing this, the ATLO had decreased the chiefly elite’s 
control over native land.  
Table 3: The differences between ALTA and NLTA lease agreements 
 
Terms and Conditions  ALTA NLTA 
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Lease Tenure  Minimum: 30 years  
Maximum: indefinite, but the 
30 years has become a de 
facto maximum 
Minimum: of  5 years 
Maximum: 99 years 
Most leases a rolling 5-10 years 
Rent  6% of  the Unimproved 
Capital Value (UCV) 
NLTB sets a “market” rent 
Premium No premium Premium paid 
Renewal of  Lease No right of  renewal  Right of  renewal subject to 
NLTB’s consent 
Settlement of  Disputes By the Fiji Sugar Industry 
Tribunal 
By independent arbitration 
Choice of  land utilisation Tenant determined As stipulated in the Act 
Source: Native Land Trust Board, ‘Distinctions Between ALTA & NLTA 
 
The difference between the NLTA, the ALTA and their preceding ordinances are vast, see 
Table 3. As explained in the preceding chapter under NLTA, the NLTB determines (on 
behalf  of  native land owners) the value of  rents and premium payment and sets the 
financial terms of  all individual non-agricultural lease rents.258 In contrast, under the ALTA, 
agricultural lease rents have a fixed value, set by the Committee of  Valuers of  which 6% is 
charged as annual rents and have no premium.259 Another key difference between them is 
the NLTA non-agricultural leases have a short minimum lease period of  5 years260 with a 
capped maximum of  99 years,261 while the ALTA lease agreements have a longer minimum 
lease length of  30 years, and no maximum.262 The passing of  the ALTA proved to be an 
immensely political decision favouring many, predominantly Indo-Fijian leaseholders, at the 
expense of  chiefly influence.   
 
In reviewing the ALTO, the Alliance government was not obliged to formalise the 
ordinance as they had done when formalising the NLTO263 into the NLTA. Instead, it had 
the option to override the ALTO with an amendment to the NLTA, extending the NLTA 
to cover agricultural lease agreements. However, it chose not to do so. Instead, it preserved 
the ALTO’s terms, which were favourable to agricultural farmers, predominantly Indo-
                                                
258 Native Land Trust Act 1970. Part 2, Section 13  
259 Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act 1976. Part II, Section 14(1) 
260 The minimum NLTA is stipulated in this document: Native Land Trust Board, "Distinctions between 
Native Land Trust Act & Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act," (Native Land Trust Board). But a 
minimum NLTA lease term is not specified in the NLTA itself. 
261 Native Land Trust Act 1970. Part IV, Section 33(6). ———, "Distinctions between Native Land Trust Act 
& Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act." 
262 Although ALTA and NLTA both have dates subsequent to their original passing, 1978 and 1985 
respectively, these were not the dates of  the original legislation. The terms of  ALTA were legislated by 
Act No. 35 of  1976 and the terms of  NLTA were legislated by the issuing of  Legal Notice 112 of  1970. 
Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act 1976. Part II, Section 6(b). Native Land Trust Board, "Distinctions 
between Native Land Trust Act & Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act." 
263 The terms of  the 1940 NLTO had been formalised as an Act by Legal Notice 112 of  1970. 
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Fijian sugar farmers. This move added weight to Mara’s credibility as an advocate for the 
Indo-Fijian community.  
 
While Mara entered the 1977 election expecting to consolidate the Alliance Party’s 
dominance in Fijian politics, the outcome proved much different. In seeking to extend its 
electoral appeal by passing the ALTA, the Alliance government achieved only electoral 
overreach. Although legislating the ALTA elicited support from Indo-Fijian communities, 
and bolstered the claims that the Alliance Party could construct policy across ethnic 
political divides, it alienated conservative Pacific-Fijians, splintering the Alliance Party’s core 
constituency.  
 
 
The March 1977 election 
 
The March 1977 general election was inconclusive, resulting in a constitutional quagmire. 
The situation tested the strength of  both Fiji’s electoral institutions and the Governor 
General’s impartiality as the upholder of  the rule of  law and the electoral institutions. The 
opaque nature of  the electoral result and the odd set of  events that followed paved the way 
for the Alliance Party’s return to power.  
 
The chiefly elite’s dominance within the polity had led to one of  the highest chiefs, Ratu Sir 
Joji Kadavulevu George Cakobau,264 holding the office of  Governor General. Cakobau was 
responsible for upholding the system of  checks and balances inherent in the Fijian 
constitution, yet his response to the indecisive electoral result was to disregard it 
completely. Although this was strictly constitutional, it did call into question his neutrality, 
and provided the first glimpse of  the authoritarian reality underlying Fiji’s post-colonial 
political institutions.  
 
Having overseen a peaceful transition to independence, and governed Fiji by promoting 
multiculturalism for nine years,265 Mara was defeated at the polls. The National Federation 
Party won a plurality with 26 of  the 52 seats in the House of  Representatives, with the 
                                                
264 Cakobau was one of  the highest chiefs in both Fijian colonial and post-colonial history. He was a 
paramount chief, holding the traditional titles of  Vunivalu of  Bau and Tui Levuka, and was a member of  the 
Council of  Chiefs between 1938 and 1972, until his appointment as Governor General in 1973. 
265 Although two of  these years were before independence, Mara possessed vast influence having been the 
political leader of  Fiji between the 1968 election and independence in 1970. 
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Alliance Party winning 24 seats and the Fijian Nationalist Party the remaining two. Mara’s 
attempt, with the passage of  the ALTA, to build a cross-ethnic coalition and reach out to 
the Indo-Fijian community, in fact isolated groups within the Pacific-Fijian community. The 
Fijian Nationalist Party, led by Sakeasi Butadroka,266 emerged in 1974267 challenging the 
Alliance Party’s position as the protector of  Pacific-Fijian interests and the chiefly 
system.268 At this election, the Alliance Party’s vote was squeezed from both sides.269 Its 
vote in Pacific-Fijian communal electorates fell from 83% in 1972, to 67% in 1977.270 A 
large proportion of  these lost votes went to the Fijian Nationalist Party, the first election it 
contested, which won 25% of  the vote in Pacific-Fijian communal electorates.271 
Conservative Pacific-Fijian communities abandoned Mara, believing he had marginalised 
their interests and threatened chiefly paramountcy. The Alliance Party also saw its vote in 
Indo-Fijian communal electorates drop from 24% in 1972, to 16% in 1977,272 a result of  
the National Federation Party’s success in achieving electoral unity within the Indo-Fijian 
community. 
 
Although the National Federation Party achieved a plurality of  the vote, it did not form a 
government. The National Federation Party was one seat short of  a majority in the house, 
while the Alliance Party needed three seats to form a government. This left the formation 
of  a majority coalition government limited to two combinations. The political distance 
between National Federation Party and the Fijian Nationalist Party meant that a coalition 
between these two was not viable, leaving a coalition between the two largest parties as the 
only plausible solution. Mara, however, rejected Koya’s overtures to negotiate such a deal, 
precipitating instead a constitutional crisis, in which Governor General Cakobau held the 
power to determine the solution.273  
 
After the election, the National Federation Party met to elect a formal leader, having 
                                                
266 Butadroka was elected as an Alliance Party Member of  Parliament in 1972. He left the Alliance in 1974, 
forming the Fijian Nationalist Party. Ahmed Ali, "The Fiji General Election of  1977," The Journal of  Pacific 
History 12, no. Part 4 (1977): p. 193.  
267 While the Fijian Nationalist Party emerged before the formalisation of  ALTO, it believed its claims of  
Mara margainalising Pacific-Fijian interests were vindicated by the passing of  ALTA. 
268 In October 1975, Butadroka had unsuccessfully moved a parliamentary motion requesting the 
Government repatriate all Fijian citizens of  Indo-Fijian ethnicity. Although this motion was unsuccessful, 
it provided Butadroka with extensive radio and press coverage. Ali, "The Fiji General Election of  1977," 
p. 193.   
269 Ibid.: p. 190, 98. 
270 Ibid.: p. 191. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid.  
273 Norton, Race and Politics in Fiji, p. 118. 
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campaigned without one. Dr Siddiq Koya was elected leader, but it took two ballots to do 
so, displaying disunity within a party that would later rupture into factions.274 After the 
election of  Koya as leader of  the National Federation Party, despite it only holding 26 
seats, Cakobau invited Koya to form a government and he made an appointment to do so, 
and departed for Government House to be sworn in. Yet, in the intervening 45 minutes 
between agreeing to swear Koya in and his arrival at Government House, Cakobau, called 
Mara to his residence and appointed him interim Prime Minister.275 Cakobau then informed 
the people of  Fiji of  his actions:  
 
“In the recent elections the people of  Fiji did not give a clear mandate 
to either of  the major political parties. It therefore became the duty of  
the Governor General under the Constitution to appoint as Prime 
Minister the member of  the House of  Representatives who appeared 
to him best able to command the support of  the majority of  the 
House…In compliance with the Constitution and acting in his own 
deliberate judgement, the Governor General has accordingly appointed 
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as Prime Minister.”276  
 
Rather than pressure Mara to work with Koya to form a government, or simply allow Koya 
to test his support in the parliament, Cakobau had chosen to effectively pre-empt the 
electoral results. Although the Alliance Party was defeated, Cakobau’s actions allowed it to 
maintain control of  government. If  Mara had been the statesman he proclaimed himself  to 
be, he could have chosen to acknowledge the people’s will by working with Koya to 
maintain the legitimacy of  Fiji’s electoral institutions. Instead, he supported Cakobau’s 
actions, which although constitutionally permissible, undermined the legitimacy of  Fiji’s 
institutions and permanently disrupted the potential for parties not backed by the chiefly 
elite to attain government.  
 
Cakobau’s solution to the constitutional crisis raised also questions about the ability of  
high chiefs in the highest constitutional positions to act impartially in protecting 
                                                
274 The first ballot was a tie of  13 each between Koya and General Maitoga. The second ballot resulted in 14 
votes for Koya and 12 for Maitoga. Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrel, Heads of  State in the Pacific: A Legal and 
Constitutional Analysis (Suva: Institute of  Pacific Studies of  the University of  the South Pacific, 1990), p. 
175.; Ali, "The Fiji General Election of  1977," p. 200. 
275 Ghai and Cottrel, Heads of  State in the Pacific: A Legal and Constitutional Analysis, p. 175.; Ali, "The Fiji 
General Election of  1977," p. 200. 
276 Ali, "The Fiji General Election of  1977," p. 201. 
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constitutional and electoral institutions. As one of  the highest chiefs in Fiji’s history, the 
reassertion of  the chiefly-backed Alliance Party as government, seemed to serve Cakobau’s 
interests as much as that of  any other high chief.  
 
After bypassing the March electoral result and reappointing Mara, Cakobau called a second 
general election for September 1977. He proclaimed this the only workable solution to the 
constitutional crisis. The actions of  the Governor General returned the incumbent 
government, which subsequently ruled for another ten years. The lack of  a change of  
government over this time, and in particular as a result of  the March 1977 election, further 
compounded problems regarding the legitimacy of  Fiji’s electoral institutions. 
Furthermore, the National Federation Party’s inability to form a government after the first 
election exacerbated the emergence of  internal factions and undermined its electoral 
credibility, and the credibility of  any alternative to chiefly dominance, as was borne out in 
subsequent election results.  
 
 
The September 1977 election 
 
Following the bypassing of  the March election results, Mara quickly reasserted himself  as 
the foremost political representative of  the Pacific-Fijian community. Subsequently, the 
Alliance Party won a landslide victory in the September election claiming 36 of  the 52 seats 
in the House of  Representatives. This was mainly due to Cakobau’s solution to the 
constitutional crisis posed by the March election result, which undermined the electoral 
appeal of  both the National Federation Party and the Fijian Nationalist Party. The crisis 
had demonstrated to Pacific-Fijians that without political unity, the maintenance of  chiefly 
interests could not be guaranteed. This led to Pacific-Fijian voters returning to the Alliance 
Party and it regained the two seats lost to the Fijian Nationalist Party, who won no seats at 
the September 1977 general election. It also regained seats lost to the National Federation 
Party in March 1977. Notably, in the Pacific-Fijian communal electorates, the Alliance 
Party’s vote rose from 65% in March 1977, to 81% in September.277  
 
For Mara, the scare of  March 1977 election hardened his political resolve for another 
decade, during which he retained control of  government throughout. Although he 
                                                
277 Norton, Race and Politics in Fiji, p. 188. 
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continued to publicly refer to his multicultural experiment, Mara never again attempted to 
court the Indo-Fijian vote on the scale of  the ALTA. At the same time infighting within 
the National Federation Party, arising from its inability to form a government, partnered 
with intra-party generational change, hindered the party’s organisation and electoral appeal 
throughout the following decade. 
 
The events of  1977 also changed the character of  politics in Fiji. Henceforth, ethnic 
cleavages framed electoral results, with only voter turnout determining electoral outcomes. 
The events of  March 1977 demonstrated that the distribution of  electoral seats amongst 
political parties was effectively ‘frozen’, while ethnicity was the primary cleavage within the 
polity. This ongoing stasis was entrenched by Mara’s failed attempt to construct an 
electoral coalition across ethnic groups, followed by Koya’s inability to form a coalition 
government. It soon became apparent that a new form of  politics was needed if  the 
Alliance Party’s electoral dominance was to be challenged.  
 
 
The demise of  electoral governance 1987-1990 
 
Ten years after the constitutional crisis threatened the chiefly elites control of  government, 
electoral institutions once again threatened their dominance at the general election of  1987. 
In that election, the Labour Party-National Federation Party Coalition278 won an outright 
majority, securing 28 seats to the Alliance Party’s 24.279 Unlike in March 1977, the coalition 
parties held a majority of  seats and a clear mandate to govern, resulting in the formation 
of  Fiji’s first government not backed by the chiefly elite. Although the Pacific-Fijian chiefly 
elite still controlled the economy, and Pacific-Fijian chiefs held the offices of  President and 
Vice-President, as well as a majority of  the seats in the Senate, the chiefs had lost control 
of  government. The transition to a new government, only Fiji’s second government after 
independence, created a tension between elected government and the chiefly elite that 
                                                
278 Here the National Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party campaigned together as a coalition. Their 
coalition agreement was finalised in December 1986 and on the ballot the parties were listed as one. Of  
the 52 candidates selected to contest the election, 37 were from the Labour Party. However, many Labour 
candidates were selected for unwinnable seats. Following the election, exactly half  of  the coalition’s MPs 
were Labour members, although the majority of  Cabinet members came from the Labour Party. I will 
refer to the government elected in March 1987 as the ‘Labour-National Federation Coalition 
Government’. Lawson, The Failure of  Democratic Politics in Fiji, p. 253.; Brij V. Lal, "Before the Storm: An 
Analysis of  the Fiji General Election of  1987 " Pacific Studies 12, no. 1 (1988): p. 73-79.  
279 Lal, "Before the Storm: An Analysis of  the Fiji General Election of  1987 ": p. 71. 
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retained overwhelming influence in both the economy and society. Events following the 
1987 election result revealed the authoritarian institutional infrastructure underlying Fiji’s 
political economy. 
 
The Labour-National Federation coalition’s electoral majority created a challenge for the 
chiefly elite. Unlike 1977, where Cakobau used his constitutional powers to bypass the 
National Federation Party’s electoral ‘victory’, the chiefly elite possessed no legal means to 
remove the Labour-National Federation government from power. However, while the 
chiefly elite had no formal powers to inhibit the government’s formation, their significant 
influence within the Pacific-Fijian community remained. As Fiji’s electoral institutions were 
yet to produce a change of  government, chiefly support was crucial if  the Labour-National 
Federation coalition was to translate its electoral success into a wide mandate from all 
Fijians to govern.  
 
The events that followed the 1987 election further revealed the nature of  the power 
structures underlying Fiji’s political institutions. Seventeen years of  Alliance Party rule had 
entrenched the chiefly hierarchy’s dominance of  the polity. This had negated the presence 
of  electoral results, leaving electoral institutions somewhat ill prepared to observe the 
peoples’ demands for a change in government. The chiefs’ response to the 1987 general 
election is the most documented feature of  Fiji’s history: a coup d’état.  
 
The seemingly unending rule of  the Alliance Party had rendered Fiji’s electoral institutions 
superfluous. Although, the Labour-National Federation government had attracted voters 
from across Fiji’s ethnic communities, its electoral mandate had little legitimacy in the eyes 
of  chiefly elites. The chiefs were unwilling to tolerate a government beyond their authority 
and control. Consequently, the Labour-National Federation government, sworn in on 13 
April 1987, lasted only a month. Its sudden removal would also see Fiji’s constitution 
rewritten to entrench chiefly privilege and ensure that electoral institutions could never 
again undermine chiefly authority again. The overthrow of  government in 1987 exposed a 
parallel set of  authoritarian institutions controlled by the chiefly elite. 
 
This section is split in three parts. First, it examines the arrival of  the Labour Party and the 
impact this had on political cleavages within the polity. Second, it then explains the 1987 
general election and the subsequent coup. The overthrow of  government in 1987 exposed 
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a parallel set of  authoritarian institutions controlled by the chiefly elite. Finally, it addresses 
how the 1990 constitutional reform served to entrench Pacific-Fijian advantage within 
electoral institutions, to guarantee chiefly-backed governments.  
 
 
A change of  government  
 
The general election of  1987 brought a new form of  politics to Fiji. Mara’s rule was over 
and a new political entity, the Fiji Labour Party, in a coalition government with the National 
Federation Party, ended the Alliance Party’s political dominance. Established in 1985, the 
Labour Party presented a new of  politics to Fiji, one that spoke of  class280 instead of  
race.281 During the 1987 election campaign, Labour Party leader Dr Timoci Bavadra282 had 
emphasised that the individual’s democratic right to vote, did not mean a compulsion to 
vote for a chief, rather, “it was a free choice.”283 Throughout their campaign, the Labour 
Party agued chiefs had manipulated politics within the Pacific-Fijian community and 
encouraged Pacific-Fijians to think beyond communalism when casting their vote. 
 
The arrival of  the Labour Party redrew political cleavages, and altered the rules of  electoral 
campaigning in Fiji.284 Its success also demonstrated the viability of  political coalitions 
across ethnic communities. The Labour Party spoke beyond racial identities, and Mara’s 
multicultural experiment, in doing this they identified the authoritarian hierarchy of  chiefly 
elites and the power of  big business as the real causes of  Fiji’s ills. This new form of  
politics transcended ethnic divisions, and appealed to those disaffected by Mara’s arbitrary 
                                                
280 A distinction must be drawn between race and ethnicity when discussing the characteristics of  the Fijian 
polity. Historically in Fiji, race and ethnicity have been closely associated as defining political ideas. As 
Robert Norton has documented, racial politics is the manipulation and politicisation of  ethnic differences 
by political elites whose interests have been in the division of  the two predominant ethnic groupings in 
Fiji. Norton, Race and Politics in Fiji. 
281 Mahendra Chaudhry, The Rise of  the Fijian Labour Party (Sydney: H. V. Evatt Memorial Foundation, 1987).; 
Brij V. Lal, "Postscript: The Emergence of  the Fiji Labour Party," in Politics in Fiji: Studies in Contemporary 
History, ed. Brij V. Lal (North Sydney, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1986). 
282 Bavadra was a medical doctor from a middle class background. He typified many Pacific-Fijians who had 
risen to prominence in the civil service in the period following independence. As the head of  his 
Tokatoka (sub-lineage or extended family) he was a low-ranking chief  but, like many Pacific-Fijians from 
western Fiji, he chose not to use his title of  Ratu. Lal, "Rhetoric and Reality: The Dilemmas of  
Contemporary Fijian Politics," p. 99. 
283 Brij V. Lal, Broken Waves: A History of  the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century, Pacific Islands Monograph 
Series (Honolulu: University of  Hawaii Press, 1992), p. 337. 
284 Although due to their combined campaign it is difficult to ascertain the relative effectiveness of  the 
Labour Party’s campaign compared to the National Federation’s, extant literature emphasises on the new 
politics brought by the Labour Party and the importance of  its discourse in shaping election debate. 
Lawson, The Failure of  Democratic Politics in Fiji.; Robertson and Tamanisau, Fiji: Shattered Coups. 
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exertion of  power, building electoral support in both Indo-Fijian and urban Pacific-Fijian 
communities.285  
 
The arrival of  this new politics of  class had freed electioneering from its demographic 
stalemate. Previously, no political party had been able to attract significant support from 
multiple ethnic communities and an ethnic demographic majority had translated to an 
electoral majority as long as political unity was maintained within that ethnic community. 
The Alliance Party had achieved high socio-political cohesion by institutionalising the 
chiefly system within the party, with high chiefs represented throughout its ranks. By 
imposing this formal social hierarchy within the Party, it facilitated disciplined ethnic voting 
amongst Pacific-Fijians, making political unity within this community straightforward.   
 
The problem for the Labour-National Federation government,286 was that although it 
possessed electoral legitimacy, a clear mandate and a willingness to share power across 
ethnic communities, it lacked chiefly support, and this undermined its longevity. Because a 
majority of  the coalition’s MPs were of  Indo-Fijian ethnicity, the coalition elevated Pacific-
Fijian MPs to cabinet to demonstrate its commitment to cross-ethnic power sharing, and to 
bolster its legitimacy in the eyes of  Pacific-Fijians. It appointed Labour Party leader, Dr 
Timoci Bavadra, a Pacific-Fijian as Prime Minister along with six other Pacific-Fijians MPs 
from the Labour Party as Ministers.  
 
The 1987 election brought Fiji’s first change of  government and, consequently, raised 
tensions that would undermine the legitimacy of  Fiji’s electoral institutions. Mara 
acknowledged his defeat, saying: “You have given your decision. That decision must be 
accepted. While I am naturally disappointed…I am proud that we have been able to 
demonstrate that democracy is alive and well in Fiji.”287 Yet, despite this rhetoric, chiefs’ 
were questioning the sustainability of  the new government, thus ensuring that the hope 
Mara had displayed in Fijian democracy and the rule of  law would be premature. The 
eventual usurping of  government in 1987 provides the second and clearest illustration of  
the continuing authoritarian structure of  Fijian politics.  
 
 
                                                
285 Ravuvu, The Facade of  Democracy: Fijian Struggles for Political Control 1830-1987, p. 77.  
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The reassertion of  chiefly control over government 
 
On 14 May 1987, Fiji’s democratic facade came crashing down. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Rabuka, the third-in-command of  the Fijian Royal Military Forces (FRMF), led a group of  
armed soldiers into the parliamentary complex in Suva and ordered sitting MPs to evacuate 
Parliament. The 1987 electoral defeat was too harsh a reality for chiefs to tolerate.  
 
The loss of  direct control of  government was considered unacceptable, forcing the chiefs 
to usurp the new government and override the constitution and rule of  law. This action 
proved electoral processes would only be permitted to determine the composition of  
government if  they reaffirmed the chiefly-backed Alliance Party’s rule. If  1977 had 
indicated a weakness of  Fiji’s electoral institutions because of  the institutional control of  
the chiefly elite, the events of  1987 made this relationship unmistakable. 
 
A clear relationship existed between the chiefly elite and the protagonists of  the 1987 coup, 
and indeed considerable evidence demonstrates that the chiefly elite orchestrated the 
overthrow itself. In his authorised biography,288 Rabuka illustrated how he played golf  with 
Mara in the days leading up to the coup. In speaking of  the problem of  the Labour-
National Federation government, Rabuka recounts the following incident: “Mara looked at 
him carefully and said, quietly, ‘The only way to change the situation is to throw the 
constitution out the window.’ Rabuka replied, ‘I can do that sir.’”289 Throughout the coup, 
Rabuka made clear his desire to reassert the chiefs as Fiji’s highest authority and on 14 May 
Rabuka stated, “Everyone is welcome to come and live here as our guest, as long as the 
[Pacific-] Fijian[s] run the nation.”290 Such rhetoric highlights a Taukei Movement291 view 
that the chiefly elite must remain the highest and exclusive political authority in Fiji.   
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Rabuka expressed a number of  motivations for the coup: he claimed he was on a mission 
“that God has given me” to ensure “the survival of  the [Pacific-] Fijian race.”292 The most 
telling justification came in his conception of  the role of  the chiefs in the governance of  
Fiji, asserting:  
 
“When a political party loses, and that party is the sole and final 
guarantor of  your values, you would be forced to do something about 
it…I am a commoner and to see my high chief  [Mara] being accused of  
corruption with no proof…[and] the language used against him, I will 
never accept nor would any right thinking [Pacific-] Fijian.”293 
 
Writing in 2000, Rabuka reflected, “The objective of  the 1987 coups as confirmed by the 
Great Council of  Chiefs on 20 May 1987, was to change the constitution in favour of  the 
indigenous Fijians…The aim was…assertion of  the indigenous Fijian identity and the 
leadership of  the role of  the chiefs.”294 During the coup, as seen in his justification, Rabuka 
failed to acknowledge constitutional legitimacy, democratic process, or the rule of  law. 
From the earliest days after the coup, Rabuka asserted that Fiji’s chiefly elite is the ultimate 
focus of  political loyalty for Pacific-Fijians.295 The absence of  chiefly support for the 
Labour-National Federation government meant it was doomed to fail from its inception.296 
One dominant rationale was clear, the restoration of  chiefly authority at the top of  Fiji’s 
political institutions.  
 
Following the election of  the Labour-National Federation government, anti-government 
rhetoric quickly became commonplace within conservative Pacific-Fijian communities. The 
actions of  chiefs’ following the coup provide insight into their opinions of  the overthrow. 
At a political Taukei Movement meeting after the coup, a prominent chief  of  Kubuna 
stated, “Ratu Mara’s government has been defeated and so all the chiefs in the land have 
been defeated.”297 Governor General Ratu Sir Penaia Kanatabatu Ganilau298 was the only 
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high chief  to condemn the overthrow of  the Labour-National Federation government 
publicly. However, even his opposition evaporated quickly when he realised he was isolated 
amongst his chiefly peers. Despite earlier rhetoric, Mara was one of  the first to publicly 
support Rabuka’s actions and then join the transitional cabinet. Most significantly, the 
Council of  Chiefs endorsed Rabuka’s actions overwhelmingly. High chiefs interests in 
maintaining their supremacy over the electoral desires of  constituents, directly aligns with 
those of  the protagonists of  the coup.  
 
Before the 1987 election campaign, the Labour Party had outlined its desire to reform the 
NLTB, to make it more efficient and responsive to both native land owners’ needs and 
tenants’ concerns. These planned reforms would have directly threatened chiefly interests. 
At the Labour Party’s first annual conference Bavadra stated, “My concern is that the 
NLTB has become too much of  the tool of  certain vested interests in this country and that 
all too often steps taken by the NLTB are not in the best interests of  the majority of  
landowners themselves.” He added:  
 
“The NLTB must be democratised so that it comes to serve the interests 
of  all [Pacific-] Fijians and not just the privileged few and their business 
associates... I feel that we must discuss means to achieve a more equitable 
distribution of  income from rent within the landowning group as 
well.”299  
 
Leading up to the 1987 election, the Labour-National Federation Coalition suggested the 
establishment of  a National Lands Commission. It proposed this institution should 
comprise of  representatives from the government, native land owners and tenants, and that 
would watch over the NLTB’s operations, keeping it accountable to all. The Alliance clearly 
opposed any reform to the NLTB, with Mara using coded rhetoric to appeal to Pacific-
Fijian’s insecurities about native land ownership saying, it “could lead to a slipping300 of  
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299 It is notable that Bavadra himself  had a vested financial interest as a chief, albeit a low-ranking chief, and 
recipient of  lease payments to maintain the system of  lease distribution. Timoci Bavadra, "Text Address by 
the Newly Elected President of  the Fiji Labour Party," in Fiji Labour Party 1st Annual Conference (Suva: South 
Pacific Forum, 1986).; Lal, "Before the Storm: An Analysis of  the Fiji General Election of  1987 ": p. 87.  
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native land.”301 Speaking more aggressively about the proposed reform, Alliance Party 
Deputy Prime Minister Ratu David Toganivalu stated, “What they do not know is that 
when they touch the land it is dynamite, the world will explode.”302 This proposal to reform 
the distribution of  rental earnings from native land leases challenged the foundation of  the 
chiefly elites’ material power and contributed to the urgency in usurping the new 
government. 
 
During the 1987 campaign, the Alliance Party’s advertising also hinted at the chiefs’ power 
over the electoral system. An Alliance Party newspaper advertisement berating Bavadra’s 
political experience read, “Bavadra has never been in Parliament. He has no experience. He 
has no influence. The Council of  Chiefs do not listen to him. The international scene 
where we sell our sugar has never heard of  him. He cannot get renewal of  leases for our 
farmers.”303 It is notable that this Alliance advertisement cited the two key pieces of  the 
economy, which had served to keep the chiefly elite’s dominance over Fijian society: EEC s 
sugar subsidies and land tenure.  
 
After the appointment of  the Labour-National Federation government, a number of  
prominent Pacific-Fijians propagated claims aimed at undermining the Government. For 
example, it was claimed the government did not possess a broad-based coalition of  support 
as only 9.6% of  Pacific-Fijians had voted for the coalition government, while 15.1% of  
Indo-Fijians had voted for the Alliance.304 Government objectors also questioned its 
legitimacy, as it had not won a majority of  the popular vote. Although it won four seats 
more than the Alliance, the Labour-National Federation coalition had achieved only 46% 
of  the popular vote, compared with the Alliance’s 49%. These claims argue past the reality 
of  Fiji’s electoral system, which did not use the popular vote to determine the distribution 
of  constituency. Rather, it used a first-past-the-post method to determine the distribution 
of  constituent seats in the lower house of  Parliament. Under this system, the Labour-
National Federation coalition had won a majority, with 28 seats. In reality, these objections 
were not to do with the system itself, but simply about the Indo-Fijian presence in 
Government.  
 
After two decades of  uninterrupted chiefly domination of  government, the 1987 election 
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result revealed chiefs’ insecurities about their place in Fijian society. The chiefly elite’s 
apparent crisis regarding its lost control of  government was heightened by the complete 
lack of  alternation of  government. This was further exacerbated by the extent to which the 
elite had been institutionalised within Fiji’s political institutions.  Furthermore, the elite was 
not only constitutionally entrenched, but possessed material advantages over the rest of  
Fijian society and controls over the economy. The Alliance Party’s continual electoral 
success, and its housing of  high chiefs within its ranks, had provided further political 
legitimacy to the tribal hierarchy. To ensure a peaceful transition to independence, high 
chiefs filled the ranks of  prominent political positions across the executive and legislature. 
However, after this transition, the chiefly hierarchy was never detached from the ranks of  
the Alliance Party. Rather, as the Alliance Party solidified its unchallengeable position as the 
dominant political force in Fiji, the chiefs solidified their position at the apex of  Fijian 
society. The chiefly elite believed the Alliance Party’s loss, and particularly its loss of  
government undermined the paramountcy of  their social hierarchy. Many chiefs feared that 
electoral competition and uncertainty would disrupt the staid certainty of  the traditional 
social hierarchy. 
 
The failure to decouple the chiefly social hierarchy from Fiji’s electoral institutions left 
them in tension with one another. The location of  pre-colonial social leadership in Fiji’s 
political institutions satisfied conservative Pacific-Fijians, but it created problems for the 
maintenance of  electoral institutions. In the short term, the placement of  high chiefs in the 
Alliance Party initially legitimised the new political institutions in the eyes of  conservative 
Pacific-Fijians. Although this ensured chiefly control of  government, it created a 
perception within some Pacific-Fijian communities that the legitimacy of  these electoral 
institutions derived only from them being filled by chiefs, specifically, those within the 
Alliance Party. So when the Alliance Party and Mara lost, the legitimacy of  the electoral 
institutions in the eyes of  some Pacific-Fijians evaporated. Those whose political 
identifications had been manipulated by communal politicking could not comprehend Fiji 
being run by non-chiefs. This group included both chiefly elites and rural tribal based 
Pacific-Fijians. Some urban Pacific-Fijians on the other hand, saw beyond this frigid 
political identification. In addition to this, lengthy dominance of  electoral politics by the 
Alliance Party had also eroded the legitimacy of  the political institutions in the eyes of  the 
Indo-Fijian community.  
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Alongside this, the restriction to chiefly elites of  high constitutional positions, such as 
Senate seats, and the top positions within the Alliance Party, limited the development of  
new leadership within the Pacific-Fijian community for those without chiefly title. In failing 
to liberalise access to the highest levels of  governance, the chiefly elite found themselves in 
conflict with ‘common’ Pacific-Fijians who sought political representation and authority 
but lacked a hereditary title. Throughout the 1987 election campaign, Bavadra, the Labour 
Party, leader addressed this conflict: “We respect the chiefly system but condemn the 
manipulation of  respect for chiefs for political ends…the chiefly system should be 
separated from democratic politics.”305 It became rapidly apparent that the integration of  
the chiefly elite into the electoral process and true democratisation were not compatible.  
 
 
Rewriting chiefly institutionalised privilege 
 
The 1990 constitutional reform embedded chiefly authority and Pacific-Fijian advantage 
more deeply within Fiji’s political institutions. The March 1987 coup solved the short-term 
crisis created by the Labour-National Federation coalition’s victory and the chiefs’ loss of  
executive power. A new constitution was needed to entrench the political dominance of  the 
chiefly elite and mitigate any risks that electoral institutions presented to this elite. The 
constitution was redrawn to ensure electoral processes would never again threaten chiefly 
control of  government as they had in 1987, and nearly had in 1977.  
 
The new constitution enhanced Pacific-Fijians’ disproportionate advantage over political 
institutions and guaranteed chiefly control over electoral institutions. While Rabuka wanted 
immediate constitutional reform, it did not come until 1990. A week after the first coup he 
pronounced, “The sooner we accept a new constitution the better, for we will be 
preserving what is dear to our hearts – the chiefly system, our land and Christianity.”306 
Established by the post-coup interim government, an advisory committee, chaired by Dr 
Asesela Ravuvu, set about drafting reform of  the constitution. The advisory committee 
sent its proposals to the interim cabinet, which then passed it on to the Council of  Chiefs, 
which explicitly approved the reforms, before was decreed by Presidential edict.307 The role 
of  the Council of  Chiefs in drafting Fiji’s 1990 Constitution was yet another demonstration 
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of  the intention to completely entrench the chiefly elite’s control of  political institutions.  
 
Representatives from Fiji’s political parties, excluded from the interim government, 
accepted the terms of  the 1990 Constitution unenthusiastically as a necessary compromise 
for the transition back to electoral governance in 1992. If  electoral processes, inherently 
unpredictable, were to determine the composition of  Fiji’s parliament, then Parliament’s 
role in determining political outcomes had to be restricted. Notably, the new constitution 
further entrenched racial politics by removing all national seats from the legislature and 
leaving only communal seats, of  which Pacific-Fijian seats were the majority. Again, the 
institution that embodied chiefly authority, the Council of  Chiefs, received increased 
powers over the polity at the expense of  the democratic process.  
 
The 1990 Constitution also proclaimed the unambiguous supremacy of  the Pacific-Fijian 
chiefs’ interests and their institutions.308 Under the new constitution, the House of  
Representatives comprised 70 seats: 37 seats for Pacific-Fijians, 27 for Indo-Fijians, 5 for 
‘General Voters’ and 1 for Rotumans.309 Meanwhile, the Senate had a membership of  34 
seats: 24 were appointed by the Council of  Chiefs, nine by the President and one by the 
Council of  Rotuma. The Council of  Chiefs also received the power to appoint the 
President and the two Vice-Presidents, giving them control over all institutions of  
government. 
 
Table 4: 1990 Constitution distribution of  electoral seats amongst Fiji’s ethnic communities 
 
Ethnic Group Seats Total Populations % of  Total Population People Per 
Seat310 
Pacific-Fijian 37 329,305 46.0 8,900 
Indo-Fijian 27 348,704 48.8 12,915 
Rotuman 1 8,652 1.2 8,652 
Others 5 28,714 4.0 5,743 
Source: Fiji 1990 Constitution. 
 
The 1990 Constitution also explicitly stated that the office of  Prime Minister must be filled 
by a Pacific-Fijian. As well as granting the Council of  Chiefs the right to appoint two-thirds 
of  the seats in the Senate, it granted it the right to appoint the President and Vice-President 
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as well. Finally, as Table 4 demonstrates, the constitution reserved a disproportionate 
number of  electorate seats for Pacific-Fijians in the House of  Representatives with Pacific-
Fijian constituent seats representing 8,9000 people and Indo-Fijian constituent seats almost 
12,915 people. Seat allocation plainly ignored the demographic realities of  the 1986 Census, 
which had counted a relatively even number of  Pacific-Fijians and Indo-Fijians. 
Furthermore, the electoral reform also gerrymandered constituencies to favour rural 
provinces (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: 1990 Constitution distribution of  Pacific-Fijian communal seats amongst regional 
provinces 
 
Area Seats Registered Voters % of  Total 
Voters 
Voters Per Seat 
Rural Provinces311 
(14) 
32 110,619 65 3,457 
Urban Provinces312 
(5) 
5 43,276 35 8,655 
Source: Fiji 1990 Constitution. 
 
The uneven distribution of Pacific-Fijian electorates under the 1990 constitutional reform 
discriminated against urban Pacific-Fijians whose loyalties to chiefly elites and conservative 
political positions were weaker than rural Pacific-Fijians, and which had bolstered the 
Labour Party’s vote in the 1987 election. With these new electoral advantages, a chiefly-
sponsored party that maintained unity within the Pacific-Fijian community should have 
been able to build a parliamentary majority government without the need for coalition. 
When the country returned to electoral governance in 1992, despite the protections of  the 
new electoral system, exclusive chiefly control did not result, as conflict amongst chiefs had 
started to emerge.  
 
Soon after independence Fiji seemed to be an example of  a multicultural democracy for 
the post-colonial world, but, its democracy was very quickly proven a façade, as the power 
structures underlying its electoral institutions were exposed. If  Cakobau’s response to the 
constitutional crisis seemed merely benign and convenient in returning government to the 
control of  the chiefs, Rabuka’s 1987 coup confirmed the chiefs desire to bypass the 
electoral system to ensure their dominance of  government. This overthrow openly 
displayed for the first time the chiefly elites control of  a parallel set of  authoritarian 
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institutions, which enabled them to usurp elected government. The following chapter 
examines the problems the chiefly elite encountered in elusively controlling government in 
Fiji, despite their constitutional advantages over electoral institutions. The political events 
of  the 1990s brought the emergence of  rifts within the chiefly elite. This exposed their 
previous as existing solely for material benefit. This in turn created a wide fracturing of  this 
elite the conditions that would lead to the Labour Party’s second electoral victory. 
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Chapter Five: Divided Authoritarianism 1990-2005 
 
 
In December 1987, following the September coup, Rabuka handed control of  government 
to a selected group of  political elites, predominantly high chiefs. This interim government 
then set about rewriting the 1970 Constitution, with their reforms targeting the electoral 
system and composition of  Parliament. Provisions were built into the new constitution that 
created advantages for rural Pacific-Fijian political elites, aimed at skewing electoral results 
in order to benefit chiefly elites. However, this electoral engineering did not provide a long-
lasting monopoly on governance for chiefs. Rather, the post-coup civilian government and 
the new electoral system produced a fracturing of  the chiefs’ coalition and with it the 
Pacific-Fijian vote, opening up new political cleavages within Pacific-Fijian communities.  
 
In this new political environment, the legitimacy of  the 1990 Constitution soon 
disintegrated. Tensions between chiefs fractured the Pacific-Fijian vote, forcing Rabuka’s 
SVT Party to call upon Indo-Fijian political support in the formation of  coalition 
governments. This new political reality undermined the key aim of  the 1990 Constitution: 
keeping government from Indo-Fijians. The 1997 constitutional reform ushered in a more 
proportionate distribution of  electorate seats, bringing a sense of  contestability back to 
Fiji’s electoral system. These new electoral conditions enabled the Labour Party to 
capitalise on factionalism within the Pacific-Fijian community, and its newfound unity 
within Indo-Fijian community resulted in its landslide victory, taking power form the 
chiefly elite again at the 1999 general election. This second Labour Party victory presented 
a challenge to the chiefly elite similar to the election result of  1987. This time, however, the 
chiefs lacked unity and this complicated their response. 
 
This chapter explains the transition back to electoral governance in 1992 and the success 
of  the two constitutions in providing electoral outcomes that seemed sustainable. First, it 
details the unravelling of  the 1990 Constitution, the factionalisation of  Pacific-Fijian 
political elites, and their power sharing with Indo-Fijian political parties. Second, it 
addresses the chiefs’ reaction to their loss of  government for a second time.  
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The decline of  Pacific-Fijian chiefly unity 1990-1999 
 
Through the 1990s, Pacific-Fijian support for Rabuka deteriorated in concert with the 
perceived legitimacy of  the 1990 Constitution. Although the Indo-Fijian proportion of  the 
total population had decreased significantly following the events of  1987, the Labour Party 
was still able to win a majority of  seats at the 1999 election. Just as in 1987 though, neither 
the Labour Party’s margin of  victory, nor its constitutional legitimacy, prevented the chiefs 
from ousting it, a year after its swearing in. 
 
This section has two parts. First, it describes the return to civilian rule and constitutional 
elections, the subsequent decline of  Rabuka’s control over the country, and the political 
pressures leading to another constitutional reform and the 1997 Constitution. Second, it 
explains the Labour Party’s victory at the 1999 general election and the tensions this non-
chiefly-backed government created.  
 
 
Return to electoral rule 
 
Under international pressure, Fiji returned to electoral governance in May 1992, albeit 
according to a new constitution put in place by precisely those elites who had overthrown 
the previous government.313 After Rabuka handed control of  the government to Ganilau as 
President and Mara as interim Prime Minister, he repackaged himself  as a politician and the 
new guardian of  Pacific-Fijian chiefly interest. Rabuka’s SVT ‘land-owners’ Party served 
one purpose: maintaining the paramountcy of  chiefly interest.314 Soon after this return to 
electoral governance, pressure built from the international community, the Indo-Fijian 
community, and sections of  the Pacific-Fijian community to review the 1990 Constitution. 
The Labour Party made a constitutional review a key condition of  their coalition 
agreement with the SVT in 1992. This review finally took place in 1996,315 but only after 
Rabuka faced mounting political pressure to do so from his coalition partner, National 
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Federation Party leader Jai Ram Reddy. This review’s report produced the 1997 
Constitution, which diluted the chiefs’ influence over electoral processes and provided for 
fairer elections in 1999.   
 
The 1990 Constitution’s disproportionate distribution of  electoral seats across ethnic 
communities, favouring Pacific-Fijians, along with the Council of  Chiefs’ explicit public 
support for Rabuka’s SVT Party, should have guaranteed it an unassailable victory in the 
1992 general election. Before this election, the chiefs had deemed that Mara’s Alliance 
Party was a defunct political vehicle and the SVT, led by Rabuka, should succeed it. The 
Council of  Chiefs openly endorsed the SVT, making it clear that this party would be now 
the standard bearer of  chiefly interests.316 Yet, regardless of  this backing, in both elections 
under the 1990 electoral system, the SVT only won a plurality of  the votes and not the 
majority it needed to govern alone. 
 
The electoral engineering of  the 1990 reform proved to be flawed. Under the arrangements 
of  the interim government, chiefs had governed without political challenge or electoral 
accountability. And before the 1987 coup, the chiefly elite had publicly maintained an 
appearance of  unity in the face of  the Indo-Fijian political threat. Yet, under interim 
arrangements, this threat dissipated and obvious factions quickly emerged. As high chiefs 
fought to control the levers of  civilian government, political divisions between tribal 
hierarchies and between confederacies grew.  
 
Disunity within the SVT nearly immobilised the party, further undermining the goals of  
the 1990 Constitution. It had attempted to create advantages that would ensure that a 
Pacific-Fijian government held office in perpetuity.317 These electoral advantages, however, 
had a detrimental effect on the unity of  the Pacific-Fijian community. The apparent 
guarantee of  an electoral majority permitted Pacific-Fijians to switch their focus to 
particular grievances amongst them, and this led to fracturing of  their unity. Between 1992-
1999, the SVT split into two factions. The main fissure inside the SVT was between 
Rabuka and Josevata Kamikamica and their respective supporters. Although Kamikamica 
was a commoner, he had been the Finance Minister in the interim government and was the 
previous General Manager of  the NLTB, and therefore was held in high regard amongst 
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the high chiefs; he also had the personal backing of  Mara and his close supporters.318 These 
factions refused to work together to form a government, yet neither of  them was prepared 
to break away and form a separate party. Fortunately, for the chiefs, tight electoral 
competition amongst the Indo-Fijian parties and the limited number of  Indo-Fijian seats 
restricted the Indo-Fijian political threat. Where constitutional reform had sought to 
engineer unchallenged Pacific-Fijian rule, factionalism within the Pacific-Fijian community 
made Indo-Fijian political support necessary in the formation of  Pacific-Fijian-led 
governments.   
 
In turn, the candidate selection process further exacerbated tensions between Pacific-Fijian 
factions. Provincial councils selected candidates, and their principal loyalty was to those 
who held provincial power. This meant that party leaders had limited influence over 
candidate selection, and even less when it came to disciplining them for failing to follow 
the party line. The predictable result was a proliferation of  political parties, formed by 
disgruntled candidates touting regional interests and camouflaging private agendas under 
the guise of  ‘Pacific-Fijian interests’.319  
 
Amongst this Pacific-Fijian factionalism, SVT ethno-nationalist MPs left the party to join 
either the Fijian Christian National Party or the Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua Party. These 
two parties formed a nationalist coalition as the Fijian National United Front (FNUF), 
which was led by Butadroka. The 1992 election also saw the emergence of  the General 
Voters Party (GVP), representing the assorted 10,000 Europeans, part-Europeans, Chinese 
and other Pacific Islanders in Fiji. Meanwhile the dominant Indo-Fijian political vehicles 
remained.320 
 
At the 1992 election, the increase in new parties saw seats distributed across five political 
parties, see Table 6. The 37 Pacific-Fijian communal seats were split between the SVT, 
which won 30 of  these, the FNUF which won five seats, with independent candidates 
winning the remaining two seats. The Indo-Fijian communal seats were split between the 
National Federation Party, with 14 seats, and the Labour Party, which won 13 seats, despite 
its decision to stand only weeks before the election.321 The GVP won the five general 
                                                
318 Ralph Premdas, "General Rabuka and the Fijian Elections of  1992," Asian Survey 33, no. 10 (1993): p. 
1001. 
319 Lal, Islands of  Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji, p. 236. 
320 A large number of  other political parties contested the 1992 election and won no seats. 
321 Premdas, "General Rabuka and the Fijian Elections of  1992," p. 1007. 
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seats.322  
Table 6: Fiji 1992 general election results 
 
Party Pacific-Fijian Communal 
Seats 
Indo-Fijian Communal 
Seats 
Other Seats 
SVT 30 - - 
FNUF 5 - - 
National Federation 
Party 
- 14 - 
Fiji Labour Party - 13  
GVP - - 5 
Independents  2 - - 
    
Total 37 27 5 
Source: Ralph Premdas, "General Rabuka and the Fijian Elections of  1992," Asian Survey 33, no. 10 (1993) 
 
The SVT had won a majority of  Pacific-Fijian communal seats, and a plurality of  seats in 
Parliament, but still needed to form a coalition government. The problems of  coalition 
building were heightened by inter-SVT tensions, with relationships between the factions 
having deteriorated to the point of  unworkability by the time of  the election. Rabuka had 
the support of  20 SVT MPs, while Kamikamica had the support of  10 MPs.323 Each group 
spoke openly about forging a coalition with its preferred Indo-Fijian party.  
 
Rabuka initially sought a coalition with Pacific-Fijian focused parties, but was unable to 
reconcile differences between the GVP and the FNUF. This forced him to turn to Indo-
Fijian support. After lobbying and horse-trading, Rabuka emerged with a workable majority 
of  votes, forming a coalition with the GVP, independent MPs, and, ironically, the Labour 
Party.324 In the coalition agreement the Labour Party leader, Mahendra Pal Chaudhry, 
demanded and received a review of  the 1990 Constitution, but requested no Cabinet seats. 
Nonetheless, the fact remained, that Rabuka had become Prime Minister with the support 
of  the very party he had overthrown only five years earlier. Rabuka’s need for Labour Party 
support further demonstrated the extent of  disunity within the Pacific-Fijian community 
after the 1987 coup. This created divisions amongst the highest chiefs and foreshadowed 
the political ruptures that later emerged.  
(FNUF 
                                                
322 Ibid.: p. 1006. 
323 At the SVT’s party convention Rabuka only beat Kaikamica in the leadership ballot by only one vote. Ibid.: 
p. 1001. 
324 Ibid.: p. 1008. 
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Table 7: Fiji 1994 general election results 
 
Party Pacific-Fijian Communal 
Seats 
Indo-Fijian Communal 
Seats 
Other 
Seats 
SVT 32 - - 
FNUF 5 - - 
National Federation Party - 20 - 
Fiji Labour Party - 7  
GVP - - 4 
Independents  1 - - 
    
Total 37 27 5 
Source: Brij V. Lal, Islands of  Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press 2006) 
 
Rabuka’s government lasted only 18 months when, as the Labour Party abandoned the 
coalition after Rabuka failed to deliver the promised constitutional review. After Labour 
pulled its support, Rabuka’s government was unable to pass a budget in November 1993, 
and the following general election in February 1994 produced a moderate redistribution of  
seats, see Table 7. The SVT again won a majority of  Pacific-Fijian communal seats with 32, 
while the FNUF secured five seats. In the Indo-Fijian communal seats, the National 
Federation Party gained six seats from the Labour Party, while the GVP lost one general 
seat to an independent candidate who had left that party. Once again, Rabuka’s SVT 
faction forged a coalition government, though this time with the GVP and the National 
Federation Party.  
 
Under the 1990 Constitution, a Pacific-Fijian majority in the House of  Assembly and the 
ethnicity of  the Prime Minister were a foregone conclusion. The distribution of  electoral 
seats and gerrymandering of  electorates had guaranteed this. Although electoral processes 
determined the composition of  the constituent seats, satisfying the demands of  the 
international community, the electoral system was severely restricted in its capacity to 
determine the composition of  government. Disregarding the structure of  Fiji’s political 
economy, with the constitutionally entrenched chiefly control over the economy, the 
international community naively viewed the return to electoral governance as the equivalent 
to a return of  ‘democracy’.325 The effective inability of  Fiji’s electoral processes to 
determine the composition of  government through a contestable process, however, was 
further limited under the new electoral laws of  1990. Although this reform ensured each 
                                                
325 Under each of  Fiji’s constitutions the provision providing the Council of  Chiefs with veto over reform of  
the land tenure system and the unelected status of  the Senate, restricts the status of  Fiji’s political 
institutions to only being electoral, not democratic.  
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electoral result was predictable and unthreatening for the chiefs, the conditions it produced 
paradoxically worked to undermine the intentions of  the 1990 constitutional reform. 
 
 
Another constitution  
 
Through the 1990s, the legitimacy of  the 1990 Constitution and its imbalanced electoral 
terms faded, and support for constitutional reform grew. In 1995, under pressure from the 
National Federation Party, Rabuka finally agreed to appoint a commission to review the 
constitution. This three-person commission’s brief  directed it to reform Fiji’s political 
institutions and promote cross-ethnic sharing of  executive power, in order to neutralise 
ethnic antagonism as a tool of  political mobilisation.  
 
The Reeves Commission delivered its report to the President, and a bipartisan 
Parliamentary Select Committee was established to consider its recommendations. Many 
conservative Pacific-Fijian MPs rejected the Commission’s emphasis on national unity over 
communal affiliations and institutions. They also dismissed the Commission’s comparison 
of  Fiji to other jurisdictions as a gauge of  Fiji’s constitutional provisions. Instead, they 
claimed that Fiji was a unique country and its Pacific-Fijian peoples had unique rights and 
needs.326 After diluting the Reeves Commission’s recommendations, particularly concerning 
the proportions of  open and communal seats, the Select Committee passed a draft 
constitution to the President, who then ratified it and the new constitution was 
subsequently passed into law.  
 
The key reform of  the 1997 Constitution was the return to an ethnic and geographically 
proportionate distribution of  electoral seats.327 In the 1997 Constitution, the lower house 
of  the legislature, formerly the House of  Assembly, was renamed the ‘House of  
Representatives’, and its membership increased by one seat. Out of  its 71 seats, 25 were 
general constituencies elected by all Fijians, with the remaining 46 retained as communal 
constituencies, divided proportionally amongst Fiji’s ethnic communities. Twenty-three of  
these were reserved as Pacific-Fijian communal seats, 19 as Indo-Fijian seats, three for 
                                                
326 Lal, Islands of  Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji, p. 132.  
327 Although, the redistribution of  seats amongst ethnic communities was more propionate than that of  the 
1990 Constitution, it was not totally proportionate. Notably, Pacific-Fijian electorates still skewed with 
rural constituencies having fewer voters per seat than urban constituencies.  
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‘other’ ethnic groups, and one for Rotumans.328 Along with this, the first-past-the-post 
electoral system was replaced with the alternative vote system, where voters ranked 
candidates in order of  preference. The reform also included new provisions aimed at 
encouraging the formation of  multi-party, cross-ethnic governments.329 Notably, however, 
the parliamentary select committee rejected the Reeves Commission’s proposal to open the 
appointment of  the Senate up to the popular vote. Instead, it preserved the existing 
appointment processes and retained the constitutional provisions that provided the Council 
of  Chiefs veto power over reform of  the land-tenure system. While, these constitutional 
changes liberalised the electoral system, they still did not remove the legislative veto of  the 
Senators nominated by the Council of  Chiefs, and therefore failed to democratise Fiji’s 
electoral institutions decision-making abilities.  
 
Although the 1997 Constitution brought some contestability back to Fiji’s electoral process, 
it did not remove the dominance of  the chiefly elite within Fiji’s political institutions. By 
providing seats proportionate to Fiji’s ethnic communities, and with constitutional 
provisions encouraging cross-ethnic, multi-party coalition governments, the chiefs aimed to 
only provide a limited, but sustainable model, of  electoral governance. 
 
 
A new challenge authoritarianism  
 
The splintering of  the Pacific-Fijian vote and the Labour Party’s success in 1999 shocked 
both political observers and the chiefs. The Labour Party capitalised on the National 
Federation Party’s close relationship with Rabuka, which had grown very unpopular, and 
swept both the Indo-Fijian communal electorates and the general electorates. This success 
represented a major challenge to the chiefly elite with an Indo-Fijian occupying the office 
of  Prime Minister for the first time. This resurgence of  the electoral process, however, did 
not last long. Once again, as chiefs lost electoral control, they overthrew the elected 
government. 
 
For the 1999 general election, political parties campaigned in broad blocs to project 
probable coalition partners and, therefore, the likely composition of  government. The 
                                                
328 Rotumans are from the island Rotuma, which is north west of  Fiji’s northern Mamanuka islands. 
Constitution of  the Republic of  the Fiji Islands 1997. Section 51., (a), i-iv 
329 There is a clause obligating the party with the largest votes to approach the party with the second largest 
vote to form a coalition. Ibid. 
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parties of  the incumbent government: the SVT, National Federation Party and United 
General Party, campaigned with draft coalition agreements ready to implement after the 
election. To present an alternative to Rabuka’s government, the Labour Party affiliated 
itself  with potential coalition partners, forming the People’s Coalition between itself, the 
Party of  National Unity (PANU) and the Fijian Association Party. Notably it was key 
members of  Kamikamica’s SVT faction who formed the Fijian Association Party, which 
supported Chaudhry in his formation of  a government. In turn, a third coalition, between 
Pacific-Fijian parties opposed to Rabuka’s policies and the concessions the 1997 
Constitution had granted to Indo-Fijians, was launched on the eve of  the election. This 
coalition comprised the Veitokani ni Lewenivanua Vakaristro Party and the Christian 
Democratic Alliance.  
 
At the 1999 election Rabuka’s coalition government a suffered massive defeat, and 
particularly the SVT’s vote was splintered among the several parties that contested the 
Pacific-Fijian communal seats, see 8. Among the parties of  the People’s Coalition, the 
Labour Party won an outright majority of  37 seats, including all 19 Indo-Fijian communal 
seats, and 18 of  the 25 open seats. The Fijian Association Party won 11 seats, and the 
PANU won four seats. Of  the incumbent coalition’s parties the SVT won eight seats, the 
United General Party won two seats, and the National Federation Party won no seats 
Minor parties and independent candidates won the remaining seats, see Table 8. Although 
Chaudhry won enough seats to govern alone, he proceeded with the formation of  a 
government of  the People’s Coalition, as encouraged by new constitution.330  
 
Table 8: Fiji 1999 general election results 
 
Party Pacific-Fijian 
Communal 
Seats 
Indo-Fijian 
Communal 
Seats 
Council 
of  
Rotuma 
Other 
Seats 
General 
Seats 
Total 
Fiji Labour Party - 19 - - 18 37 
SVT 5 - - - 3 8 
Fijian Association Party 9 - - - 2 11 
United General Party - - - 1 1 2 
PANU 4 - - - - 4 
Christian Democrats 2 - - - - 2 
Fiji Nationalist Party 1  - 1  2 
Independents 1 - 1 1 2 5 
       
Total 23 19  3 25 71 
                                                
330 Lal, Islands of  Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji, p. 173-78. 
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Source: Brij V. Lal, Islands of  Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press 2006) 
 
Before the new parliament met for its first session, Rabuka abruptly resigned to take up a 
position as chair of  the Council of  Chiefs. His tenure as Fiji’s dominant political actor had 
been brought to an end by the electoral process and by the party that he had overthrown in 
1987. Rabuka won the chairmanship of  the Council under a secret ballot with 32 votes to 
Tui Vuda Ratu Josefa Iloilo’s 18. Notably, at his victory Rabuka announced it to be “a sign 
of  the chiefly support I have”, not to mention a product of  his role in deposing the elected 
government in 1987 and supporting chiefly agendas as Prime Minister throughout the 
1990s.331 
 
The close political relations between the National Federation Party and Rabuka’s SVT 
faction had clearly undermined the National Federation’s credibility in Indo-Fijian 
communities. Specifically, many perceived that the National Federation Party’s leader Jai 
Ram Reddy was too close to Rabuka, whom many Indo-Fijians still resented for his role in 
the 1987 coup. Reddy had even addressed the Council of  Chiefs, requesting their blessing 
for the proposed constitutional reform. At the same time, although the Labour Party had 
also supported Rabuka’s government in 1992, it subsequently brought that government 
down by withholding its votes for the government’s budget in November 1993. This 
initially undermined the Labour Party’s electoral appeal in the short-term, but in the long-
term reinforced its credibility as an independent political force and advocate for both Indo-
Fijians and non-chiefly aligned Pacific-Fijians.  
 
Unsurprisingly, many chiefs found it difficult to tolerate an Indo-Fijian Prime Minister and 
the Labour Party’s dominance in government. The efforts of  the first coup to keep 
government out of  Indo-Fijian hands had obviously failed, with Indo-Fijians constituting 
part of  every coalition since 1992, and now in 1997 controlling the government outright.  
 
Furthermore, the positive effect of  the Council of  Chiefs’ sponsorship of  the SVT had 
faded through the 1990s, with chiefly factions splintering and Indo-Fijians maintaining 
influence in government. Under the new electoral system, Chaudhry had not only unified 
Indo-Fijians but also attracted high levels of  support in the open seats. His electoral 
mandate, partnered with his decision to include many Pacific-Fijians in his cabinet, put 
chiefs in a difficult position. The chiefs could not claim outright that Pacific-Fijian interests 
                                                
331 Ibid., p. 187. 
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were not represented in government, but these were also not their own specific Pacific-
Fijian interests but those of  the middle-class and commoners. As time progressed, these 
tensions grew, and presented a paradox for the chiefly elite. Despite the majority of  chiefly 
being were sidelined from government, many ‘moderate’ chiefs saw little room for action 
and made it clear they did not want a repeat of  the turmoil that had crippled Fiji for the 
previous decade. Nevertheless, after prolonged agitation, action did occur and was 
orchestrated by conservative chiefs. 
 
 
The reassertion of  Pacific-Fijian nationalism 2000-2005 
 
The 2000 putsch332 demonstrated the entrenched dominance of  the Pacific-Fijian chiefs 
and their intolerance of  the elected government. After a slow transition back to civilian 
government and then democratic elections, the constitutional reform in 1997 was thought 
to have provided Fiji with sustainable electoral institutions. The focus of  these reforms, 
however, ignored the underlying realities of  Fiji’s political economy and did nothing to alter 
the power structure in Fijian society. Consequently, when elections delivered an undesirable 
outcome, a group of  chiefs responded in a similar manner to those in 1987, albeit without 
the chiefly unity of  that first coup. Using extra-constitutional means this subset of  the 
chiefs ousted the Labour-led government in May 2000, and ensured that it was not 
reinstated in the subsequent transition back to civilian rule. 
 
This section has two parts. First, it explains the putsch that overthrew the Labour-led 
government. Second, it describes the political aftermath of  the civilian putsch, and the 
marginalisation of  the deposed Labour-led government in the transfer back to 
constitutional and civilian rule. 
 
 
The civilian putsch  
 
Despite the return to elected government in 1992, and the partial liberalisation of  the 
electoral system in 1997, Fiji’s constitutional and electoral institutions were once again 
                                                
332 I use putsch to distinguish the coups of  1987 and 2006, which were led by high military personal, with the  
2000 overthrow which was led by civilians with the support of  private military personal. 
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usurped. Elections under the 1990 electoral laws produced two successive governments led 
by Rabuka’s SVT Party with coalition support from non-chiefly backed parties. While 
Indo-Fijian political support had been crucial to the formation of  government, they 
exerted little influence on policy outcomes, with the exception the constitutional reform. 
Despite the increased factionalism between chiefly elites from 1992 to 1999, chiefs still 
maintained overall control of  government, with the assistance of  the electoral advantages 
provided to Pacific-Fijians by the constitution. 
 
The chiefs’ response to an Indo-Fijian government in 1999 differed to that of  1987. In 
1987, the chiefs had responded to an Indo-Fijian majority in Cabinet with unanimous 
support for the military’s overthrow of  the government. In 1999, however, this unity was 
absent. Division among chiefs complicated the Pacific-Fijian response to an Indo-Fijian 
Prime Minister and accordingly, there was no swift action to topple Chaudhry. Rather, the 
movement for change mounted slowly as the persistence of  an Indo-Fijian controlled 
government increasingly threatened chiefly authority. The eventual ousting of  the People 
government came from a different source to that in 1987. 
  
On 19 May 2000, an armed paramilitary stormed the parliamentary buildings, taking 
members of  the government hostage. The group was partly comprised of  members of  the 
Republic of  Fiji Military Force’s (RFMF) Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRWU). 
This armed group was led by the CRWU’s Commander, Major Iliisoni Ligari, and civilian 
George Speight.333 Although enacted by a military unit, this was essentially a putsch by a 
group of  armed civilians.334 This was made clear by their first words as they stormed the 
House of  Representatives, they announcing it was a civilian coup by the taukei335 people.336 
 
The timing of  the putsch was not accidental. 19 May 2000 was the Labour-led 
government’s first anniversary in office, and it was the day the government was to present 
the Social Justice Bill. This bill was designed to spread government assistance to the most 
disadvantaged communities in Fiji. However, many Pacific-Fijian political elites interpreted 
                                                
333 Speight, who emerged as the putsch’s leader, was until then largely unknown, except for allegations of  
fraudulent business against him. Notably George Speight did have a close association with parliamentary 
politics because his father Sam Speight (Savenaca Tokainavo) was an SVT Party MP. Christene Gounder, 
"Journalists and the George Speight Coup," Pacific Journalism Review 13, no. 1 (2007): p. 125.  
334 Roderic Alley, "Fiji's Coups of 1987 and 2000: A Comparison," Revue Juridique Polynesienne 1 (2001): p. 218. 
335 Taukei is Pacific-Fijian for Pacific-Fijian people. 
336 Brij V. Lal, "'Chiefs and Thieves and Other People Besides': The Making of  George Speight's Coup," The 
Journal of  Pacific History 35, no. 3 (2000). 
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it as dismantling the pro-Pacific-Fijian affirmative action policies established after the 1987 
coup. In response, the Taukei Movement, resurgent as a challenge to the non-chiefly 
backed government, planned a protest. Some 15,000 Pacific-Fijians marched through the 
streets of  Suva, and the protest soon broke down into a riot and shops were looted. One 
this day 269 people were arrested in the disturbance, which caused F$ 30 million in 
damages.337 All of  this took place on a day when the Police Commissioner happened to be 
on holiday, the President (Mara) was in Lau celebrating his 80th birthday, and the Head of  
the RFMF, Commodore Voreqe Frank Bainimarama, was visiting Fijian peacekeeping 
troops in Lebanon.338   
 
With Bainimarama absent, Speight and his group hoped the RFMF would back the 
uprising. Instead, the military encircled the parliamentary complex, commencing a 
protracted siege. The RFMF, however, went no further; claiming further interference with 
Speight’s actions would endanger the hostages.339 This led some commentators to suggest 
that the army’s failure to secure the parliament, deny Speight access to the news media, and 
prevent his people from looting Suva and the farms beyond, all point to the military’s 
complicity in the hostage taking.340 Nationalist leaning chiefs, whose identities and roles 
were later revealed in a swath of  court cases and convictions, had in fact neatly 
orchestrated the events of  the day behind the scenes. 
 
It became clear soon after 19 May that while the putsch had not been undertaken by the 
RFMF or fronted by the highest of  Fiji’s chiefs, it had the support of  many important 
chiefs. Rabuka publicly conceded his complicity in preparing the putsch and he disclosed 
that, as with Mara before the 1987 coup, he had played golf  with Speight shortly before the 
overthrow, and that the CRWU forces that led the putsch had trained on his estates shortly 
before it took place.341 Rabuka also publicly expressed his support for the goals of  
Speight’s putsch. Notably, former Senator Laisenia Qarase also voiced public support for 
Speight’s goals and was later installed as Fiji’s interim Prime Minister. Pacific-Fijian 
parliamentarians quickly fell in behind Speight’s putsch, with a large number of  former 
                                                
337 “F$” indicates Fijian Dollars  
Mosmi Bhim, "The Impact of  the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill on the 2006 Election," in From 
Election to Coup: The 2006 Campaign and Its Aftermath, ed. Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth (Canberra: Asia Pacific 
Press, 2007), p. 115. 
338 Lal, "'Chiefs and Thieves and Other People Besides': The Making of  George Speight's Coup," p. 288. 
339 Bhim, "The Impact of  the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill on the 2006 Election," p. 115. 
340 Alley, "Fiji's Coups of  1987 and 2000: A Comparison," p. 223. 
341 Jon Fraenkel, "The Clash of  Dynasties and Rise of  Demagogues; Fiji's Tauri Vakaukauwa of  May 2000," 
The Journal of  Pacific History 35, no. 3 (2000): p. 296. 
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SVT ministers in Rabuka’s government appearing alongside Speight during the hostage 
crisis.342 In addition, nine of  the 11 Fijian Association Party MPs proclaimed their support 
for Speight on the afternoon he took over Parliament, despite their coalition with the 
FLP.343 
 
In contrast with the 1987 coup, the chiefs’ overthrow of  the election of  an Indo-Fijian 
government in 2000 was delayed by their own disunity. Mara, as President, had overseen 
the installation of  the Labour-led government, and in doing so provided it legitimacy. This 
act had compromised Mara and his supporters in the eyes of  hardliners. Speight 
represented a new generation of  Pacific-Fijians who were brought up after the 1987 coup, 
and under the conditions of  the 1990 Constitution. They had experienced a Fiji dominated 
by Pacific-Fijian political leadership, although this leadership was not united under a single 
high chief  as it had been before 1987.344 Mara’s support for the Labour-led government 
troubled many Pacific-Fijian chiefs who demanded that action be taken to reinstate chiefly 
control of  government. Speight’s actions, and those of  the chiefs who backed him, were as 
much a challenge to Mara’s chiefly authority as they were to the toleration of  an Indo-
Fijian government.345  
 
The putsch threw Fiji’s constitutional institutions into disarray. The day after the invasion 
of  Parliament, high chief  Ratu Jope Seniloli, usurping the role of  the President, swore 
Speight in as the new Prime Minister of  Fiji, and his accomplices as Fiji’s cabinet. Under 
the 1997 Constitution, the Council of  Chiefs had the sole right to appoint the President, 
and on 23 May it met in response to Senioli’s actions, to determine the legal status of  
Mara’s power. During the meeting, Rabuka pronounced “Democracy, as we have always 
stated, [is] a foreign flower346”, and he demanded that it should be refined to meet the 
needs of  local circumstances. Although many high chiefs agreed with Rabuka, and 
sympathised with Speight’s cause, the Council as an institution backed Mara to lead the 
country out of  crisis.347 Importantly, in affirming Mara as President, the Council rejected 
Senioli’s appointments and his self-claimed authority to make such appointments.  
                                                
342 Ibid.: p. 297. 
343 Ibid.: p. 298. 
344 Speight was an odd leader for the civilian putsch. He did not present himself as a traditional Pacific-Fijian, 
using his European name, and speaking to journalists exclusively in English.  
345 Teresia Teaiwa, "An Analysis of  the Political Crisis in Fiji," Scoop Media, 23 May 2000. 
346 This same phrase was used by the political Taukei movement after the 1987 election. Lal, "Rhetoric and 
Reality: The Dilemmas of  Contemporary Fijian Politics," p. 97. 
347 Bhim, "The Impact of  the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill on the 2006 Election," p. 115. 
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Mara quickly attempted to defuse the crisis. He sought to transfer the constitutional powers 
of  the office holders who were being held hostage inside the parliamentary complex to 
another cabinet member, outside. He appointed Ratu Tevita Momoedonu348 as Prime 
Minister. As civil order deteriorated however, Bainimarama, who had returned to Fiji, 
informed the President that he believed the 1997 Constitution was no longer a suitable 
framework within which to resolve the crisis. Mara heeded this demand by abrogating the 
constitution, stepping aside as President, and formally dismissing the Labour-led 
government. This move then allowed the military to take over, with the second Labour-led 
government dismissed in a manner reminiscent of  1987.349 
 
Three weeks after the putsch, NLTB General Manager Maika Qarikau and Conservative 
Alliance MP Niko Nawaikula circulated a 20-page ‘Deed of  Sovereignty’ document, which 
demanded the return of  all state and freehold land to Pacific-Fijian ownership, and its 
conversion into native land.350 This ‘Deed of  Sovereignty’ was modelled on the 1874 Deed 
of  Cession and sought to significantly alter Fiji’s land-tenure system.351 Although the Deed 
claimed it transferred this land to Speight’s government, its legal status was dismissed by 
subsequent constitutional rulings by the Court of  Appeal. Nonetheless, the Deed and its 
proponents indicate further underlying motivations for the putsch, to permanently shift the 
political-economic balance of  Fiji towards chiefly interests and place political control 
beyond the reach of  any electoral system. 
 
The crisis ended when Speight and Bainimarama signed the Muanikau Accord on 9 July 
2000. Speight held the hostages for 56 days, before releasing them on 13 July 2000. The 
Muanikau Accord promised Speight and his accomplices immunity from criminal 
prosecution and civil liability in exchange for freeing the hostages and surrendering their 
weapons. Soon after the release of  hostages, however, Bainimarama claimed Speight had 
not properly surrendered, having found him in possession of  more weapons, and arrested 
him and other key players of  the putsch, charging them with treason.  
 
Although the Council of  Chiefs had stymied Speight’s attempts to replace the ousted 
government with his own cabinet, the putsch had still been successful for the protagonists. 
                                                
348 Momoedonu had not been present at Parliament during the putsch. 
349 Alley, "Fiji's Coups of  1987 and 2000: A Comparison," p. 223. 
350 Lal, "'Chiefs and Thieves and Other People Besides': The Making of  George Speight's Coup," p. 287. 
351 Robertson and Sutherland, Government by the Gun: The Unfinished Business of  Fiji's 2000 Coup, p. 28. 
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In this constitutional vacuum, Bainimarama appointed an interim civilian government, 
replacing the Labour-led government, with former Senator Qarase as Prime Minister.352 
The interim government also included former SVT MPs from Rabuka’s faction. While the 
appointment of  an interim government quelled tensions, it also installed as ministers 
several nationalist chiefs who had orchestrated the putsch. Legal prosecutions would later 
reveal the significance of  these associations. Speight’s ultimate goal was not to govern Fiji, 
but rather to prevent a non-chiefly-backed party from doing so. In this sense, the putsch 
viewed as a success. 
 
The events surrounding the 2000 putsch not only displayed, but also exacerbated, 
factionalism among chiefs, which had burn to emerge in the early 1990s. These factions 
emerged across both eastern and western tribal confederacies, but also within each 
confederacy. Speight framed his putsch as a rising of  his eastern Kubuna confederacy 
against the western Tovata confederacy. In doing this, he targeted Mara personally, 
demanding his resignation from the Presidency. As well as installing a Labour-led 
government, Mara was accused of  using his political dominance to extend his family’s 
control of  the paramount chiefly titles.353  
 
The intra-confederacy conflict between chiefs was over how to react to Speight’s putsch, 
and how much public support they should lend it. Many chiefs had historical and family 
ties crossing confederacies and this, combined with sub-confederate tribal units, 
complicated traditional alliances. The third confederacy, Burebasaga, had become closely 
involved with the putsch, but its highest chiefs were also closely aligned with Mara, whose 
wife held its highest chiefly title. Intra-confederacy loyalties were in tatters as a proliferation 
of  national political factions though the 1990s and the events of  the 2000 putsch 
undermined traditional chiefly alliances. A month after the putsch an army spokesman 
reflected on the rifts that had appeared, saying they “are riddled with personal agendas” 
and that the chiefs were incapable of  impartial and decisive action.354 This was undoubtedly 
a product of  the new political conditions created after the 1987 coup.  
 
                                                
352 Although Qarase was not a high chief, he had previously held an influential position in the Fijian economy, 
as the Managing Director of  the Fiji Development Bank.  
353 There are three paramount chiefly titles in Fiji. They are the highest chiefly rank within the Pacific-Fijian 
chiefly system.  
354 Lal, "'Chiefs and Thieves and Other People Besides': The Making of  George Speight's Coup," p. 282.  
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The non-renewal of  the ALTA lease agreements 
From 1997, the thirty-year ALTA lease agreements, which had been first signed as ALTO 
agreements in 1976, began to expire. This raised the politically sensitive issue of  the 
structure of  Fiji’s land-tenure system. As these lease agreements expired, some landowners 
were unwilling to extend their terms, choosing instead to cultivate the land themselves, or 
to apply to have the land re-zoned as non-agricultural, permitting it to be leased under the 
more favourable NLTA terms. Others threatened to pursue such actions, as a means to 
extract higher rents from tenants. By the end of  2009, 4521 (91%) of  the ALTA leases will 
have expired. Of  the ALTA leases, 93.7% have been held by Indo-Fijians (see Appendix 2 
for the annual expiry of  ALTA sugarcane leases held by Indo-Fijians), yet between 1997 
and 2002, only 48% of  the expired lease agreements were renewed to existing tenants.355 
Where previously renewal of  native land lease agreements, had been relatively easy to 
attain, given the right lease terms, with the expiry of  the ALTA agreements, many land 
owners simply rejected any renewal under them. This action further reflects the extent to 
which the land-tenure system has been politicised in Fiji dating back to Mara’s decision to 
formalise the ALTO in 1976.  
  
The NLTB, which campaigned against the formalisation of  the ALTA in 1976, led a 
campaign against the renewal of  the ALTA lease agreements from 1997, seeking the 
extension of  NLTA to cover agricultural leases.356 A 1997 NLTB survey suggested that 
many native land owners either wanted to reclaim their lands or alter leasing terms and 
rents rates. The NLTB argued that the valuation system of  Unimproved Capital Value 
(UCV) was severely undervaluing land and that 6% was too low a percentage of  UCV to 
pay for a lease rent.357 As NLTB General Manager from 1998 to 2002 Qarikau personally 
campaigned against native land owners extending the ALTA leases by rallying at provincial 
councils and through his networks in the Methodist Church.358  
 
Where the NLTB’s actions may have seemed counterintuitive, given they eroded land 
owners’ rental revenue earnings,359 they served a deeper purpose. Although landowners lost 
                                                
355 Biman C. Prasad and Paresh Kumar Narayan, "Fiji Sugar Corporation's Profitability and Sugar Cane 
Production: An Econometric Investigation, 1972-2000," in USPEC Working Paper (Suva: USPEC, 
Department of  Economics, University of  the South Pacific, 2003), p. 14. 
356 Maika Qarikau, ‘The General Manager’s Report’, Native Land Trust Board, "Native Land Trust Board 
Annual Report 1999," p. 7. 
357 Laisenia Qarase whilst Prime Minister (2001-2006) also argued the ALTA terms are unfair to landowners. 
358 Lal, "'Chiefs and Thieves and Other People Besides': The Making of  George Speight's Coup," p. 287. 
359 The NLTB has cited the expiry of  ALTA lease as having a significant impact on its rental incomes. ‘The 
 111 
revenue by allowing expiring ALTA lease agreements to go unrenewed, this non-renewal 
strategy altered and continues to alter, the demographic composition of  rural Fiji. All Indo-
Fijian ALTA lease agreements serve a dual purpose, because the agricultural leases also 
provide their tenants with residences. Tenants whose ALTA leases are not extended 
therefore face eviction from the land they have resided on for at least thirty years, and 
which families have often held for generations. Being unable to attain leases in rural areas 
evicted tenants are forced to urban areas, particularly the slums in Fiji’s main urban centres. 
Rabuka has played an important role in the ALTA debate as chair of  the Council of  Chiefs. 
His assertion on the matter is indicative of  the chiefs’ strategy behind the non-renewal 
policy: 
 
“In the next five to ten years there will be significant change. The 
majority of  the leases will expire and return to the Fijian communities. 
And then there may be a decline in the value of  land. It may not be as 
attractive as when it was openly available, which the Fijians will have to 
adapt themselves to, and look at ways and means to get the maximum 
value out of  their land…My other hope is that the Indians will migrate. 
We tighten the controls, then Fiji is no longer attractive to the Indian 
settler as it has been over the last 120 years. Maybe they will slow down 
their immigration rate, thereby having a natural decline in their numbers, 
to a level about would be manageable [sic].”360 
 
Consistent with conservative chiefly sentiment, interim Prime Minister Qarase used 
populist claims to support the NLTB’s strategy for the non-renewal of  ALTA leases. 
Qarase argued at the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group in 2000, that the ALTA 
system was unfair to land owners because sugar farmers were not passing on the high 
profits apparently being made through the Sugar Protocol subsidy.361 Overall, the deliberate 
non-renewal policy of  many chiefs, combined with the NLTB's efforts, and the SVT- and 
SDL-led government’s campaign for non-renewal of  ALTA leases, has served to accelerate 
Indo-Fijian emigration from Fiji, which had begun after the 1987 coup. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
General Manager’s Report,  Native Land Trust Board, "Native Land Trust Board Annual Report 2003," p. 
4.  
360 Sharpham, Rabuka of  Fiji: The Authorised Biography of  Major-General Sitiveni Rabuka, p. 316. 
361 Lal, Lim-Applegate, and Reddy, "Alta or Nlta: What's in a Name? Land Tenure Dilemma and the Fiji Sugar 
Industry," p. 15. 
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The aftermath of  the putsch 
 
The events of  May 2000 demonstrated that the electoral changes of  the 1997 Constitution 
had not altered the chiefs’ position parallel to constitutional order. This authoritarian 
structure is entrenched in the constitution and permeates all facets of  Fijian life. The 
events of  1987 and 2000 demonstrate that in Fiji, the maintenance of  government and 
electoral institutions is contingent on the support of  the chiefs. Even when internally 
divided, this authoritarian elite possessed the necessary political, institutional, social and 
material capacities to usurp elected government. 
 
Although the 1997 Constitution lessened the electoral advantages granted to rural Pacific-
Fijian electorates, it failed to bring democratic decision-making to the institutions of  power. 
The authoritarian structures undergirding Fiji’s political economy continued to give the 
chiefly elite direct influence over Fiji’s highest political institutions. These powers, on top 
of  the social control that chiefs exerted over commoners and their economic privileges, 
negated the concessions of  ethnically and geographic proportionate seat distribution in the 
1997 Constitution.  
 
On 1 March 2001, the Court of  Appeal ruled the 2000 putsch unconstitutional and 
restored the 1997 Constitution as the supreme law of  Fiji.362 Soon after the court’s 
decision, interim Prime Minister Qarase announced that Fiji would return to democratic 
rule under the electoral laws of  the 1997 Constitution.363  
 
National elections were then held between 27 August and 1 September 2001. Two new 
Pacific-Fijian political parties, the SDL led by Qarase, and the Matanitu Vanua Party, were 
launched before the election. Both represented political elites supportive of  Speight’s 
putsch. Each sought to replace Rabuka’s SVT Party as the dominant Pacific-Fijian party, 
and campaigned on an explicitly nationalist platform. In the post-putsch political 
environment, the SDL won a plurality of  the vote, with 32 seats. The Labour Party was the 
second largest parliamentary party with 28 seats. The Conservative Alliance-Matanitu 
                                                
362 Ghai and Cottrel, "A Tale of  Three Constitutions: Ethnicity and Politics in Fiji," p. 665.;  George Williams, 
"The Case That Stopped a Coup? The Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in Fiji," Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 73, no. 1 (2001): p. 2. 
363 These events, centering upon the decision of  the Court of  Appeal, were an important landmark in the 
history of  Fijian public law. It was the first time that the leaders of  a coup voluntarily submitted to the 
jurisdiction of  a court and came only months after a takeover. It is also the first time that a court decision 
restored a Constitution, and the electoral system created by it.  
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Vanua Party (CAMV) won six seats. Minor parties won the remaining seats, see Table 9. 
Importantly the most conservative Pacific-Fijian party, the SDL, housing many key 
supporters and protagonists of  the putsch, won out as the protector of  Pacific-Fijian 
interests against the more moderate SVT and Fijian Association Party, which failed to win 
any seats. Together the SDL, CAMV and the New Labour Unity Party formed a coalition 
government.  
Table 9: Fiji 2001 general election results 
 
Party Pacific-Fijian 
Communal 
Seats 
Indo-Fijian 
Communal 
Seats 
Council 
of  
Rotuma 
Other 
Seats 
General 
Seats 
Total 
SDL 18 - - 1 13 32 
Fiji Labour Party - 19 - - 9 28 
CAMV 5 - - - 1 6 
New Labour Unity 
Party - - - 1 1 2 
United General Party - -  1 - 1 
Independents - - 1 - 1 2 
       
Total 23 19 1 3 25 71 
Source: Brij V. Lal, Islands of  Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press 2006) 
 
The SDL-led government, under Qarase, sought to consolidate its electoral base by 
rewarding the chiefly protagonists and supporters of  the 2000 putsch. Notably, Seniloli, 
who had less than a year earlier sworn himself  in as President during the putsch, was 
appointed Vice-President, even though he had been convicted for commissioning this 
unlawful oath.364 Despite this conviction he retained his title as Vice-President and full pay 
while in prison, and served only four months of  his four-year sentence, after being released 
early by Qarase’s government.365 Others such as Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, a key player in 
both the 1987 and 2000 overthrows,366 became High Commissioner to Papua New Guinea. 
Qarase also appointed Ratu Josefa Dimuri and Ratu Inoke Takiveikata, two high-ranking 
chiefs who supported the putsch, to the Senate.367 The actions of  Qarase demonstrated his 
support for the nationalist chiefs. In addition to this, five members of  Qarase’s interim 
                                                
364 Seniloli was Vie-President between March 2001 and November 2004. He was convicted of  administering 
an unlawful oath and sentenced to four years in prison. Bhim, "The Impact of  the Reconciliation, Tolerance 
and Unity Bill on the 2006 Election," pp. 118-19. 
365 Lal, "Heartbreak Islands: Reflections on Fiji in Transition," p. 338. 
366 Field, Baba, and Nabobo-Baba, Speight of  Violence: Inside Fiji's 2000 Coup, p. 274. 
367 Other notable appointments of  Qarase’s government with close association to the putsch include: Isikia 
Savua, Police Commissioner at the time of  the 2000 coup, and allegedly involved in it, was appointed as Fiji’s 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Adi Samanunu Talakuli, a known Speight supporter was 
appointed Fiji’s High Commissioner to Malaysia. Lal, Islands of  Turmoil: Elections and Politics in Fiji, p. 237. 
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government, and then the following SDL-led government, were also subsequently 
convicted for assisting with the putsch.368    
 
After a drawn-out process, the Director of  Public Prosecutions announced in late 2004 
that sufficient evidence had been compiled to launch prosecutions against those involved in 
the 2000 putsch. While several of  the protagonists had been arrested following the release 
of  the hostages, many chiefs who played key roles in the events remained free. The 2004 
prosecutions produced a long list of  convictions.369 Notable putschists convicted included: 
the putsch’s leader, George Speight370 and the head of  the CRWU, Colonel Ilisoni Ligari.371 
A number of  prominent high chiefs, who were members of  Rabuka’s SVT-led 
governments and Qarase’s interim and elected governments, were also convicted. These 
included: paramount chief372 of  Cakodrove and the Tovata confederacies and former SVT 
MP and minister in the SDL-led government, Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu;373 paramount 
chief  of  Naitasiri, minister in Qarase’s interim government, a senator and minister and in 
his SDL-led government, Ratu Inoke Takiveikata;374 former Fijian Association Party MP 
and minister in Qarase’s interim government Ratu Timoci Silatolu;375 Senator and minister 
in the SDL-led government, Ratu Josefa Dimuri;376 and CAMV MP, Deputy Speaker of  the 
House of  Representatives in Qarase’s government, Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure.377 At the 
trials’ conclusions, the state prosecutor made specific mention of  the role played in the 
putsch by former SVT finance minister Berenado Vunibobo and NLTB General Manager 
Qarikau, though, both escaped conviction.   
 
These convictions openly demonstrate the close connection between Fiji’s highest chiefs 
and the putsch, and that Qarase’s appointment as interim Prime Minister and his 
subsequent cabinet appointments merely replaced an elected government with those who 
deposed it.  
 
                                                
368 Bhim, "The Impact of  the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill on the 2006 Election," p. 118-19. 
369 A total of  62 mutiny charges were laid and 24 treason charges against those accused of  involvement in the 
putsch.  
370  Convicted of  treason and sentenced to life in prison  
Bhim, "The Impact of  the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill on the 2006 Election," p. 118-19. 
371 Convicted of  wrongful confinement and sentenced to two years in prison. Ibid. 
372 Two (of  the three) paramount chiefs were convicted of  direct involvement with the putsch.  
373 Convicted of  unlawful assembly and sentenced to eight months in prison Bhim, "The Impact of  the 
Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill on the 2006 Election," p. 118-19. 
374 Convicted of  inciting mutiny and sentenced to life in prison Ibid. 
375 Convicted of  treason an sentenced to life in prison Ibid. 
376 Convicted of  unlawful assembly and sentenced to eight months in prison Ibid. 
377 Convicted of  administering an unlawful oath and sentenced to six years in prison Ibid. 
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The convictions of  the putschists did not eventuate until 2004, well after the return to 
electoral processes in 2001. After the putsch, Qarase’s control of  government as interim 
Prime Minister provided his newly formed SDL with a sense of  political incumbency, 
which then translated to victory at the 2001 general election. In 2001, although electoral 
processes determined the composition of  the lower house, Qarase’s victory meant they 
merely legitimised the nationalist chiefs, many of  whom were convicted in direct 
association with the 2000 putsch.  
 
The events of  the putsch itself  and the political manoeuvring underlying the appointment 
of  the 2000-2001 interim government, demonstrates the institutional structures underlying 
Fiji’s political economy. Nationalist chiefs undertook the 2000 putsch to oust the Labour-
led government and replace it with a government that it controlled. The convictions of  key 
protagonists of  the putsch further demonstrated the clear connection between with the 
highest chiefs and the overthrow.378 The chiefs’ actions were made possible by their 
position within the constitution and in prominent Pacific-Fijian political parties, and their 
material advantages over the rest of  Fijian society. The putsch of  2000, as with the coup of  
1987, expose a chiefly authoritarian elite, that has used whatever means necessary to defend 
itself  against the electoral desires of  the people. In fear of  democratisation and the erosion 
of  its material and social controls over Fiji, this elite repeatedly used authoritarian means to 
reinstate its grip over Fiji’s political institutions. 
 
Fiji’s political institutions have never been democratic. Rather, its electoral institutions have 
provided a smokescreen behind which the authoritarian chiefly elite has manipulated 
government decision-making through the chiefly-backed Alliance, SVT and SDL parties, 
which have controlled government. When elections have resulted in the loss of  control of  
government, the elite has summoned the necessary means to overthrow legitimately elected 
governments and reinstate a government of  their design. The chiefly elite has only 
permitted electoral governance when the parties in government have supported its 
entrenched illiberal advantages.  
                                                
378 The Qarase government’s opposition to these convictions was evident in its presentation of  the 2006 
Promotion of  Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill providing amnesty to those convicted in relation to 
the 2000 putsch. Ibid., pp. 111-43. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has argued that the repeated failings of  Fiji’s democratic system have been 
caused by the presence of  an authoritarian political infrastructure, controlled by a chiefly 
elite, and maintained by Fiji’s peculiar place in the world economy. This thesis has 
comprehensively examined the structure of  this authoritarian infrastructure, the 
constitutional provisions that facilitate its operation as well its material foundations. 
  
The final section of  this thesis reflects on the important tenets of  this research. First, it 
reiterates the post-colonial reality of  Fiji’s political institutions: a democratic façade 
controlled by an authoritarian chiefly elite. Second, it evaluates the present situation, where 
a military regime controls Fiji’s government, and examines the prospects for 
democratisation after its eventual return to electoral rule. Finally, it projects the likely 
political future for Fiji, through an examination of  the structures of  its political and 
economic institutions, providing insight into the chances of  long-term democratisation in 
Fiji.  
 
This thesis initially posed four key questions to test the strength of  its hypothesis. 
Revisiting these determines the how the tenets of  the hypothesis been proven through the 
thesis. First it was posed, what institutional mechanisms have perpetuated chiefly hierarchy 
over Fijian society? Chapter Three demonstrated how the vesting of  native land in chiefly 
control, the stipulated tiered distribution of  lease rents to chiefs and the turaga’s control of  
lease rents distribution have all perpetuated chiefs over Fijian society. While Chapters Four 
and Five demonstrated how chiefs material advantages over Fijian society have translated to 
political dominance. 
 
The second question it asked concerned how Fiji’s illiberal institutions been buffered from 
economic pressure on world markets. After examining the illiberal structures of  Fiji’s land-
tenure system, this thesis has demonstrated how receipt of  the EU’s Sugar Protocol 
subsidies has permitted the maintenance of  the land-tenure system. Chapter Three 
demonstrated how the excess earnings provided by these subsidises have enabled the 
chiefly controlled NLTB to charge highly inflated lease rents, which has inhibited efficient 
production and reinforced chiefly advantage over Fijian society. 
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Finally, it was asked whether interruptions of  Fijian democracy occurred when it has been 
at its weakest, or when they threatened to impinge on core chiefly institutions. Chapters 
Four and Five of  this thesis has demonstrated how Fiji’s history since independence shows 
one key theme: when non-chiefly-backed parties won government, they have been 
overthrown. Despite the presence of  electoral institutions, authoritarian chiefly controlled 
institutions have reasserted themselves whenever their dominance was threatened. Fiji’s 
history details the maintenance of  authoritarianism as directed by high chiefs, to ensure the 
perpetuation of  their controls over Fijian society.    
 
This thesis has demonstrated the presence of  authoritarian institutions underlying Fiji’s 
polity, the source of  these institutions, the means by which they have been perpetuated, 
and how they have usurped elected government repeatedly. It has demonstrated how Fiji’s 
constitutional institutions have never been democratic, due to the control granted to the 
Council of  Chiefs over policy reform of  the land-tenure system. For the chiefly elite, this 
veto power was a safeguard and the linchpin of  its control over Fijian society. The structure 
of  the land-tenure system perpetuates chiefly authority over non-chiefs, Pacific-Fijian and 
Indo-Fijian alike. Despite the security of  the veto, chiefs have acted to overthrow 
government after every change of  government that has provided non-chiefly backed 
parties with the power to govern. This elite’s monopoly control over land has enabled it to 
charge highly inflated rents set, not by equilibrium markets rates, but by the chiefs 
themselves. These advantages have been permitted in part through Fiji’s peculiar position 
in the world economy, as a recipient of  the EU’s Sugar Protocol subsidy. 
 
Fiji’s constitutional realities and underlying political-economic structure have plagued all 
attempts to forge a successful multicultural democracy. Under each of  Fiji’s constitutions, 
institutions were structured to ensure that the chiefly elite’s dominance over Fijian society 
was maintained. These institutional provisions have provided a chiefly elite with formal 
controls and indirect means to subvert electoral outcomes when they threatened their 
authority. These coups as well as the solution to the 1977 ‘constitutional crisis’, simply 
reinstated chiefly authority after chiefs lost direct control of  government. 
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2006 Coup 
After a ‘cold-war’379 between the SDL-led government and the Head of  the RFMF, 
Commodore Voreqe Frank Bainimarama, elected government was again overthrown on 5 
December 2006. Yet, this coup was undertaken for very different reasons and by 
protagonists with greatly different motivations to the previous two overthrows. This coup 
threw out a government that was most explicit in its advocacy for Pacific-Fijian rights, at 
the expense of  others’. Since its electoral victory in 2001, the SDL-led government had 
sought to deepen institutional advantages given to Pacific-Fijians. This was best shown by 
various affirmative actions policies favouring Pacific-Fijians, and presentation of  the 
Qoliqoli Bill, which would have privatised the foreshore and seabed in Fiji into chiefly 
control. In addition, it had released key protagonists of  the 2000 military overthrow under 
the auspices of  health concerns. This served to annul their wrong-doing in the minds of  
conservative Pacific-Fijians who had actively supported the putsch. 
 
The initial actions of  Bainimarama, including his sacking of  the NLTB’s Board of  
Trustees, have indicated his awareness of  the chiefs’ material controls over Fijian society. 
Bainimarama’s actions have demonstrated his opposition to the monopoly the nationalist 
chiefs have held over political institutions, ever since he handed power to Qarase as the 
head of  the interim government in the aftermath of  the 2000 overthrow. However, this 
opposition is only to the nationalist chiefs controlling these institutions. Importantly a 
number of  high chiefs are ministers in Bainimarama’s interim government, including Ratu 
Epeli Ganilau and Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, who is now Vice-President. These chiefs portray 
themselves as ‘moderates’, and have been linked with Mara’s faction since the 1990s. Since 
the 2006 coup there has been a visible split between the moderate and nationalist chiefs. 
Bainimarama has shown no desire whatsoever to dismantle high chiefs material advantages 
over Fijian society. 
 
Due to the prolonged delays of  Bainimarama’s desired reforms, his true motivations for 
the coup are not clear, and it is difficult to determine whether he is a far-sighted statesman 
or short-sighted and self-interested one. Although Bainimarama’s desired reform of  the 
electoral system may neutralise ethnicity as a tool of  political mobilisation, unless this is 
accompanied by reforms of  the land-tenure system and chiefs’ material advantages of  
                                                
379 As described in Steven Ratuva, "The Pre-Election 'Cold War': The Role of  the Fiji Military During the 
2006 Election," in From Election to Coup: The 2006 Campaign and Its Aftermath, ed. Jon Fraenkel and Stewart 
Firth (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2007), pp. 26-45. 
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society it will not democratise Fiji’s electoral institutions.  
 
Projections 
Irrespective of  the actions of  the Bainimarama regime, the EU’s Sugar Protocol subsidy 
will cease to exist on 1 October 2009.380 In the short-term preferential payments are 
expected to continue, but at a decreased rate. There will be a, yet to be determined, time-
period providing stepped decreases in subsidy payments from the Sugar Protocol’s rate to 
world markets rates.381 The evaporation of  excess earnings provided by the Sugar Protocol 
will produce a deep transformation of  Fiji’s political-economic structure.  
 
Fiji’s land-tenure system has never known the realities of  free-market fluctuations and 
vulnerabilities. Fiji’s sugar industry and its native land owners have always had the security 
of  preferential prices, to sustain the illiberal structure of  land tenures and distribution of  
rents: first as a British colony under the CSA and then after independence under the Sugar 
Protocol. As sugar export earnings drop either the FSC will collapse, halting all lease 
payments to land owners on behalf  of  lease holders, or farmers’ earnings will drop to a 
level so low that most will be unable to continue farming sugar. Once either or these 
situations eventuate, either land-owning beneficiaries will see their rental income plummet, 
or the number of  beneficiaries from that income must decrease sharply. Alternatively, if  the 
number is not decreased, the legal state of  the land may be reformed. Transfer to a liberal 
freehold land-tenure system seems unlikely, however, as it may provide opportunities for 
non-chiefly Fijians to gain a comparative edge in Fiji’s political economy, something the 
monopoly over land and the illiberal distribution of  rents has maintained for the chiefly 
elite alone.  
 
The evaporation of  this Sugar Protocol subsidy will also lead to further change is Fiji’s 
demographic structure. As Indo-Fijian sugar leaseholders, namely those who have retained 
ALTA leases despite the non-renewal strategy of  the NLTB, become increasingly unable to 
pay native land lease payments, large proportions will likely be forced to move into Fiji’s 
urban centres, and in many cases its urban slums. There may also be an accelerated exodus 
of  Indo-Fijians as they flee Fiji altogether to join family in Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
or the United States, as explained earlier. 
                                                
380 The Council of  the European Union, "Council Decision to Denounce the Acp Sugar Protocol." 
381 A key theme of  public EU documentation on the phase out of  the Sugar Protocol displays its desire and 
perceived need to lessen the subsidy payment from a payment close to the CAP to one closer to the world 
market price. 
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The prospects for democratisation in Fiji are slim. Under all of  Fiji’s constitutions, the 
Council of  Chiefs has held effective veto power within the Senate over vital pieces of  
legislation. This demonstrates Fiji’s political status as an authoritarian system, which has 
tolerated, at times, limited power sharing with electoral institutions. Each of  Fiji’s 
Constitutions have also entrenched the economic advantages first provided to the chiefly 
elite under colonial rule. Fiji’s history with electoral institutions demonstrates that without 
structural reform of  its authoritarian institutions, it is unlikely to produce any result that 
the repetition of  authoritarian behaviour. Thus, for Fiji to become a democracy a complete 
transformation of  its socio-political economic structures and the dismantling of  chiefly 
controlled institutions are necessary. Most important to this is particularly the removal of  
the monopoly over the utilisation of  native land, and the illiberal distribution of  rental 
payments, from the control of  the chiefly elite.    
 
Given Fiji’s history of  political upheaval and the resulting lack of  structural reform, it is 
unlikely that reform of  its economic and political institutions will eventuate voluntarily. It is 
unlikely the Bainimarama regime, or any other chiefly influenced power wielder will reform 
the foundation of  their material advantages, as they are aware it will erode their political 
and social dominance of  Fijian society. As this thesis has demonstrated, it has not been 
domestic political forces that have determined the fundamental structures of  Fiji’s political 
economy. Rather, it has been its place in the world economy, determined at the outset by 
British colonial rule and maintained by EU subsidy payments. This reform, however, may 
eventuate unwillingly, irrespective of  domestic political desires. With the evaporation of  
preferential payments to sustain its highly inefficient sugar industry, external material 
pressures may cause a total reworking of  Fiji’s social and political order.  
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Appendix 1: Raw sugar produced per sugar industry employee, selected developing 
countries 
 
 Direct Employment 
(growers and factory) 
Tones of  Raw Sugar 
Produced Average 
1999-2000 
Tons of  Raw Sugar 
Per Employee 
EU Sugar 
Protocol signatory 
High Productivity 
Producers 
    
Brazil 1,100,000 19,485,000 17.7 No 
Guyana 18,000 293,072 16.3 Yes 
South Africa 130,000 2,589,667 19.9 No 
Low Productivity 
Producers 
    
Fiji 40,500 336,333 8.3 Yes 
Kenya 69,000 485,333 7.0 Periodically 
Mauritius 65,000 529,299 8.1 Yes 
Other Producers     
Malawi 17,000 200,667 11.8 Yes 
Mexico 300,000 5,069,233 16.9 No 
Source: Donald Mitchell, ‘Sugar Policies: Opportunities for Change, Development Prospects Group,’ in 
Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries, ed. M. Ataman Aksoy and John C. Beghin (Washington DC: 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2005), p. 145. 
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Appendix 2: Expiry numbers of ALTA sugarcane leases held by Indo-Fijians due to expire 
in Fiji 1997-2024 
 
Year of  expiry Indo-Fijian expiring ALTA 
sugarcane leases  
1997 27 
1998 120 
1999 158 
2000 1,133 
2001 1,494 
2002 310 
2003 435 
2004 216 
2005 228 
2006 301 
2007 415 
2008 255 
2009 204 
 Averages listed below 
2010-14 199 
2015-24 45 
Total 6,743 
Source: Mahendra Reddy and Vijay Naidu, "Land Tenure System in Fiji: The Poverty Implications of  
Expiring Leases," Development Bulletin 55 (2001), p. 34. 
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